T1474 Supply Chain Compromise

---
name: "T1474_supply-chain-compromise"
description: "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise."
category: "input-validation"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - mobile
  - t1474
  - initial-access
  - android
  - ios
technique_id: "T1474"
tactic: "initial-access"
all_tactics:
  - initial-access
platforms:
  - Android
  - iOS
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474"
tech_stack:
  - android
  - ios
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-20
chains_with:
  - T1474.001
  - T1474.002
  - T1474.003
prerequisites: []
severity_boost:
  T1474.001: "Chain with T1474.001 for deeper attack path"
  T1474.002: "Chain with T1474.002 for deeper attack path"
  T1474.003: "Chain with T1474.003 for deeper attack path"
---

# T1474 Supply Chain Compromise

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.

Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:

- Manipulation of development tools
- Manipulation of a development environment
- Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
- Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
- Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
- Compromised/infected system images
- Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
- Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
- Shipment interdiction

While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency, specifically with the widespread usage of third-party advertising libraries.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Initial Access (TA0027)

**Platforms:** Android, iOS

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Supply Chain Compromise technique is applicable to target mobile environment
- [ ] Check Android devices for indicators of Supply Chain Compromise
- [ ] Check iOS devices for indicators of Supply Chain Compromise
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (2 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target mobile environment is susceptible to Supply Chain Compromise by examining the target platforms (Android, iOS).

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T1474 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

## Remediation Guide

### M1001 Security Updates

Security updates may contain patches for devices that were compromised at the supply chain level.

### M1013 Application Developer Guidance

Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application.

## Detection

### Detection of Supply Chain Compromise

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                                      | Severity | Impact         |
| -------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------- |
| Supply Chain Compromise technique applicable | Low      | Initial Access |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID | Title                     |
| ------ | ------------------------- |
| CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation |

## References

- [Grace-Advertisement](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2185448.2185464)
- [NowSecure-RemoteCode](https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-0.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-1.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-2.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-3.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-4.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-5.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-6.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-7.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-8.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-9.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-10.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-11.html)