T1608.001 Upload Malware

---
name: "T1608.001_upload-malware"
description: "Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting."
category: "information-gathering"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - enterprise
  - t1608.001
  - resource-development
  - pre
  - sub-technique
technique_id: "T1608.001"
tactic: "resource-development"
all_tactics:
  - resource-development
platforms:
  - PRE
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001"
tech_stack:
  - pre
cwe_ids: []
chains_with:
  - T1608
  - T1608.002
  - T1608.003
  - T1608.004
  - T1608.005
  - T1608.006
prerequisites:
  - T1608
severity_boost:
  T1608: "Chain with T1608 for deeper attack path"
  T1608.002: "Chain with T1608.002 for deeper attack path"
  T1608.003: "Chain with T1608.003 for deeper attack path"
---

# T1608.001 Upload Malware

> **Sub-technique of:** T1608

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.

Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.

Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typo-squatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Resource Development (TA0042)

**Platforms:** PRE

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Upload Malware technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check PRE systems for indicators of Upload Malware
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Manual Testing

1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Upload Malware by examining the target platforms (PRE).

2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1608.001 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.

> **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates.

## Remediation Guide

### M1056 Pre-compromise

This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.

## Detection

### Detection of Upload Malware

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                             | Severity | Impact               |
| ----------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------- |
| Upload Malware technique applicable | High     | Resource Development |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID | Title                 |
| ------ | --------------------- |
| N/A    | No direct CWE mapping |

## References

- [Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 2024](https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/malicious-pypi-package-targeting-highly-specific-macos-machines/)
- [Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020](https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/)
- [Bleeping Computer Binance Smart Chain 2023](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-use-binance-smart-chain-contracts-to-store-malicious-scripts/)
- [Talos IPFS 2022](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/)
- [Guardio Etherhiding 2023](https://labs.guard.io/etherhiding-hiding-web2-malicious-code-in-web3-smart-contracts-65ea78efad16)
- [Atomic Red Team - T1608.001](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1608.001)
- [MITRE ATT&CK - T1608.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)