Three-tier code quality defense: L1 quick scan, L2 deep audit (via bug-audit), L3 cross-validation with adversarial testing. 三级代码质量防线。
Scanned 9/9/2026
Install to Claude Code
npx -y skills add Lord1Egypt/awesome-skill-forge --skill codex-review --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
Are you the author of Codex Review?
Add the live security badge to your README — it updates automatically with every re-scan.
[](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/lord1egypt-codex-review)More formats (shields.io, HTML) on the badges page.
---
name: codex-review
version: 2.1.0
description: "Three-tier code quality defense: L1 quick scan, L2 deep audit (via bug-audit), L3 cross-validation with adversarial testing. 三级代码质量防线。"
metadata:
{ "openclaw": { "emoji": "🔍" } }
tags:
- code-review
- quality-assurance
- bug-detection
- security-audit
- cross-validation
- ai-code-review
- nodejs
- openclaw-skill
- clawhub
- devops
---
# Codex Review — Three-Tier Code Quality Defense
Unified orchestration layer: picks audit depth based on trigger phrases. bug-audit is invoked as an independent skill — never modified.
## Security & Privacy
- **Read-only by default**: This skill only reads your project files for analysis. It does NOT modify, delete, or upload your code anywhere.
- **Optional external model**: L1/L3 can use an external code-review API (OpenAI-compatible) for a second opinion. This is **opt-in** — if no API key is configured, the skill works fine with agent-only review.
- **Credentials via environment variables only**: API keys are loaded from `CODEX_REVIEW_API_KEY` env var. Never hardcoded, never logged, never stored.
- **Local-only artifacts**: Hotspot files are written to system temp directory and auto-cleaned. No network transmission of analysis results.
- **No data exfiltration**: Code snippets sent to the external API are limited to the files being reviewed. No telemetry, no analytics, no third-party data sharing beyond the configured review model.
## Prerequisites
- **External model API** (optional, for L1 Round 1 and L3): Any OpenAI-compatible endpoint.
- Set env vars: `CODEX_REVIEW_API_BASE` (default: `https://api.openai.com/v1`), `CODEX_REVIEW_API_KEY`, `CODEX_REVIEW_MODEL` (default: `gpt-4o`)
- Works without this — falls back to agent-only audit
- **bug-audit skill** (optional): Required for L2/L3. Without it, L2 uses a built-in fallback.
- **curl**: For API calls (standard on macOS/Linux)
## Trigger Mapping
| User says | Level | What it does | Est. time |
|-----------|-------|--------------|-----------|
| "review" / "quick scan" / "review下" / "检查下" | L1 | External model scan + agent deep pass | 5-10 min |
| "audit" / "deep audit" / "审计下" / "排查下" | L2 | Full bug-audit flow (or built-in fallback) | 30-60 min |
| "pre-deploy check" / "上线前检查" | L1→L2 | L1 scan → record hotspots → L2 audit → hotspot gap check | 40-70 min |
| "cross-validate" / "highest level" / "交叉验证" | L3 | Dual independent audits + compare + adversarial test | 60-90 min |
---
## Level 1: Quick Scan (core of codex-review)
### Flow
1. **Gather code** — local `read`, `git clone <url>`, server scp, user-pasted snippet, or PR diff
2. **Exclude** — node_modules/, .git/, package-lock.json, dist/, *.db, __pycache__/, vendor/
3. **Round 1** — send to external model API for automated scan (skipped if no API key)
4. **Round 2** — current agent does deep supplementary pass
5. **Merge & dedup** — output severity-graded report
6. **Write hotspot file** (for L1→L2 handoff)
### External Model API Call
```bash
curl -s "${CODEX_REVIEW_API_BASE:-https://api.openai.com/v1}/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${CODEX_REVIEW_API_KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"model": "${CODEX_REVIEW_MODEL:-gpt-4o}",
"messages": [
{"role": "system", "content": "<REVIEW_SYSTEM_PROMPT>"},
{"role": "user", "content": "<code content>"}
],
"temperature": 0.2,
"max_tokens": 6000
}'
```
**Fallback**: If API call fails or times out (120s), skip Round 1 and complete with agent-only audit.
### System Prompt (L1 External Scan)
```
You are an expert code reviewer. Find ALL bugs and security issues:
1. CRITICAL — Security vulnerabilities (XSS, injection, auth bypass), crash bugs
2. HIGH — Logic errors, race conditions, unhandled exceptions
3. MEDIUM — Missing validation, edge cases, performance issues
4. LOW — Code style, dead code, minor improvements
For each: Severity, File+line, Issue, Fix with code snippet.
Focus on real bugs, not style opinions. Output language: match the user's language.
```
### Agent Round 2 — Universal Checklist
- [ ] Cross-file logic consistency (imports, exports, shared state)
- [ ] Authentication & authorization bypass
- [ ] Race conditions (concurrent requests, DB write conflicts)
- [ ] Unhandled exceptions / missing error boundaries
- [ ] Input validation & sanitization (SQL injection, XSS, path traversal)
- [ ] Memory/resource leaks (unclosed connections, event listener buildup)
- [ ] Sensitive data exposure (keys in code, logs, error messages)
- [ ] Timezone handling (UTC vs local)
- [ ] Dependency vulnerabilities (outdated packages, known CVEs)
### Agent Round 2 — Tech-Stack Specific (auto-detect & apply)
**Node.js/Express:**
- [ ] SQLite pitfalls (DEFAULT doesn't support functions, double-quote = column name)
- [ ] Middleware ordering (auth before route handlers)
- [ ] pm2/cluster mode compatibility
**Python/Django/Flask:**
- [ ] ORM N+1 queries
- [ ] CSRF protection enabled
- [ ] Debug mode in production
**Frontend (React/Vue/vanilla):**
- [ ] innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML without sanitization
- [ ] WebView compatibility (WeChat, in-app browsers)
- [ ] Nginx sub-path / base URL issues
**Other stacks:** adapt checklist to detected technology.
### Code Volume Control
- Single API request: backend core files only (server + routes + db + config)
- Send frontend as a second batch if needed
- Very large projects (>50 files): summarize file tree first, then scan in priority order
### Hotspot File (L1→L2 handoff)
After L1, write issue summary to `${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/codex-review-hotspots.json`:
```json
{
"project": "my-project",
"timestamp": "2026-03-05T22:00:00",
"hotspots": [
{"file": "routes/admin.js", "severity": "CRITICAL", "brief": "Admin auth bypass via localhost"},
{"file": "routes/game.js", "severity": "CRITICAL", "brief": "Score submission no server validation"}
]
}
```
This file is only used internally for L1→L2 handoff. bug-audit is unaware of it.
---
## Level 2: Deep Audit
### Flow (bug-audit available)
1. Read bug-audit's SKILL.md and execute its full flow (6 Phases)
2. bug-audit itself is never modified
3. Agent strictly follows bug-audit's specification
### Flow (bug-audit NOT available — built-in fallback)
1. **Phase 1: Project Dissection** — read all source files, build dependency graph
2. **Phase 2: Build Check Matrix** — generate project-specific checklist from actual code patterns
3. **Phase 3: Exhaustive Verification** — verify every checklist item against real code
4. **Phase 4: Reproduce** — for each finding, trace the exact execution path
5. **Phase 5: Report** — output full severity-graded report
6. **Phase 6: Fix Suggestions** — provide concrete code patches
---
## Level 1→2 Cascade: Pre-Deploy Check
### Flow
1. Execute L1 quick scan
2. Write hotspot file
3. Execute L2 (bug-audit or fallback)
4. After L2, **agent does hotspot gap analysis**:
- Read hotspot file
- Check if L2 report covers each L1 hotspot
- Uncovered hotspots → targeted deep analysis, add to report
- L1 vs L2 conclusions conflict → flag for manual review
5. Output final merged report
---
## Level 3: Cross-Validation (highest level)
### Flow
```
Step 1: External model independent audit
→ Full code to external API with detailed system prompt
→ Output: Report A
Step 2: Agent independent audit (bug-audit or fallback)
→ Full bug-audit flow (or built-in fallback)
→ Output: Report B
Step 3: Cross-compare
→ Both found → 🔴 Confirmed high-risk (high confidence)
→ Only external → 🟡 Agent verifies (possible false positive)
→ Only agent → 🟡 External verifies (possible deep logic bug)
→ Contradictory → ⚠️ Deep analysis, provide judgment
Step 4: Adversarial testing
→ Ask external model to bypass discovered fixes
→ Validate fix robustness
```
### Adversarial Test Prompt
```
You are a security researcher. The following security fixes were applied to a project.
For each fix, analyze:
1. Can the fix be bypassed? How?
2. Does the fix introduce new vulnerabilities?
3. Are there edge cases the fix doesn't cover?
Be adversarial and thorough. Output language: match the user's language.
```
---
## Report Format (all levels)
```markdown
# 🔍 Code Audit Report — [Project Name]
## Audit Level: L1 / L2 / L3
## 📊 Overview
- Files scanned: X
- Issues found: X (🔴 Critical X | 🟠 High X | 🟡 Medium X | 🔵 Low X)
- [L3 only] Cross-validation: Both agreed X | External only X | Agent only X | Conflict X
## 🔴 Critical Issues
### 1. [Issue Title]
- **File**: `path/to/file.js:42-55`
- **Found by**: External model / Agent / Both
- **Description**: ...
- **Fix**:
(code snippet)
## ✅ Highlights
- [What's done well]
```
## User Options
Users can customize behavior by saying:
- "only scan backend" / "只扫后端" → skip frontend files
- "ignore LOW" / "忽略低级别" → filter out LOW severity
- "output in English/Chinese" → control report language
- "scan this PR" / "审这个PR" → fetch PR diff instead of full codebase
- "skip external model" / "不用外部模型" → agent-only audit
## Notes
1. External API timeout: 120 seconds. On failure, skip that round — agent completes independently
2. Large projects: split into batches (backend → frontend → config)
3. Long reports: split across multiple messages, adapted to current channel
4. L2/L3 bug-audit execution strictly follows its own SKILL.md — no modifications or shortcuts
5. Hotspot file is ephemeral — overwritten each L1 run, not persisted
6. All secrets/keys must come from env vars or user config — never hardcoded in this skill
Is this your skill, or is something wrong with this listing? Request removal or report an issue. Author removals are honored within 72 hours.
No comments yet. Be the first to comment!