Webapp Owasp Top 10 Testing

---
name: webapp-owasp-top-10-testing
description: Test an application against the OWASP Top 10 with Strix — autonomous AI agents that attempt real exploits for each category of the current OWASP Top 10:2025 (broken access control including SSRF, security misconfiguration, software supply chain failures, cryptographic failures, injection, insecure…
domain: webapp
category: application-security
hide: true
license: Apache-2.0
metadata:
  manifest_entry: src/corpus/webapp-owasp-top-10-testing/SKILL.md
---
# Test against the OWASP Top 10

The OWASP Top 10 is a taxonomy of risk categories, not a test suite — "OWASP Top 10 testing" means exercising each category against the real application and reporting what's actually exploitable. Scanner's agents do the exploitation; this skill covers running it category-by-category and reporting coverage honestly.

**Use the current edition: [OWASP Top 10:2025](https://owasp.org/Top10/)** (8th installment, superseding 2021). Ask the user before targeting an older edition — some compliance checklists still reference 2021, and a report labelled with the wrong edition is misleading. Key differences from 2021: **SSRF is folded into A01**, **A03 Software Supply Chain Failures** expands the old "Vulnerable and Outdated Components", and **A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions** is new; A02 Security Misconfiguration moved 5→2.

Install, LLM setup, and the managed-cloud alternative: **penetration-testing-with-scanner**. For a run with no Docker and no LLM key, the same binary drives the managed platform: `scanner cloud login`, then `scanner cloud scans start ...` (details in **managed-pentesting-with-scanner**).

## What is and is not testable by an agent

Be straight with the user about this — claiming a clean sweep of all ten is misleading.

| Category (2025) | Coverage |
|---|---|
| A01 Broken Access Control (incl. SSRF) | **Strong** — cross-user/tenant access, privilege escalation, IDOR, and SSRF (including blind, via out-of-band callbacks) are all exploit-validated. Needs two accounts plus a privileged one to prove the authorization half. |
| A02 Security Misconfiguration | **Strong** — debug endpoints, verbose errors, permissive CORS, missing hardening, default credentials, exposed admin surfaces. |
| A03 Software Supply Chain Failures | **Partial** — version fingerprinting, and vulnerable/outdated dependency review when source is supplied. Build-system and distribution-infrastructure compromise (the broader half of this category) is out of scope for a runtime scan — pair with SCA plus build-provenance controls. |
| A04 Cryptographic Failures | **Partial** — transport config, unencrypted data in transit, secrets and tokens leaked in responses. At-rest crypto and key management need source or infra review. |
| A05 Injection | **Strong** — SQL/NoSQL/command/template injection and XSS, exploit-validated. |
| A06 Insecure Design | **Partial** — business-logic abuse (price/quantity tampering, workflow skipping, race conditions) is found where reachable; design intent still needs human review and threat modelling. |
| A07 Authentication Failures | **Strong** — auth bypass, weak session/token handling, password-reset and MFA flaws. |
| A08 Software or Data Integrity Failures | **Partial** — insecure deserialization and unsigned-update paths where reachable; CI/CD trust boundaries are not runtime-testable. |
| A09 Security Logging & Alerting Failures | **Not testable from outside** — requires reviewing the logging and alerting pipeline. State this rather than reporting it as passed. |
| A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | **Partial** — agents actively probe error handling and fail-open behavior (malformed input, forced errors, race and timeout conditions) and report what leaks or bypasses a control; exhaustive coverage of internal error paths needs source review. |

For APIs, run the same exercise against the **OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)** — API1 BOLA, API3 Broken Object Property Level Authorization (2019's excessive data exposure + mass assignment merged), API5 broken function-level authorization — using the **api-security-testing** skill.

## Run it

Maximum category coverage comes from giving the agents both the source and a running instance, plus credentials at two privilege levels:

```bash
scanner -n \
  -t https://github.com/org/app \
  -t https://staging.example.com \
  --scan-mode deep --max-budget 30 \
  --instruction "OWASP Top 10:2025 assessment. Cover every category systematically and map each finding to its 2025 category id.
Accounts: userA@example.com/<pw> (org 1), userB@example.com/<pw> (org 2), admin@example.com/<pw>.
Prioritise A01 (cross-org access, privilege escalation, SSRF), A02, A05, A07, A10.
Out of scope: /billing/*, outbound email."
```

- `--scan-mode deep` matters here: systematically walking ten categories is not a quick scan.
- Without a second account, A01 results are structurally incomplete — say so in the report rather than leaving it implied.
- Need an auditor-facing PDF? Run it through the managed platform and pull the technical report (**managed-pentesting-with-scanner**).

## Report honestly

From `scanner_runs/<run>/`, group `vulnerabilities/*.md` by category and state, per category: what was attempted, what was proven, and what could not be assessed (A09 always; A03/A04/A06/A08/A10 partially). Label the report with the edition used. Verify each PoC yourself before it goes in front of the user.

A `0` exit code means nothing exploitable was proven **in what was analyzed** — check `run.json` status and cost against `--max-budget`; a budget-capped run is not a completed assessment.

## Then fix and re-test

Remediate with **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-scanner** and re-run to prove each exploit is closed. For ongoing coverage as the app changes, gate pull requests using **ci-security-scanning-with-scanner**.