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Thick Client

ASecurity

Use for authorized security testing of desktop thick clients including local storage, update channels, IPC, traffic, and client-side trust boundaries.

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  • Added October 17, 2026
securityrustsqltestingapidatabasesecurity

Works with

  • cli
  • api

Security analysis

A100/100

Pro scans all 3 files and shows the line behind each finding

Scanned October 17, 2026

npx -y skills add NetVar1337/agent-skill-canon --skill thick-client --agent claude-code

Installs into .claude/skills of the current project.

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SKILL.md
---
name: router-reverse-skill-router-thick-client
description: Use for authorized security testing of desktop thick clients including local storage, update channels, IPC, traffic, and client-side trust boundaries.
---

# Thick Client Security Testing

## ACTION REQUIRED (execute immediately after reading)

1. `NOW`: read `../field-journal/precedent-pentest.md`
2. `NOW`: confirm the target is a **desktop thick client** (Win/macOS/Linux GUI or service companion), not pure web
3. `NOW`: case-init; write the installer source and test accounts into scope
4. `NEXT`: tools (Burp upstream proxy, process monitoring, reverse engineering tools)
5. `ACT`: trust-boundary map → local surface → network surface → update/supply chain

## Applicable Scenarios

- C/S architecture clients, Electron/Qt/.NET WinForms/WPF
- Local config/credential storage, IPC, named pipes
- Client-side enforced-validation bypass research (authorized)
- Auto-update channels and code-signature verification

## Workflow

### 1. Build Boundaries

```text
□ Process tree, child processes, drivers/services
□ Listening ports and outbound domains
□ Local sensitive paths: %APPDATA%, Keychain, registry
```

### 2. Local Attack Surface

```text
□ Cleartext config, hardcoded keys, debug switches
□ DLL hijacking/search order (Windows)
□ Database file (SQLite) permissions and encryption
□ IPC: who can connect? Is there authentication?
```

### 3. Network Surface

```text
□ System proxy / app-custom TLS
□ Certificate pinning → combine with mobile/js methodology or Frida
□ API privilege escalation: admin endpoints hidden in the client
```

### 4. Reverse-Engineering Verification

```text
□ .NET → dotnet-reverse; native → ida/ghidra; Electron → asar + js-reverse
```

## Toolchain

| Tool | Purpose |
|------|------|
| Process Monitor / API Monitor | Behavior |
| Burp / mitmproxy | Traffic |
| dnSpy / IDA / Ghidra | Reverse engineering |
| Sysinternals | Windows surface |
| asar / nexe detection | Electron |

## References

- `references/thick-client-checklist.md`
- `../dotnet-reverse/` `../ida-reverse/` `../js-reverse/` `../api-security/`

## Routing Context

**Upstream**: MASTER R32  
**Downstream**: pure protocols `protocol-reverse`; supply-chain updates `supply-chain-security`

## Task Completion Self-Check

- [ ] Trust boundaries drawn?
- [ ] Both local + network surfaces covered?
- [ ] Checklist?

Files in this skill

  • SKILL.md2.4 KB
  • agents/openai.yaml43 B
  • references/thick-client-checklist.md320 B

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