Relocate [organization-defined] to [organization-defined] under the following conditions or circumstances: [organization-defined].
Scanned 9/3/2026
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---
name: "SC-48_sensor-relocation"
description: "Relocate [organization-defined] to [organization-defined] under the following conditions or circumstances: [organization-defined]."
category: "configuration"
version: "5.2.0"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
- nist
- sp800-53
- rev5
- sc-48
- sc
tech_stack:
- aws
- azure
- gcp
- linux
- windows
- network
cwe_ids:
- CWE-311
chains_with:
- AU-2
- SC-7
- SI-4
prerequisites: []
severity_boost:
AU-2: "Chain with AU-2 for comprehensive security coverage"
SC-7: "Chain with SC-7 for comprehensive security coverage"
SI-4: "Chain with SI-4 for comprehensive security coverage"
---
# SC-48 Sensor Relocation
## High-Level Description
**Family:** System and Communications Protection (SC)
**Framework:** NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
Adversaries may take various paths and use different approaches as they move laterally through an organization (including its systems) to reach their target or as they attempt to exfiltrate information from the organization. The organization often only has a limited set of monitoring and detection capabilities, and they may be focused on the critical or likely infiltration or exfiltration paths. By using communications paths that the organization typically does not monitor, the adversary can increase its chances of achieving its desired goals. By relocating its sensors or monitoring capabilities to new locations, the organization can impede the adversary’s ability to achieve its goals. The relocation of the sensors or monitoring capabilities might be done based on threat information that the organization has acquired or randomly to confuse the adversary and make its lateral transition through the system or organization more challenging.
## What to Check
- [ ] Verify SC-48 Sensor Relocation is documented in SSP
- [ ] Confirm control is operating effectively
- [ ] Review evidence of continuous monitoring for SC-48
## How to Test
### Step 1: Review Documentation
Examine the System Security Plan (SSP) and related artifacts for SC-48 implementation details. Verify the organization has documented how this control is satisfied.
### Step 2: Validate Implementation
```
# For cloud environments, use cloud-audit-mcp tools
# For on-premises, review system configurations directly
# Example: Check if account management policies exist
grep -r "account.management\|access.control" /etc/security/ 2>/dev/null
```
### Step 3: Test Operating Effectiveness
Verify the control is actively functioning, not just documented. Check logs, configurations, and operational evidence.
## Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Usage |
| --------------- | ------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ |
| cloud-audit-mcp | Check encryption and network controls | `cloud_audit_encryption` |
| nmap | Network scanning | `nmap -sV --script ssl-enum-ciphers` |
## Remediation Guide
### Control Statement
Relocate [organization-defined] to [organization-defined] under the following conditions or circumstances: [organization-defined].
### Implementation Guidance
Adversaries may take various paths and use different approaches as they move laterally through an organization (including its systems) to reach their target or as they attempt to exfiltrate information from the organization. The organization often only has a limited set of monitoring and detection capabilities, and they may be focused on the critical or likely infiltration or exfiltration paths. By using communications paths that the organization typically does not monitor, the adversary can increase its chances of achieving its desired goals. By relocating its sensors or monitoring capabilities to new locations, the organization can impede the adversary’s ability to achieve its goals. The relocation of the sensors or monitoring capabilities might be done based on threat information that the organization has acquired or randomly to confuse the adversary and make its lateral transition through the system or organization more challenging.
## Risk Assessment
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
| --------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------- |
| SC-48 Sensor Relocation not implemented | High | System and Communications Protection |
| SC-48 partially implemented | Medium | Incomplete System and Communications Protection |
## CWE Categories
| CWE ID | Title |
| ------- | ------------------------------------ |
| CWE-311 | Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data |
## References
- [NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 - SC-48](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=sc-48)
- [NIST SP 800-53A Rev 5 (Assessment Procedures)](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/a/r5/final)
- [NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Full Catalog](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final)
## Checklist
- [ ] Control documented in SSP
- [ ] Implementation evidence collected
- [ ] Operating effectiveness validated
- [ ] Continuous monitoring in place
- [ ] Related controls (AU-2, SC-7, SI-4) reviewed
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