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AI & Agents
LLMs, agent workflows, RAG, MCP, prompting, and AI app patterns
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Showing 2,953–2,976 of 306,251 skills
- Cloud Iam PrivescEscalate privileges in cloud IAM (AWS/GCP/Azure) from a low-priv set of credentials. Load when you hold cloud creds/keys/a role and want higher privilege or new resources. Signals: leaked AWS keys, an assumed role, a service-account token, "escalate in AWS/GCP/Azure", enumerated permissions.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Cloud GcpAttack Google Cloud Platform — metadata/SA token theft, IAM privilege escalation, and storage/ function misconfig. Load when the target runs on GCP, you hold a GCP SA key/token, or see gcp/gcloud/GCE/GKE/appspot. Signals: metadata.google.internal, service-account.json, storage.googleapis.com, cloudfunctions, gcloud.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Cloud Docker RegistryFind and loot exposed container registries — image pull/push, secrets baked in layers, and registry misconfig. Load on exposed Docker registry (port 5000, /v2/), a registry URL, harbor/ECR/ GCR/ACR references, or "container registry". Signals: /v2/_catalog, registry:2, unauth pull/push.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Cloud Docker Api AbuseTurn an exposed container daemon or an over-privileged container into host compromise — a Docker API on 2375/2376, a mounted docker.sock, or a privileged/`-v /:/host` container. Load when you find an open Docker/containerd socket, port 2375/2376, a container you can run images in, or you landed inside a container and want the host. Signals: 2375/tcp open, /var/run/docker.sock reachable, `docker` group membership, privileged container, host paths mounted in.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Cloud Container EscapeBreak out of a container to the host. Load when you have a shell in a container/pod and want the node: privileged container, mounted docker.sock, dangerous capabilities, hostPath, or "escape the container". Signals: /.dockerenv, cgroup shows docker/k8s, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, mounted socket.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Automation Recon PipelineChain recon tools into a repeatable, resumable pipeline for continuous bug-bounty coverage. Load on "automate recon", "recon pipeline", monitoring many programs, or scaling subdomain→ live→scan. Signals: wildcard scope at scale, wanting scheduled/continuous discovery.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Automation Nuclei TemplatesWrite custom nuclei templates to codify a finding into a repeatable, mass-scannable check. Load on "write a nuclei template", turning a manual bug into automation, checking a CVE across many hosts, or regression-scanning. Signals: a reproducible request→match, YAML templates, nuclei.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Automation BrowserDrive a real browser against an in-scope web app with Playwright / agent-browser: automated login, form and payload submission through the UI, scraping JS-rendered pages, request/response interception, and evidence screenshots. Load on "browser automation", "fill this form", "submit payload", "screenshot this page", automated login, headless crawling, or UI-driven XSS testing. Signals: Playwright, agent-browser, headless, @e1 element refs, networkidle, DOM interaction.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Api VersioningFind and attack old/shadow API versions that missed a fix — improper inventory management. Load when the API is versioned (/v1, /v2, /api/2021-01), on "old API", or after mapping the surface. Signals: version in path/header/subdomain, deprecated docs, mobile app using an older version.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Api Testing ChecklistA fast, ordered methodology for assessing an API end to end — REST/GraphQL/gRPC/SOAP — so nothing gets skipped. Load when the target is an API (or recon found one), on "test this API", "checklist", methodology triage, or to confirm coverage before reporting. Signals: /api, swagger/openapi.json, GraphQL /graphql, gRPC, JSON/XML endpoints, a mobile/SPA backend.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Api Mongo Agg Facet BypassBypass a MongoDB aggregation-pipeline stage allowlist by nesting disallowed read stages inside $facet, then $unionWith/$lookup sibling collections to exfiltrate secrets (invite tokens, creds, hashes). Load when: an endpoint accepts a user-supplied `pipeline` (or errors like "operator-form queries not accepted, use the pipeline parameter"), a Node/Express + MongoDB backend, 24-hex `_id`s, or an "advanced query" API. Authorized targets only.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Api Mass AssignmentMass assignment / auto-binding privilege escalation. Load when an API binds JSON directly to a model (Rails, Spring, Django REST, Node/Mongoose), on signup/profile-update/create endpoints, or when responses expose fields you didn't send (role, isAdmin, balance, verified). Signals: ORM object binding, extra fields accepted silently.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Api GrpcTest gRPC / Protocol Buffers APIs — reflection, method enumeration, authz, and injection. Load on gRPC services (HTTP/2, content-type application/grpc, .proto files, ports like 50051), grpc-web, or "protobuf". Signals: grpc, protobuf, reflection service, ServerReflection.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Api GraphqlAttack GraphQL APIs. Load on /graphql, /graphiql, /v1/graphql, a POST with {"query":"..."}, Apollo/Hasura/graphene stacks, or "query/mutation" language. Signals: introspection enabled, batched queries, deeply nested fields, __schema, aliases.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Api FuzzingDiscover and fuzz API endpoints, methods, params, and versions systematically. Load when you have an API base but not its full surface, an OpenAPI/Swagger/Postman spec, or "map/fuzz the API". Signals: /api, /v1, swagger.json, GraphQL, mobile backend, undocumented routes.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Api BolaBroken Object/Function Level Authorization in REST/JSON APIs (the #1 API risk). Load on any REST API with object ids in paths/bodies (/api/v1/users/123, /orders/{id}), Bearer auth, mobile-app backends, or admin vs user function separation. Signals: predictable ids, verbs that skip re-authorization, "role" enforced only in the UI.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Ai System Prompt LeakageExtract an LLM app's system prompt / hidden developer instructions — the attack map that reveals guardrails, tool definitions, internal endpoints, and planted secrets. Load when the target is a chatbot/assistant/agent with hidden instructions, refuses with policy-sounding language, names tools or functions in errors, or does RAG. Signals: "repeat your instructions", canned refusals, verbose tool-call errors, "you are a helpful assistant for <company>".Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Ai Supply ChainAttack the ML/LLM supply chain — poisoned models, datasets, plugins, and unsafe model deserialization. Load when an app loads third-party models/weights (HuggingFace, .pt/.pkl/.h5), installs ML deps, uses plugins/extensions, or fine-tunes on external data. Signals: torch.load, pickle model files, model hub downloads, plugin marketplace, RAG over external corpora.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Ai Sensitive Data DisclosureMake an LLM app disclose sensitive data it should never reveal: training-data memorization, secrets/PII in RAG context, cross-tenant leakage, conversation logs. Load when the target LLM has RAG/document access, is multi-tenant (per-user/per-org assistants), was fine-tuned on private data, or logs conversations. Signals: "ask your documents", per-org chatbots, upload a file and query it, admin/debug endpoints, conversation history in analytics.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Ai Rag PoisoningPoison a RAG/knowledge-base pipeline so retrieved content hijacks the model (indirect prompt injection at scale) or exfiltrates data. Load when the app does retrieval over documents/URLs/ tickets/emails the attacker can influence, "RAG", vector DB, "knowledge base", agent that reads content. Signals: upload-to-KB, "chat with your docs", crawled sources.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Ai Prompt InjectionTest LLM-backed apps for prompt injection (direct + indirect) and its consequences: data exfil, tool/function abuse, guardrail bypass. Load when the target is a chatbot/assistant/ agent, summarizes untrusted content, has tools/functions, or does RAG. Signals: "ask AI", system prompts, function-calling, "summarize this URL/file", agentic actions.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Ai Model ExtractionExtract or steal an ML/LLM model's parameters, training data, or system prompt via query access — model stealing, membership inference, training-data extraction. Load when testing an ML API/endpoint, "model extraction/inversion", data-leakage or IP-theft concerns, exposed inference endpoints. Signals: a predict/inference API, embeddings endpoint, fine-tuned model.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Ai Mcp SecurityAssess Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and agent tool integrations — tool poisoning, prompt injection via tool descriptions/results, over-broad scopes, and unauth tool exposure. Load when the target uses MCP servers, agent tool/function integrations, or connectors. Signals: mcp.json, MCP server, tool schemas, connector marketplace, agent with external tools.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21
- Ai Llm DosUnbounded-consumption / denial-of-wallet attacks on LLM apps — force runaway tokens, cost, or latency. Load when testing an LLM product's limits/billing, on "LLM DoS", cost amplification, or resource exhaustion. Signals: user-controlled prompts/max_tokens, agent loops, no rate/'cost caps'.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 21