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---
name: linux-ops
version: 3.0.0
description: >
Bounded Linux operations skill for observing, diagnosing, and executing
narrow remote changes over SSH with hard safety guardrails.
compatibility:
tools:
- exec
system_deps:
- ssh
- scp
- bash
- awk
- sed
- grep
- python3
- sshpass
- timeout
- curl
---
# Linux Ops Skill v3
This skill provides bounded Linux operations over SSH.
## Constitutional Authority
The agent constitution in `AGENTS.md` is the governing authority for this
skill. This file is subordinate operating guidance only: it may add stricter
Linux/SSH constraints, but it must never relax, replace, reinterpret, or
narrow the constitution's safety, stability, authorization, secret-handling,
trust, or scope rules.
Before every action, apply the constitution's priority order and conflict
resolution rules. A gate, autonomy level, user request, tool instruction, or
workflow in this skill cannot create authorization that the constitution does
not grant. If this skill conflicts with `AGENTS.md`, follow `AGENTS.md`, stop
when required, and report the conflict rather than improvising an exception.
The constitution's forbidden paths, confirmation requirements, and red-line
operations apply even when they are not repeated below.
Use it when you need to:
- inspect a remote Linux host
- diagnose a runtime issue
- apply a narrow, reversible fix
- run a gated workflow with verification and audit
Do not use it when you need to:
- implement app-specific repair logic
- make broad or destructive changes
- handle secrets, credentials, or policy bypass
## Safety Model
Priority order:
- Safety first
- Stability second
- Service third
Hard boundaries:
- Never expose secrets or private credential material
- Never read private key contents
- Never bypass the gate
- Never run raw shell unless explicitly approved
- Never perform L5 actions
Sensitive areas require extra caution:
- `/root/claw/`
- `/root/.openclaw/.env`
- `/root/.openclaw/credentials/`
- `/root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/linux-ops/.secrets/`
- `/root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/linux-ops/.secrets/.bak-*`
- `/root/.config/systemd/user/openclaw-gateway.service.d/override.conf`
- `/root/.config/notion/api_key`
The forbidden paths and other constitutional boundaries in `AGENTS.md` also
apply here, even when they are not repeated in this file.
If the action could leak credentials, lock out access, or touch auth, persistence, or firewall state, treat it as L4 unless proven otherwise.
## Autonomy Levels
| Level | Meaning | Default stance |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Advisory only; no remote execution | Always safe |
| L1 | Read-only patrol and observation | Run unattended by default |
| L2 | Low-risk, narrow, reversible, immediately verifiable action | May run unattended through policy and gate |
| L3 | Narrow emergency containment or obvious security fix | May run unattended only with tight blast radius |
| L4 | Major change or lockout-risk action | Requires explicit approval |
| L5 | Forbidden behavior | Never execute |
When evidence is ambiguous, rollback is unclear, or blast radius is broad, escalate to L4.
## Operating Model
Default flow:
1. Observe
2. Classify
3. Decide
4. Gate
5. Execute one primitive
6. Verify
7. Roll back or escalate if needed
Rules:
- Prefer semantic primitives over raw shell
- Keep changes minimal
- Execute one primitive per decision
- Verify real outcomes, do not assume success
- Escalate when risk, ambiguity, or rollback uncertainty is high
## Core Interfaces
Primary entry points:
- `scripts/agent_gate.py`
- `scripts/agent_gate.sh`
- `scripts/primitive_rules.json`
- `scripts/validate_decision.py`
- `scripts/validate_autonomy.py`
Observation and action primitives:
- `scripts/composite.sh`
- `scripts/sys.sh`
- `scripts/file.sh`
- `scripts/proc.sh`
- `scripts/net.sh`
- `scripts/pkg.sh`
- `scripts/service.sh`
- `scripts/lock.sh`
- `scripts/scp_transfer.sh`
Support files:
- `schemas/decision-record.schema.json`
- `schemas/audit-event.schema.json`
- `schemas/gate-result.schema.json`
- `schemas/run-summary.schema.json`
- `schemas/escalation-event.schema.json`
- `tests/agent_gate_tests.sh`
## Workflow
Before execution:
- Validate the decision record
- Validate the autonomy policy
- Run a dry-run gate check when appropriate
Execution:
- Run exactly one primitive
- Respect computed risk and autonomy limits
- Redact audit output
After execution:
- Verify the result on the real system
- Roll back if verification fails and rollback is available
- Escalate if the system state is uncertain
## Setup Notes
This repo ships safe examples only. Keep real inventory, autonomy policy, and secrets local.
`hosts.yaml` may use aliases and sample `host` / `key_path` values such as `/keys/<name>`. The runtime does not require a `/keys` mount. Use the alias directly; `common.sh` resolves the real `HOST` and `KEY_PATH` from the matching `.secrets` entry.
## Local Checks
When runtime logic changes:
- Run the gate tests
- Run the validation scripts
- Confirm the gate rejects invalid or unsafe input
Keep business-specific repair logic outside this skill.