Implement the security design principle of predicate permission in [organization-defined].
Scanned 9/3/2026
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---
name: "SA-8(15)_predicate-permission"
description: "Implement the security design principle of predicate permission in [organization-defined]."
category: "configuration"
version: "5.2.0"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
- nist
- sp800-53
- rev5
- sa-8-15
- sa
- enhancement
tech_stack:
- any
cwe_ids:
- CWE-16
chains_with:
- AC-5
prerequisites:
- SA-8
severity_boost:
AC-5: "Chain with AC-5 for comprehensive security coverage"
---
# SA-8(15) Predicate Permission
> **Enhancement of:** SA-8
## High-Level Description
**Family:** System and Services Acquisition (SA)
**Framework:** NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
The principle of predicate permission states that system designers consider requiring multiple authorized entities to provide consent before a highly critical operation or access to highly sensitive data, information, or resources is allowed to proceed. [SALTZER75](#c9495d6e-ef64-4090-8509-e58c3b9009ff) originally named predicate permission the separation of privilege. It is also equivalent to separation of duty. The division of privilege among multiple parties decreases the likelihood of abuse and provides the safeguard that no single accident, deception, or breach of trust is sufficient to enable an unrecoverable action that can lead to significantly damaging effects. The design options for such a mechanism may require simultaneous action (e.g., the firing of a nuclear weapon requires two different authorized individuals to give the correct command within a small time window) or a sequence of operations where each successive action is enabled by some prior action, but no single individual is able to enable more than one action.
## What to Check
- [ ] Verify SA-8(15) Predicate Permission is documented in SSP
- [ ] Confirm control is operating effectively
- [ ] Review evidence of continuous monitoring for SA-8(15)
- [ ] Verify enhancement builds upon base control SA-8
## How to Test
### Step 1: Review Documentation
Examine the System Security Plan (SSP) and related artifacts for SA-8(15) implementation details. Verify the organization has documented how this control is satisfied.
### Step 2: Validate Implementation
```
# For cloud environments, use cloud-audit-mcp tools
# For on-premises, review system configurations directly
# Example: Check if account management policies exist
grep -r "account.management\|access.control" /etc/security/ 2>/dev/null
```
### Step 3: Test Operating Effectiveness
Verify the control is actively functioning, not just documented. Check logs, configurations, and operational evidence.
## Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Usage |
| ------------- | --------------------------------- | ----- |
| Manual Review | Documentation and interview-based | N/A |
## Remediation Guide
### Control Statement
Implement the security design principle of predicate permission in [organization-defined].
### Implementation Guidance
The principle of predicate permission states that system designers consider requiring multiple authorized entities to provide consent before a highly critical operation or access to highly sensitive data, information, or resources is allowed to proceed. [SALTZER75](#c9495d6e-ef64-4090-8509-e58c3b9009ff) originally named predicate permission the separation of privilege. It is also equivalent to separation of duty. The division of privilege among multiple parties decreases the likelihood of abuse and provides the safeguard that no single accident, deception, or breach of trust is sufficient to enable an unrecoverable action that can lead to significantly damaging effects. The design options for such a mechanism may require simultaneous action (e.g., the firing of a nuclear weapon requires two different authorized individuals to give the correct command within a small time window) or a sequence of operations where each successive action is enabled by some prior action, but no single individual is able to enable more than one action.
## Risk Assessment
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
| --------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------ |
| SA-8(15) Predicate Permission not implemented | Medium | System and Services Acquisition |
| SA-8(15) partially implemented | Low | Incomplete System and Services Acquisition |
## CWE Categories
| CWE ID | Title |
| ------ | ------------- |
| CWE-16 | Configuration |
## References
- [NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 - SA-8(15)](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=sa-8.15)
- [NIST SP 800-53A Rev 5 (Assessment Procedures)](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/a/r5/final)
- [NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Full Catalog](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final)
## Checklist
- [ ] Control documented in SSP
- [ ] Implementation evidence collected
- [ ] Operating effectiveness validated
- [ ] Continuous monitoring in place
- [ ] Related controls (AC-5) reviewed
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