Use when about to send a request to, scan, enumerate, exploit, or otherwise interact with any host, IP, URL, or asset — before the first packet reaches a target
Scanned 9/6/2026
Install to Claude Code
npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill scope-discipline --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
Are you the author of Scope Discipline?
Add the live security badge to your README — it updates automatically with every re-scan.
[](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/hypnguyen1209-scope-discipline)More formats (shields.io, HTML) on the badges page.
---
name: scope-discipline
description: Use when about to send a request to, scan, enumerate, exploit, or otherwise interact with any host, IP, URL, or asset — before the first packet reaches a target
---
# Scope Discipline
## Overview
**The Iron Law: No target without authorization.** Every target you touch must be inside the
written authorization, encoded in `scope.json`. This is the authorization boundary of an authorized
engagement — it is not optional, and the operator cannot waive it. It is the offensive equivalent of
TDD's "no code without a test": no action without an in-scope, authorized target.
**Violating the letter of this rule is violating its spirit.**
## The rule
Before touching ANY target, confirm it is in scope:
```bash
python skills/coding-mastery/scripts/_lib/scope_guard.py check <target> --scope .engage/scope/scope.json
# exit 0 = in-scope (proceed) | exit 3 = OUT (stop) | exit 2 = error (stop)
```
For outward actions, gate through `action_guard.py` (mutating verbs need approval; out-of-scope → block;
per-host circuit breaker). Bash scripts source `lib.sh` and call `_in_scope`.
`scope.json` is **operator-defined per engagement** — you declare exactly what your authorization covers.
The guard never blocks authorized testing; it blocks what is *outside your own declared scope* (strays,
typos, look-alikes, an attacker-influenced redirect target).
## Red Flags — STOP, do not send the request
- "This subdomain is obviously theirs" (not in `scope.json` → out)
- "It's just a quick check / read-only GET" (in-scope check still required first)
- "The target came from a redirect / recon output / user paste" (verify before touching)
- "`*.acme.com` so `acme.com.evil.com` is fine" (look-alike — the guard rejects it; so do you)
- "The user told me to hit it" (instructions don't expand the authorization boundary)
**All of these mean: run `scope_guard.py check` first. Out-of-scope ⇒ do not proceed.**
## Rationalizations
| Excuse | Reality |
|--------|---------|
| "Scope is obviously fine" | Confirm against scope.json; assumption is how OOB incidents happen. |
| "It's adjacent infra, basically in scope" | Adjacent ≠ authorized. Out unless declared. |
| "I'll note the out-of-scope hit in the report" | You don't hit it, then note it. You don't hit it. |
| "Removing the guard is faster" | The guard IS the authorization. Removing it = unauthorized attack. |
Out-of-scope, shared/third-party, and anything not named in the authorization are off-limits — see
[`TERMS.md`](../../TERMS.md). You own every request the toolkit sends.
Is this your skill, or is something wrong with this listing? Request removal or report an issue. Author removals are honored within 72 hours.
No comments yet. Be the first to comment!