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Kernel Security
BSecurityLinux kernel security skill for LSM, hardening, and exploit mitigations. Use when writing SELinux/AppArmor policies, seccomp-bpf filters, configuring KASLR/CET/PAC, or triaging kernel CVEs. Activates on queries about SELinux, AppArmor, seccomp, KASLR, CET, PAC, BTI, KASAN, or kernel CVE.
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- Added October 17, 2026
Security analysis
88/100- Accesses sensitive system or user directories
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[](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/netvar1337-kernel-security)---
name: kernel-security
description: Linux kernel security skill for LSM, hardening, and exploit mitigations. Use when writing SELinux/AppArmor policies, seccomp-bpf filters, configuring KASLR/CET/PAC, or triaging kernel CVEs. Activates on queries about SELinux, AppArmor, seccomp, KASLR, CET, PAC, BTI, KASAN, or kernel CVE.
---
# Kernel Security
## Purpose
Guide agents through Linux kernel security: LSM frameworks (SELinux, AppArmor), seccomp-bpf with libseccomp, KASLR and bypass mitigations, Intel CET (Shadow Stack + IBT), ARM PAC and BTI, kernel sanitizers (KASAN, KMSAN), and CVE triage for kernel vulnerabilities.
## When to Use
- Writing SELinux or AppArmor policies for confined services
- Sandboxing processes with seccomp-bpf filters
- Hardening binaries with CET, PAC, or BTI
- Enabling KASAN on kernel builds for vulnerability research
- Triaging kernel CVE impact on your distro/kernel version
- Designing container or microservice security boundaries
## Workflow
### 1. LSM framework overview
```
Application syscall
→ DAC (uid/gid, file mode)
→ LSM hook (SELinux/AppArmor/Yama/...)
→ Capability check
→ seccomp filter
→ Kernel
```
```bash
# Active LSM
cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
# common: lockdown,capability,yama,apparmor,safesetid
```
### 2. SELinux policy
```bash
# Check SELinux status
getenforce
sestatus
# Context of file/process
ls -Z /usr/sbin/nginx
ps -eZ | grep nginx
# Audit denials
ausearch -m avc -ts recent
sealert -a /var/log/audit/audit.log
```
Policy module example:
```te
# myapp.te
policy_module(myapp, 1.0.0)
type myapp_t;
type myapp_exec_t;
type myapp_log_t;
init_daemon_domain(myapp_t, myapp_exec_t)
allow myapp_t myapp_log_t:file { create write append open };
allow myapp_t self:tcp_socket { create bind listen accept };
```
```bash
checkmodule -M -m -o myapp.mod myapp.te
semodule_package -o myapp.pp -m myapp.mod
semodule -i myapp.pp
```
### 3. AppArmor profiles
```bash
# Generate complain-mode profile
aa-genprof /usr/bin/myapp
# Enforce
aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.myapp
# Check status
aa-status
```
```apparmor
# /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.myapp
#include <tunables/global>
/usr/bin/myapp {
#include <abstractions/base>
/usr/bin/myapp mr,
/var/log/myapp.log w,
/etc/myapp/config r,
network bind tcp,
deny /etc/shadow r,
}
```
### 4. seccomp-bpf with libseccomp
```c
#include <seccomp.h>
int sandbox(void) {
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS);
// Allow read/write/exit/mmap
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(read), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(write), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(exit_group), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(brk), 0);
// Return EPERM instead of kill for open
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(open), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(openat), 0);
return seccomp_load(ctx);
}
```
```bash
# Export BPF filter for audit
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = ...;
seccomp_export_bpf(ctx, fd);
# strace to find needed syscalls before tightening
strace -c ./myapp
```
### 5. KASLR
```bash
# Check KASLR enabled
cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space # 2 = full
dmesg | grep KASLR
# Kernel cmdline
grep kaslr /proc/cmdline
```
Mitigations against KASLR leaks:
- No `/proc/<pid>/maps` to untrusted
- Pointer hashing in `%pK` printk
- eBPF restricted on unprivileged
### 6. Intel CET
```bash
# Compile with CET
gcc -fcf-protection=full -o app app.c
# Verify shadow stack and IBT
readelf -n app | grep -E 'SHSTK|IBT'
readelf --notes app | grep -A2 GNU_PROPERTY
```
| Feature | Protects against |
|---------|------------------|
| SHSTK (Shadow Stack) | ROP return address overwrites |
| IBT (Indirect Branch Tracking) | CALL/JMP to non-ENDBR targets |
Requires CPU with CET (Intel Tiger Lake+; AMD Zen 3+ on CPUs with shadow-stack support) and kernel CET support.
### 7. ARM PAC and BTI
```bash
# GCC/Clang branch protection
gcc -mbranch-protection=standard -o app app.c
# PAC (pointer authentication) + BTI (branch target identification)
# Verify
readelf -n app | grep -E 'GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1'
llvm-objdump -d app | grep bti
```
PAC signs return addresses and pointers with cryptographic keys (ARMv8.3+).
BTI marks valid branch targets — invalid jumps fault.
### 8. Kernel memory tagging
```bash
# KASAN kernel build
# CONFIG_KASAN=y in kernel .config
make menuconfig # Kernel hacking → KASAN
# Boot with KASAN kernel
# Reports use-after-free, OOB with stack trace
# KMSAN (uninitialized memory)
# CONFIG_KMSAN=y — kernel equivalent of MSan
```
```bash
# KASAN report example fields
# BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ...
# Call trace: ...
```
### 9. CVE triage workflow
```bash
# Check kernel version
uname -r
# Distro security tracker
# Ubuntu: ubuntu-security-notices
# RHEL: errata
# NVD lookup
# https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-XXXX-XXXXX
# Is patch backported?
zgrep -l CVE-2024-XXXX /usr/share/doc/linux-*/changelog.Debian.gz
```
Triage checklist:
1. Affected subsystem (net, fs, drivers)?
2. Local or remote exploit?
3. Fixed in your kernel version?
4. Mitigation without patch (disable module, sysctl)?
## Common Problems
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|---------|-------|-----|
| SELinux denials | Missing allow rule | `audit2allow`; refine policy |
| AppArmor profile break | Path mismatch | Update profile paths; use globs |
| seccomp kills app | Missing syscall | `strace`; add allow rule |
| CET not active | Old CPU/kernel | Check `/proc/cpuinfo` flags |
| KASAN kernel slow | 2-5x overhead | Use only in test VMs |
| False sense of security | LSM bypass via kernel bug | Defense in depth; keep kernel updated |
## Related Skills
- `skills/virtualization/containers-internals` — container seccomp and caps
- `skills/runtimes/binary-hardening` — userspace CET, RELRO, PIE
- `skills/runtimes/sanitizers` — ASan/HWASan userspace counterparts
- `skills/observability/ebpf` — LSM BPF programs
- `skills/kernel/kernel-debugging` — analyze KASAN reports
- `skills/security/reverse-engineering` — exploit analysisAttribution
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