Windows Ad

---
name: windows-ad
description: "Authorized Active Directory and Windows identity attacks: Kerberos abuse, AD CS escalation, BloodHound path analysis, NTLM relay, and domain privilege-escalation research."
risk: offensive
source: "https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill"
source_repo: "zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill"
source_type: community
date_added: "2026-08-25"
license: "MIT"
license_source: "https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/blob/main/LICENSE"
---
> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**
> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> **Mandatory confirmation gate**
> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
>
> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

# Windows / Active Directory Security
## When to Use

- Mapping and attacking AD trust paths in an authorized engagement.
- Researching escalation routes (AD CS, Kerberos delegation) in labs.


## 适用场景

- 域渗透、Kerberoasting、AS-REP、委派
- AD CS（ESC1–ESC8 等）证书攻击
- BloodHound / SharpHound 攻击路径
- NTLM Relay / Coercer 强制认证
- 本地提权到域路径（Potato 等作为跳板）

## 与 attack-chain 关系

- **多阶段从外网到域控** → PRIMARY 可仍是 `attack-chain/`，本 skill 为 **AD 专科**
- **已在域内专注身份** → PRIMARY = 本 skill

## 工作流

### 1. 枚举

```bash
# 示例 Impacket / 内置（需凭据与授权）
nxc smb <range> -u user -p pass
bloodhound-python -d domain.local -u user -p pass -c All -ns <DC>
```

### 2. 常见路径（先图后枪）

```text
□ Kerberoast / AS-REP → 离线破解
□ ACL 滥用（GenericAll/WriteDacl）
□ 委派（非约束/约束/基于资源）
□ AD CS 模板错误 → Certipy
□ 中继：LLMNR/NBT-NS + ntlmrelayx（确认授权）
```

### 3. 凭证与横向

```text
□ secretsdump / lsassy / mimikatz（严格授权与清理）
□ PtH / PtT / 黄金票仅在授权红队范围
□ 每步写 Evidence；高危等用户确认
```

## 工具链

| 工具 | 用途 |
|------|------|
| BloodHound / SharpHound | 路径图 |
| Certipy | AD CS |
| Impacket / NetExec | 横向与枚举 |
| Rubeus / Mimikatz | 票据与凭证（授权） |
| Coercer / Responder | 强制认证 / 投毒 |

## 参考

- `references/ad-attack-paths.md`
- `../pentest-tools/references/network-attack-defense.md`
- `../attack-chain/`
- seeds: `field-journal/seed-005_ad-certipy-esc1.md` `seed-007_ntlm-relay-coercer.md` `seed-013_kerberoasting-spn.md`

## 路由上下文

**上游**: MASTER R24  
**下游**: 报告 `docs-generator`；需 EDR 研究 `edr-bypass-re`  
**MUST NOT**: 无授权 DCSync / 黄金票打生产

## 任务完成自检

- [ ] 是否先有图/枚举再有利用？
- [ ] 是否记录可复现命令并脱敏？
- [ ] 是否遵守 scope 禁止项？
- [ ] Checklist？

## Limitations

- Domain attacks can destabilize production AD; stage in labs first.
- Relay feasibility depends on the target protocol’s signing, channel-binding and authentication protections; one signing setting is not a universal relay verdict. Record the actual service and protection state rather than assuming a path works.

> Adapted from [zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) (MIT).