tespit etmeOS credential dumping techniques targeting LSASS memory, SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials using EDR telemetry, Sysmon process access monitoring, and Windows security event
Scanned 9/8/2026
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---
name: Tespit etme-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr
description: tespit etmeOS credential dumping techniques targeting LSASS memory, SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials using EDR telemetry, Sysmon process access monitoring, and Windows security event
correlation.
tags:
- threat-hunting
- lsass
- mitre-t1003
- mimikatz
- fetih
- sam-database
- credential-dumping
- cybersecurity
- edr
- ntds
- siber-güvenlik
triggers:
- alert
- anomali tespit
- certificate
- credential
- crypto
- Tespit etme
- dumping
- endpoint
- hash
- hunting
- incident
- log
category: threat-hunting
source_subdomain: threat-hunting
nist_csf:
- DE.CM-01
- DE.AE-02
- DE.AE-07
- ID.RA-05
adapted_for: fetih
---
# Detection T1003 Credential Dumping with Edr
## Ne Zaman Kullanılır
- hunting yaparken for credential theft activity in the environment
- After compromise indicators suggest attacker has elevated privileges
- EDR yaparken: alerts fire for LSASS access or suspicious process memory reads
- incident response sırasında to Belirle: scope of credential compromise
- auditing yaparken LSASS protection controls (Credential Guard, RunAsPPL)
## Ön Gereksinimler
- EDR agent Dağıtılmış with LSASS access monitoring (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)
- Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with LSASS-specific filters
- Windows Security Event ID 4656/4663 (Object Access Auditing)
- LSASS SACL auditing enabled (Windows 10+)
- Registry auditing for SAM hive access
## İş Akışı
1. **Monitor LSASS Process Access**: Track all processes opening handles to lsass.exe with suspicious access rights (PROCESS_VM_READ 0x0010, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 0x1FFFFF). Non-privileged or unusual processes accessing LSASS are strong indicators.
2. **tespit etmeCredential Dumping Tools**: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps.
3. **Monitor NTDS.dit Access**: tespit etmeVolume Shadow Copy creation (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy) followed by NTDS.dit file access, or ntdsutil.exe IFM creation.
4. **Track SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM Hive Access**: Hunt for reg.exe save commands targeting SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives.
5. **tespit etmeDCSync Activity**: Monitor for non-DC accounts requesting directory replication (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs).
6. **Correlate with Lateral Movement**: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.
7. **Assess Impact**: Belirle: which credentials were potentially compromised and initiate password resets.
## Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process |
| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM |
| T1003.003 | NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database |
| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords |
| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes |
| T1003.006 | DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller |
| Credential Guard | Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets |
| RunAsPPL | Protected Process Light for LSASS |
## Tespit Queries
### Splunk -- LSASS Access Tespit
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=10
| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)lsass\.exe$")
| where GrantedAccess IN ("0x1FFFFF", "0x1F3FFF", "0x143A", "0x1F0FFF", "0x0040", "0x1010", "0x1410")
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace
```
### Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Tespit
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)comsvcs\.dll.*MiniDump")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)ntdsutil.*\"ac i ntds\".*ifm")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)reg\s+save\s+hklm\\\\(sam|security|system)")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)vssadmin.*create\s+shadow")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage
```
### KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("LsassAccess", "CredentialDumpingActivity")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields
| sort by Timestamp desc
```
### Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping
```yaml
title: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_access
Tespit:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
GrantedAccess|contains:
- '0x1FFFFF'
- '0x1F3FFF'
- '0x143A'
- '0x0040'
filter:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
level: critical
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
```
## Common Scenarios
1. **Mimikatz sekurlsa**: Direct LSASS memory reading via `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.
2. **ProcDump LSASS**: `procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.
3. **Comsvcs.dll MiniDump**: `rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full` using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.
4. **NTDS.dit Extraction**: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.
5. **SAM Hive Export**: `reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save` followed by `reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save` for local account hash extraction.
6. **Task Manager Dump**: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to Şunu oluştur: memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.
## Output Format
```
Hunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Dumping Method: [LSASS_Access/NTDS/SAM/DCSync]
Source Process: [Tool or process used]
Target: [LSASS/NTDS.dit/SAM/SECURITY]
Access Rights: [Granted access mask]
User Context: [Account performing the dump]
ATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium]
Credentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]
```
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