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---
name: "T1027.002_software-packing"
description: "Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code."
category: "configuration"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
- mitre-attack
- enterprise
- t1027.002
- defense-evasion
- linux
- macos
- windows
- sub-technique
technique_id: "T1027.002"
tactic: "defense-evasion"
all_tactics:
- defense-evasion
platforms:
- Linux
- macOS
- Windows
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002"
tech_stack:
- linux
- macos
- windows
cwe_ids:
- CWE-693
chains_with:
- T1027
- T1027.001
- T1027.003
- T1027.004
- T1027.005
- T1027.006
- T1027.007
- T1027.008
- T1027.009
- T1027.010
- T1027.011
- T1027.012
- T1027.013
- T1027.014
- T1027.015
- T1027.016
- T1027.017
prerequisites:
- T1027
severity_boost:
T1027: "Chain with T1027 for deeper attack path"
T1027.001: "Chain with T1027.001 for deeper attack path"
T1027.003: "Chain with T1027.003 for deeper attack path"
---
# T1027.002 Software Packing
> **Sub-technique of:** T1027
## High-Level Description
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.
## Kill Chain Phase
- Defense Evasion (TA0005)
**Platforms:** Linux, macOS, Windows
## What to Check
- [ ] Identify if Software Packing technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check Linux systems for indicators of Software Packing
- [ ] Check macOS systems for indicators of Software Packing
- [ ] Check Windows systems for indicators of Software Packing
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)
## How to Test
### Atomic Red Team Tests
The following tests are from [Atomic Red Team](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) and provide actionable ways to test this technique:
### Atomic Test 1: Binary simply packed by UPX (linux)
Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting "the cake is a lie"), that was packed by UPX.
No other protection/compression were applied.
**Supported Platforms:** linux
```bash
cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin
```
### Atomic Test 2: Binary packed by UPX, with modified headers (linux)
Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting "the cake is a lie"), that was packed by UPX.
The UPX magic number (`0x55505821`, "`UPX!`") was changed to (`0x4c4f5452`, "`LOTR`"). This prevents the binary from being detected
by some methods, and especially UPX is not able to uncompress it any more.
**Supported Platforms:** linux
```bash
cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin
```
### Atomic Test 3: Binary simply packed by UPX
Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting "the cake is a lie"), that was packed by UPX.
No other protection/compression were applied.
**Supported Platforms:** macos
```bash
cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin
```
### Atomic Test 4: Binary packed by UPX, with modified headers
Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting "the cake is a lie"), that was packed by UPX.
The UPX magic number (`0x55505821`, "`UPX!`") was changed to (`0x4c4f5452`, "`LOTR`"). This prevents the binary from being detected
by some methods, and especially UPX is not able to uncompress it any more.
**Supported Platforms:** macos
```bash
cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin
```
### Manual Testing
If Atomic Red Team tests are not applicable, manually verify the technique by:
1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Software Packing by examining the target platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows).
2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1027.002 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
## Remediation Guide
### M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware
Employ heuristic-based malware detection. Ensure updated virus definitions and create custom signatures for observed malware.
## Detection
### Obfuscated Binary Unpacking Detection via Behavioral Patterns
## Risk Assessment
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
| ------------------------------------- | -------- | --------------- |
| Software Packing technique applicable | Low | Defense Evasion |
## CWE Categories
| CWE ID | Title |
| ------- | ---------------------------- |
| CWE-693 | Protection Mechanism Failure |
## References
- [Awesome Executable Packing](https://github.com/dhondta/awesome-executable-packing)
- [ESET FinFisher Jan 2018](https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf)
- [Atomic Red Team - T1027.002](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1027.002)
- [MITRE ATT&CK - T1027.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002)