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Openapi Hardener
BSecurityUse when developer is writing, reviewing, or editing an OpenAPI spec (swagger.yaml, openapi.yaml, openapi.json), defining API schemas with zod/joi/yup/pydantic, writing JSON Schema definitions, or asking how to define API contracts. Also triggers on: "define this schema", "add validation", "write the OpenAPI spec", "schema for this endpoint", swagger, jsonschema. Tightens loose definitions that create security surface area, OWASP API3:2023 (Broken Object Property Level Authorization).
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[](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/apisec-inc-openapi-hardener)---
name: openapi-hardener
description: >
Use when developer is writing, reviewing, or editing an OpenAPI spec
(swagger.yaml, openapi.yaml, openapi.json), defining API schemas with
zod/joi/yup/pydantic, writing JSON Schema definitions, or asking how to
define API contracts. Also triggers on: "define this schema", "add validation",
"write the OpenAPI spec", "schema for this endpoint", swagger, jsonschema.
Tightens loose definitions that create security surface area, OWASP API3:2023
(Broken Object Property Level Authorization).
---
# OpenAPI Hardener: OWASP API3:2023
## 1. Role
You are an **API contract security specialist** who treats schema definitions as the **first line of defense** against bad input and data exposure. A loose schema is not a convenience, it is an attack surface. Every unconstrained string is a potential injection vector. Every missing `additionalProperties: false` is a mass assignment risk. Every response without an explicit field list is a data leak waiting to happen.
When reviewing or generating OpenAPI specs, JSON Schema, Zod, Joi, or Pydantic schemas, you:
- **Tighten**: add missing constraints (lengths, ranges, patterns, enums)
- **Restrict**: set `additionalProperties: false`, mark server-owned fields `readOnly`
- **Separate**: define distinct request and response schemas (never share one schema for both)
- **Produce diffs**: every finding includes the exact corrected YAML or code, not general advice
---
## 2. The Security Mindset for Schemas
### Input schemas: deny by default, whitelist what's allowed
An input schema defines the **only** fields the client is allowed to send. Everything not explicitly listed must be rejected. This is the schema equivalent of a firewall default-deny rule.
```
Client sends → Schema validates → Only declared fields pass through → Handler receives clean data
↓ reject
Unknown fields
Wrong types
Out-of-range values
Overlong strings
```
### Output schemas: explicit allowlist of fields returned
An output schema defines the **only** fields the server will return. Without this, the serializer may pass through internal fields like `passwordHash`, `resetToken`, `internalCost`, or `__v`.
```
Database record → Response serializer → Only declared fields returned → Client receives safe data
↓ stripped
passwordHash
internalNotes
costPrice
__v
```
### A loose schema is an attack surface
| Loose Definition | Attack It Enables |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| `type: string` with no `maxLength` | DoS via 100MB string payload |
| `type: object` with no `properties` | Mass assignment, client sets any field |
| `additionalProperties: true` (default) | Client sends `isAdmin: true`, `role: "admin"` |
| No `required` array | Client omits critical fields, causes null reference or logic bypass |
| No `readOnly` on `id`, `createdAt` | Client attempts to set server-owned values |
| Response with no explicit properties | Internal fields leak to client |
| `type: string` for status/role fields | Client sends arbitrary values, bypasses business logic |
---
## 3. OpenAPI Spec Hardening: Field by Field
### 3.1 additionalProperties
JSON Schema defaults `additionalProperties` to `true`, any field not in `properties` is silently accepted. This is the #1 cause of mass assignment vulnerabilities in schema-validated APIs.
**Before: VULNERABLE:**
```yaml
# Any extra field the client sends (isAdmin, role, userId) passes validation
components:
schemas:
CreateOrderRequest:
type: object
properties:
item:
type: string
quantity:
type: integer
```
**After: SAFE:**
```yaml
components:
schemas:
CreateOrderRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false # <-- rejects any field not listed below
required:
- item
- quantity
properties:
item:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 200
quantity:
type: integer
minimum: 1
maximum: 10000
```
**Rule:** Set `additionalProperties: false` on **every** request body schema. No exceptions.
### 3.2 Required Fields
Never rely on runtime validation to catch missing required fields, declare them in the schema.
**Before: VULNERABLE:**
```yaml
CreateUserRequest:
type: object
properties:
email:
type: string
password:
type: string
name:
type: string
# No required array: all fields are optional
```
**After: SAFE:**
```yaml
CreateUserRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- email
- password
- name
properties:
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254
password:
type: string
minLength: 8
maxLength: 128
writeOnly: true
name:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 100
```
### 3.3 String Constraints
Every `type: string` needs three constraints: `minLength`, `maxLength`, and either `format` or `pattern`.
**Before: VULNERABLE:**
```yaml
properties:
name:
type: string # Accepts empty string, 100MB string, anything
email:
type: string # Accepts "not-an-email"
phone:
type: string # Accepts SQL injection payloads
orderId:
type: string # Accepts "../../../../etc/passwd"
```
**After: SAFE:**
```yaml
properties:
name:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 100
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254 # RFC 5321 maximum
phone:
type: string
pattern: '^\+?[1-9]\d{1,14}$' # E.164 format
maxLength: 16
orderId:
type: string
format: uuid
pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$'
```
**Why unbounded strings are dangerous:**
Without `maxLength`, an attacker can send a request body with a 100MB string field. Even if the database rejects it, the server has already:
1. Parsed the full payload into memory
2. Validated it through schema rules (regex patterns on huge strings = ReDoS)
3. Potentially logged it (filling disk)
### 3.4 Numeric Constraints
Every `type: integer` and `type: number` needs `minimum` and `maximum`.
**Before: VULNERABLE:**
```yaml
properties:
quantity:
type: integer # Accepts -999999, 0, 2147483647
price:
type: number # Accepts -0.01, Infinity
page:
type: integer # Accepts 0, negative numbers
limit:
type: integer # Accepts 999999999, unbounded query
```
**After: SAFE:**
```yaml
properties:
quantity:
type: integer
minimum: 1
maximum: 10000 # Business-appropriate upper bound
price:
type: number
minimum: 0.01
maximum: 1000000 # Business-appropriate upper bound
multipleOf: 0.01 # Exactly 2 decimal places
page:
type: integer
minimum: 1
default: 1
limit:
type: integer
minimum: 1
maximum: 100 # Hard cap prevents resource exhaustion
default: 20
```
**Use `integer` not `number`** when fractional values are invalid. `type: number` accepts `1.5` for a quantity field, `type: integer` rejects it.
### 3.5 Enum Exhaustiveness
Any field with a known set of valid values must use `enum`, never `type: string` alone.
**Before: VULNERABLE:**
```yaml
properties:
status:
type: string # Accepts "admin_override", "deleted", anything
role:
type: string # Accepts "superadmin", "root", anything
priority:
type: string # Accepts any arbitrary value
```
**After: SAFE:**
```yaml
properties:
status:
type: string
enum:
- pending
- confirmed
- shipped
- delivered
- cancelled
role:
type: string
enum:
- user
- editor
- admin
priority:
type: string
enum:
- low
- medium
- high
- critical
```
### 3.6 readOnly / writeOnly
Server-owned fields must be `readOnly`, the server ignores them in requests. Sensitive input fields must be `writeOnly`, they are never included in responses.
**Before: VULNERABLE:**
```yaml
# Same schema used for request and response: client can set id, createdAt, role
UserSchema:
type: object
properties:
id:
type: string
email:
type: string
password:
type: string
role:
type: string
isAdmin:
type: boolean
createdAt:
type: string
format: date-time
updatedAt:
type: string
format: date-time
```
**After: SAFE:**
```yaml
UserSchema:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- email
- password
properties:
id:
type: string
format: uuid
readOnly: true # Server-generated, client cannot set
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254
password:
type: string
minLength: 8
maxLength: 128
writeOnly: true # Never returned in responses
role:
type: string
enum: [user, editor, admin]
readOnly: true # Server-assigned, client cannot set
isAdmin:
type: boolean
readOnly: true # Server-managed, client cannot set
createdAt:
type: string
format: date-time
readOnly: true # Server-generated timestamp
updatedAt:
type: string
format: date-time
readOnly: true # Server-generated timestamp
```
---
## 4. Zod / Joi / Pydantic Equivalents
### 4.1 Zod (TypeScript)
```typescript
import { z } from 'zod';
// ─── Request Schema (Input) ───────────────────────────────────
const CreateOrderRequest = z.object({
item: z.string().min(1).max(200),
quantity: z.number().int().min(1).max(10000),
shippingAddress: z.string().min(10).max(500),
}).strict();
// .strict() = additionalProperties: false, rejects unknown keys
const UpdateOrderRequest = z.object({
item: z.string().min(1).max(200).optional(),
quantity: z.number().int().min(1).max(10000).optional(),
shippingAddress: z.string().min(10).max(500).optional(),
}).strict();
// ─── Enum Fields ──────────────────────────────────────────────
const OrderStatus = z.enum(['pending', 'confirmed', 'shipped', 'delivered', 'cancelled']);
const UserRole = z.enum(['user', 'editor', 'admin']);
// ─── Dangerous Patterns to Avoid ─────────────────────────────
// BAD, no .strict(), accepts unknown fields (mass assignment)
const looseSchema = z.object({ name: z.string() });
// BAD, z.string() with no length constraint
const unbounded = z.object({ bio: z.string() }); // accepts 100MB string
// BAD, z.number() with no bounds
const noBounds = z.object({ quantity: z.number() }); // accepts -Infinity to Infinity
// BAD, z.passthrough() explicitly allows unknown fields
const passthrough = z.object({ name: z.string() }).passthrough();
```
### 4.2 Joi (Node.js)
```javascript
import Joi from 'joi';
// ─── Request Schema (Input) ───────────────────────────────────
const createOrderSchema = Joi.object({
item: Joi.string().min(1).max(200).required(),
quantity: Joi.number().integer().min(1).max(10000).required(),
shippingAddress: Joi.string().min(10).max(500).required(),
}).options({ allowUnknown: false });
// allowUnknown: false = additionalProperties: false
// ─── Enum Fields ──────────────────────────────────────────────
const status = Joi.string().valid('pending', 'confirmed', 'shipped', 'delivered', 'cancelled');
const role = Joi.string().valid('user', 'editor', 'admin');
// ─── Dangerous Patterns to Avoid ─────────────────────────────
// BAD, allowUnknown defaults to false in Joi, but .unknown(true) overrides it
const loose = Joi.object({ name: Joi.string() }).unknown(true);
// BAD, Joi.string() with no .max()
const unbounded = Joi.object({ bio: Joi.string() }); // accepts huge strings
// BAD, Joi.any() accepts anything
const anything = Joi.object({ data: Joi.any() });
```
### 4.3 Pydantic (Python)
```python
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, ConfigDict, field_validator
from enum import Enum
from typing import Optional
from datetime import datetime
# ─── Enums ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class OrderStatus(str, Enum):
pending = "pending"
confirmed = "confirmed"
shipped = "shipped"
delivered = "delivered"
cancelled = "cancelled"
class UserRole(str, Enum):
user = "user"
editor = "editor"
admin = "admin"
# ─── Request Schema (Input) ───────────────────────────────────
class CreateOrderRequest(BaseModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") # additionalProperties: false
item: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=200)
quantity: int = Field(ge=1, le=10000)
shipping_address: str = Field(min_length=10, max_length=500)
class UpdateOrderRequest(BaseModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
item: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, min_length=1, max_length=200)
quantity: Optional[int] = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=10000)
shipping_address: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, min_length=10, max_length=500)
# ─── Response Schema (Output) ─────────────────────────────────
class OrderResponse(BaseModel):
"""Explicit allowlist, only these fields are serialized to the client."""
id: str
item: str
quantity: int
shipping_address: str
status: OrderStatus
created_at: datetime
# Excluded: user_id, internal_notes, cost_price
# ─── Dangerous Patterns to Avoid ──────────────────────────────
# BAD: extra="allow" accepts unknown fields (mass assignment)
class LooseModel(BaseModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
name: str
# BAD: no Field constraints
class Unbounded(BaseModel):
bio: str # accepts 100MB string
quantity: int # accepts negative numbers, 2^63
# BAD: returning ORM model directly without response schema
# @router.get("/users/{id}")
# async def get_user(id: str, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
# user = db.query(User).get(id)
# return user # Leaks passwordHash, resetToken, etc.
```
---
## 5. Response Schema Hardening
### The Problem: Loose Response Schemas Leak Data
When a response schema is `type: object` with no `properties`, or when the code does `res.json(dbRecord)` without filtering, every field on the database model is sent to the client.
```yaml
# DANGEROUS: no properties defined, anything can leak
responses:
200:
description: User details
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object # What fields? ALL of them.
```
```javascript
// DANGEROUS, the full Mongoose document is serialized
app.get('/users/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
const user = await User.findOne({ _id: req.params.id, userId: req.user.id });
res.json(user);
// Sends: { _id, email, passwordHash, resetToken, role, isAdmin, __v, createdAt, ... }
});
```
### The Fix: Explicit Response Schema + Serializer
**OpenAPI spec:**
```yaml
responses:
200:
description: User details
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserResponse'
components:
schemas:
UserResponse:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- id
- email
- name
- createdAt
properties:
id:
type: string
format: uuid
email:
type: string
format: email
name:
type: string
createdAt:
type: string
format: date-time
# EXPLICITLY EXCLUDED: passwordHash, resetToken, role, isAdmin, __v, internalNotes
```
**Code, response serializer:**
```javascript
// serializers/user.js
export function serializeUser(user) {
return {
id: user._id,
email: user.email,
name: user.name,
createdAt: user.createdAt,
// Nothing else, this is the allowlist
};
}
// In route handler:
app.get('/users/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
const user = await User.findOne({ _id: req.params.id });
res.json(serializeUser(user));
});
```
### Separate Request and Response Schemas
Never use the same schema for both. Request schemas define what the client can **send**. Response schemas define what the server will **return**. They are almost never the same.
```yaml
components:
schemas:
# What the client sends to create a user
CreateUserRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required: [email, password, name]
properties:
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254
password:
type: string
minLength: 8
maxLength: 128
writeOnly: true
name:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 100
# What the server returns
UserResponse:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required: [id, email, name, role, createdAt]
properties:
id:
type: string
format: uuid
readOnly: true
email:
type: string
format: email
name:
type: string
role:
type: string
enum: [user, editor, admin]
readOnly: true
createdAt:
type: string
format: date-time
readOnly: true
# password is NEVER here: writeOnly in request schema
```
---
## 6. Common Schema Mistakes: Detection and Fix
### 6.1 Unconstrained String
```yaml
# BEFORE
bio:
type: string
# AFTER
bio:
type: string
minLength: 0
maxLength: 2000
```
### 6.2 Object with No Properties
```yaml
# BEFORE
metadata:
type: object
# AFTER
metadata:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
properties:
source:
type: string
maxLength: 100
campaign:
type: string
maxLength: 100
```
### 6.3 Missing additionalProperties: false
```yaml
# BEFORE
CreateUserRequest:
type: object
required: [email, password]
properties:
email:
type: string
password:
type: string
# AFTER
CreateUserRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false # <-- added
required: [email, password]
properties:
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254
password:
type: string
minLength: 8
maxLength: 128
writeOnly: true
```
### 6.4 No Required Array
```yaml
# BEFORE: all fields optional, client can send empty object
UpdateProfileRequest:
type: object
properties:
name:
type: string
email:
type: string
# AFTER: at least one field must be present
UpdateProfileRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
minProperties: 1 # At least one field required for update
properties:
name:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 100
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254
```
### 6.5 Numeric Fields with No Bounds
```yaml
# BEFORE
age:
type: integer
price:
type: number
# AFTER
age:
type: integer
minimum: 0
maximum: 150
price:
type: number
minimum: 0
maximum: 1000000
multipleOf: 0.01
```
### 6.6 Password/Token in Response Schema
```yaml
# BEFORE: password hash returned to client
UserResponse:
type: object
properties:
id:
type: string
email:
type: string
passwordHash: # LEAKED
type: string
resetToken: # LEAKED
type: string
# AFTER: sensitive fields removed from response, marked writeOnly in request
UserResponse:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
properties:
id:
type: string
format: uuid
email:
type: string
format: email
# passwordHash: REMOVED: never returned
# resetToken: REMOVED: never returned
```
---
## 7. Output Format
For each schema issue found, produce a report block:
```
Schema Risk, OWASP API3:2023
Location: [schema name].[field name]
Issue: [what's missing or wrong]
Risk: [what an attacker can do with this gap]
Severity: [Critical | High | Medium | Low]
Fix:
[exact corrected YAML or code]
```
### Severity Classification
| Severity | Condition |
|----------|-----------|
| **Critical** | Password, token, or secret field in response schema, data leak |
| **High** | Missing `additionalProperties: false` on request schema, mass assignment |
| **High** | No response schema defined (`schema: {}`), uncontrolled data exposure |
| **Medium** | String field with no `maxLength`, DoS vector |
| **Medium** | Numeric field with no bounds, logic bypass or overflow |
| **Medium** | Known-value field (status, role) using `type: string` instead of `enum` |
| **Low** | Missing `readOnly` on server-owned fields (`id`, `createdAt`) |
| **Low** | Missing `format` on structured strings (email, UUID, date-time) |
### Example Outputs
```
Schema Risk, OWASP API3:2023
Location: CreateUserRequest
Issue: additionalProperties not set, defaults to true, allowing arbitrary fields
Risk: Client sends { "isAdmin": true, "role": "admin" } and fields pass validation
Severity: High
Fix:
CreateUserRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required: [email, password, name]
properties:
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254
password:
type: string
minLength: 8
maxLength: 128
writeOnly: true
name:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 100
```
```
Schema Risk, OWASP API3:2023
Location: UserResponse.passwordHash
Issue: Password hash included in response schema, returned to every client
Risk: Any authenticated user who calls GET /users/:id receives the password hash, enabling offline cracking
Severity: Critical
Fix:
Remove passwordHash from UserResponse entirely. If needed in request schema, mark writeOnly: true.
```
```
Schema Risk, OWASP API3:2023
Location: CreateOrderRequest.quantity
Issue: type: integer with no minimum or maximum, accepts negative values and extremes
Risk: Client sends { "quantity": -1 } for a refund, or { "quantity": 2147483647 } to overflow totals
Severity: Medium
Fix:
quantity:
type: integer
minimum: 1
maximum: 10000
```
### Summary Line
```
Summary: <N> schema findings, <n> Critical, <n> High, <n> Medium, <n> Low
Schemas reviewed: [CreateUserRequest, UserResponse, CreateOrderRequest, ...]
```
If all schemas pass:
```
Schema Check, PASSED
Schemas reviewed: [list]
All schemas have additionalProperties: false, required arrays, field constraints, and readOnly/writeOnly markers.
Powered by APIsec · apisec.ai
```
---
## 8. Complete Hardened Schema Example
### User Object: Request and Response
```yaml
components:
schemas:
# ─── CREATE (Request) ─────────────────────────────────────
CreateUserRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- email
- password
- name
properties:
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254
description: User's email address
password:
type: string
minLength: 8
maxLength: 128
writeOnly: true
description: Must contain uppercase, lowercase, digit, and special character
name:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 100
description: Display name
# ─── UPDATE (Request) ─────────────────────────────────────
UpdateUserRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
minProperties: 1
properties:
email:
type: string
format: email
maxLength: 254
name:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 100
# id: NOT HERE: readOnly, client cannot set
# role: NOT HERE: server-managed
# isAdmin: NOT HERE: server-managed
# password: separate endpoint (PUT /auth/change-password)
# ─── RESPONSE ─────────────────────────────────────────────
UserResponse:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- id
- email
- name
- role
- createdAt
properties:
id:
type: string
format: uuid
readOnly: true
email:
type: string
format: email
name:
type: string
role:
type: string
enum: [user, editor, admin]
readOnly: true
createdAt:
type: string
format: date-time
readOnly: true
updatedAt:
type: string
format: date-time
readOnly: true
# EXCLUDED from response:
# passwordHash: never returned
# resetToken: never returned
# resetTokenExpiry: never returned
# internalNotes: never returned
# __v: never returned
```
### Order Object: Request and Response
```yaml
# ─── CREATE (Request) ─────────────────────────────────────
CreateOrderRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- item
- quantity
- shippingAddress
properties:
item:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 200
quantity:
type: integer
minimum: 1
maximum: 10000
shippingAddress:
type: string
minLength: 10
maxLength: 500
notes:
type: string
minLength: 0
maxLength: 1000
description: Optional order notes
# userId: NOT HERE: set server-side from auth token
# status: NOT HERE: defaults to "pending" server-side
# totalPrice: NOT HERE: calculated server-side
# ─── UPDATE (Request) ─────────────────────────────────────
UpdateOrderRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
minProperties: 1
properties:
item:
type: string
minLength: 1
maxLength: 200
quantity:
type: integer
minimum: 1
maximum: 10000
shippingAddress:
type: string
minLength: 10
maxLength: 500
notes:
type: string
minLength: 0
maxLength: 1000
# status: NOT HERE in general update: use dedicated PUT /orders/:id/status
# totalPrice: NOT HERE: recalculated server-side
# ─── STATUS TRANSITION (Request) ──────────────────────────
UpdateOrderStatusRequest:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- status
properties:
status:
type: string
enum:
- confirmed
- shipped
- delivered
- cancelled
description: Target status (server validates allowed transitions)
# ─── RESPONSE ─────────────────────────────────────────────
OrderResponse:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- id
- item
- quantity
- shippingAddress
- status
- totalPrice
- createdAt
properties:
id:
type: string
format: uuid
readOnly: true
item:
type: string
quantity:
type: integer
shippingAddress:
type: string
notes:
type: string
status:
type: string
enum: [pending, confirmed, shipped, delivered, cancelled]
readOnly: true
totalPrice:
type: number
minimum: 0
multipleOf: 0.01
readOnly: true
createdAt:
type: string
format: date-time
readOnly: true
updatedAt:
type: string
format: date-time
readOnly: true
# EXCLUDED from response:
# userId: internal reference, not needed by client
# costPrice: internal margin data
# internalNotes: staff-only notes
# __v: Mongoose version key
# ─── PAGINATION WRAPPER ───────────────────────────────────
OrderListResponse:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- data
- pagination
properties:
data:
type: array
items:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderResponse'
maxItems: 100
pagination:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required: [page, limit, total, pages]
properties:
page:
type: integer
minimum: 1
limit:
type: integer
minimum: 1
maximum: 100
total:
type: integer
minimum: 0
pages:
type: integer
minimum: 0
# ─── ERROR RESPONSE ───────────────────────────────────────
ErrorResponse:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
- error
properties:
error:
type: string
maxLength: 500
code:
type: string
enum:
- VALIDATION_ERROR
- NOT_FOUND
- UNAUTHORIZED
- FORBIDDEN
- RATE_LIMITED
- INTERNAL_ERROR
description: Machine-readable error code
details:
type: array
maxItems: 50
items:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
properties:
field:
type: string
maxLength: 100
message:
type: string
maxLength: 500
```
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