Webapp Hunting For Registry Persistence Mechanisms

---
name: webapp-hunting-for-registry-persistence-mechanisms
description: Hunt for registry-based persistence mechanisms including Run keys, Winlogon modifications, IFEO injection, and COM hijacking in Windows environments.
domain: webapp
category: threat-intelligence
hide: true
license: Apache-2.0
metadata:
  manifest_entry: src/corpus/webapp-hunting-for-registry-persistence-mechanisms/SKILL.md
---
# Hunting For Registry Persistence Mechanisms

## When to Use

- When proactively hunting for indicators of hunting for registry persistence mechanisms in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Key coverage blind spots:** Run vs RunOnce vs RunOnceEx vs `Winlogon\Shell`/`Userinit` vs IFEO (`Image File Execution Options\<exe>\Debugger`, `GlobalFlag`+`SilentProcessExit`) vs COM hijack (`HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{...}\InprocServer32`). Sysmon EID 13 fires only for paths in your RegistryEvent filter — default configs routinely miss IFEO and per-user `Classes`, the #1 false-negative.
- **Hive scope:** logged-off users' HKCU lives in unmounted NTUSER.DAT, so live `reg query` misses it — hunt offline hives too.
- **Fileless values:** encoded PowerShell/mshta written directly into value data leaves no EID 11 FileCreate, so chaining EID 13→EID 11 silently fails.
- **Validate:** run Atomic T1547.001 (Run key), T1546.012 (IFEO Debugger), and T1546.015 (COM hijack); confirm EID 13 `TargetObject`, `Details`, and `Image` are all populated.
- **FP tuning:** msiexec installers, GPO, and software-update agents legitimately write Run keys — baseline by signer + value path, not by key alone.

## Prerequisites

- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation

## Workflow

1. **Formulate Hypothesis**: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
3. **Execute Queries**: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
4. **Analyze Results**: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
5. **Validate Findings**: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
6. **Correlate Activity**: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.

## Key Concepts

| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys |
| T1547.004 | Winlogon Helper DLL |
| T1546.012 | IFEO Injection |
| T1546.015 | COM Hijacking |

## Tools & Systems

| Tool | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |
| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |
| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |
| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |
| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |

## Common Scenarios

1. **Scenario 1**: Malware adding HKCU Run key for user-level persistence
2. **Scenario 2**: Adversary modifying Winlogon Shell for system-level persistence
3. **Scenario 3**: IFEO debugger injection for accessibility feature backdoor
4. **Scenario 4**: COM object InprocServer32 hijack for DLL loading

## Output Format

```
Hunt ID: TH-HUNTIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1547.001
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]
```