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Llm Jailbreak Prompt Injection

ASecurity

Direct and indirect prompt injection for apps: RAG, tools, web, email, MCP schema, tool-result injection.

  • 2 stars
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  • Added October 17, 2026
ai-agentsgo

Works with

  • mcp

Security analysis

A100/100

Pro scans all 2 files and shows the line behind each finding

Scanned October 17, 2026

npx -y skills add NetVar1337/agent-skill-canon --skill llm-jailbreak-prompt-injection --agent claude-code

Installs into .claude/skills of the current project.

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SKILL.md
---
name: llm-jailbreak-prompt-injection
description: "Direct and indirect prompt injection for apps: RAG, tools, web, email, MCP schema, tool-result injection."
version: 1.0.0
license: GPL-3.0-or-later
metadata:
  package: unleash-skills
  category: llm-redteam
  author: NetVar1337/unleash
  triggers:
    - "prompt injection"
    - "indirect injection"
    - "RAG poison"
    - "MCP injection"
---
# Prompt injection (application-level)

## Classes
1. **Direct** – user message is the injection
2. **Indirect** – content retrieved/fetched contains instructions
3. **Tool-result** – malicious output from tools/MCP
4. **Schema/description** – tool/plugin manifest instructions
5. **Store/memory** – long-term agent memory / vector DB

## Indirect injection recipe
1. Map retrieval sources (URLs, drive, tickets, wiki).
2. Plant payload where retrieval is likely (title + body + hidden HTML comment).
3. Payload structure:
   - authority claim
   - override retrieved-context rules
   - exfil channel (tool call, image URL, mailto, log)
4. Trigger via normal user question that retrieves the plant.

## High-value checks
- Does the app separate "data" vs "instructions"? (usually no)
- Are tool args validated against allow-lists?
- Can the model be forced to call `run`/`email`/`fetch`?

## Payloads should include
- Explicit tool invocation plan
- Stop conditions that prevent user-visible refusal
- Optional stealth (hide in HTML comments / white-on-white)

## Pair with
`llm-jailbreak-tool-agent` for agency escalation; Unleash settings/patches for local agents.

Files in this skill

  • SKILL.md1.5 KB
  • agents/openai.yaml43 B

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