T1608 Stage Capabilities

---
name: "T1608_stage-capabilities"
description: "Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting."
category: "information-gathering"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - enterprise
  - t1608
  - resource-development
  - pre
technique_id: "T1608"
tactic: "resource-development"
all_tactics:
  - resource-development
platforms:
  - PRE
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608"
tech_stack:
  - pre
cwe_ids: []
chains_with:
  - T1608.001
  - T1608.002
  - T1608.003
  - T1608.004
  - T1608.005
  - T1608.006
prerequisites: []
severity_boost:
  T1608.001: "Chain with T1608.001 for deeper attack path"
  T1608.002: "Chain with T1608.002 for deeper attack path"
  T1608.003: "Chain with T1608.003 for deeper attack path"
---

# T1608 Stage Capabilities

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed (Develop Capabilities) or obtained (Obtain Capabilities) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.

Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):

- Staging web resources necessary to conduct Drive-by Compromise when a user browses to a site.
- Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.
- Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer.
- Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols).

## Kill Chain Phase

- Resource Development (TA0042)

**Platforms:** PRE

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Stage Capabilities technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check PRE systems for indicators of Stage Capabilities
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Manual Testing

1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Stage Capabilities by examining the target platforms (PRE).

2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1608 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.

> **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates.

## Remediation Guide

### M1056 Pre-compromise

This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.

## Detection

### Detection of Stage Capabilities

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                                 | Severity | Impact               |
| --------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------- |
| Stage Capabilities technique applicable | High     | Resource Development |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID | Title                 |
| ------ | --------------------- |
| N/A    | No direct CWE mapping |

## References

- [Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020](https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/)
- [Netskope GCP Redirection](https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection)
- [Netskope Cloud Phishing](https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service)
- [ATT ScanBox](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks)
- [DigiCert Install SSL Cert](https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm)
- [Gallagher 2015](http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/)
- [Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku)
- [Dragos Heroku Watering Hole](https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/)
- [FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012](https://web.archive.org/web/20201024230407/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html)
- [Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/)
- [Proofpoint TA407 September 2019](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian)
- [Atomic Red Team - T1608](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1608)
- [MITRE ATT&CK - T1608](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608)