Mining Reference

---
name: mining-reference
description: "Use when correcting a mining or petroleum misconception, looking up a grade, recovery, energy, production or cost figure, finding the sources, or needing a quick-reference picker — plus the current state of critical mineral supply and export controls and deep-sea mining's legal collision. Companion to the other resource extraction skills."
---

# Resource Extraction: What's Live, Misconceptions, Numbers, and Sources

> **Part 6 of 6** of the *Resource Extraction: Mining, Oil and Gas* reference (plugin `resource-extraction-mining-and-oil`), covering §27–§32. Sibling skills: `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves` (§0–§4), `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution` (§5–§8), `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water` (§9–§13), `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing` (§14–§18), `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety` (§19–§26). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.
>
> **Currency:** The engineering is mature. Two areas are moving fast. See §27 for critical mineral supply and export controls, and deep-sea mining's legal collision.

> **⚠️ The industry that everything else in this reference series depends on.** ⚠️ **Every
> other file assumes steel, copper, silicon, polymers and energy already exist. This one is
> about where they come from, and the answer is always: a specific place, at a specific
> grade, under specific rock, at a cost that either works or doesn't.**
>
> **Complements a manufacturing reference (what the metals become), an
> organic-chemistry/plastics reference (petroleum as feedstock), a civil engineering
> reference (earthworks and geotech), a thermodynamics reference (separation energy), and a
> maritime reference (offshore and bulk transport).**
>
> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark where public intuition and industrial reality diverge.
>
> **⚠️ Scope note: this covers principles and industrial practice. Mining, drilling and
> blasting are among the most hazardous industrial activities that exist, are heavily
> licensed everywhere, and nothing here is operational guidance.**
>
> **The three ideas that organize this document:**
> 1. **⚠️ GRADE AND TONNAGE DECIDE EVERYTHING** (§1 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`, §23 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`). **A deposit is not "ore" because
>    of what's in it — it's ore only if it can be extracted profitably, so the price
>    changes the size of the deposit.**
> 2. **⚠️ MOST OF THE ENERGY GOES INTO BREAKING ROCK** (§8 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`). **Comminution is a startling
>    share of global electricity use, and it is thermodynamically appalling — most of the
>    energy becomes heat and noise.**
> 3. **⚠️ THE LIABILITY OUTLASTS THE MINE** (§12 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`, §13 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`, §25 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`). **Tailings dams and acid
>    drainage require management for centuries after the ore runs out, and the entity that
>    profited is frequently gone.**

---

## §27. What's Live — checked August 2026

### 27.1 ⚠️ Critical minerals: the bottleneck is refining, not geology
**⚠️ §1 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`'s point demonstrated at global scale — and the most consequential development in
resource markets right now.**

- **⚠️ THE CONCENTRATION.** ⚠️ **China produces around 90% of the world's rare earths, and
  its dominance is greater still downstream — the IEA puts it at about 91% of global
  separation and refining production, with Malaysia a distant second.** ⚠️ **Reported
  figures also give China roughly 80% of tungsten and 60% of antimony.**
- **⚠️ THE MAGNET STAGE IS WHERE THE LEVERAGE ACTUALLY SITS.** ⚠️ **Two decades ago China
  accounted for around 50% of sintered permanent magnet production; it has significantly
  strengthened that position since.** ⚠️ **The IEA's 2026 Outlook identifies a structural
  imbalance: announced refining capacity in diversified regions equals about TWO-THIRDS of
  expected mined supply by 2035, while planned MAGNET production represents only
  ONE-THIRD.** ⚠️ **The same pattern appears in batteries — planned cathode capacity is
  about one-third of projected lithium mining capacity.**
- **⚠️ THE CONTROLS.** ⚠️ **Seven rare earth elements were placed on an export control list
  in April 2025; five more — holmium, erbium, thulium, europium and ytterbium — were added
  from 8 November.** ⚠️ **Holmium's inclusion was pointed, because magnet makers had been
  revising designs to substitute toward it since April.** ⚠️ **The October 2025 expansion
  reportedly extended controls to processing EQUIPMENT, technology documentation and
  refining know-how — and was partially suspended until November 2026 as trade diplomacy,
  with the licensing architecture left in place.**
- ⚠️ **Reporting describes an extraterritorial reach: foreign-made products containing
  0.1% or more Chinese-origin rare earths, or made using Chinese processing technology,
  reportedly requiring a licence.** ⚠️ **Separately China has banned gallium, germanium and
  antimony exports to the US.**

> **⚠️ GOTCHA — this is not a scarcity story and reading it as one leads to the wrong
> response.** ⚠️ **Rare earths are not rare in the crust. The chokepoint is SEPARATION
> (§10 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`) — chemically similar elements requiring many solvent extraction stages, built on
> decades of process know-how, tolerance for the environmental burden of refining, scale
> economics, and an integrated magnet ecosystem.**
> ⚠️ **The evidence on how hard that is to replicate: research cited finds that China's
> 2010 rare-earth shock triggered a surge in patenting and some downstream expansion
> outside China, but innovation did not close the gap quickly; and firm-level estimates put
> supplier switching costs in the billions per firm with first-year operating-profit losses
> of 15–50% under decoupling simulations.**
> **⚠️ So "open a mine" does not solve it. Opening a REFINERY and a magnet plant might, over
> a decade.**

**⚠️ The response, and its realistic pace.** ⚠️ **A US–Australia Critical Minerals Framework
was signed in October 2025; Australia attracted about 45% of global rare earth exploration
investment in 2024 and hosts 89 active projects against Canada's 18; a A$1.25bn
government-backed loan supports an Iluka refinery tied to allied offtake.** ⚠️ **The EU has
launched Strategic Projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act.** ⚠️ **CSIS's assessment
is that new magnet capacity coming online in summer 2026 will begin to reduce reliance,
but "self-sufficiency remains a long road."**
**⚠️ Sourcing caution: this topic is covered heavily by rare-earth investment newsletters
and advocacy outlets with obvious positions, and price-spike figures (up to sixfold) and
licence approval rates (below 25% for European firms) come from those sources.** ⚠️ **I
anchored the structural claims on the IEA, CSIS and Reuters, which agree on the ~90%
refining share and the control timeline.**

### 27.2 ⚠️ Deep-sea mining: two legal regimes now collide
**⚠️ A genuine constitutional problem in international law, not merely an environmental
dispute.**

- **⚠️ THE RESOURCE.** ⚠️ **Polymetallic nodules on the abyssal plain — nickel, copper,
  cobalt, manganese — with the Clarion-Clipperton Zone estimated by USGS to contain more
  cobalt and manganese than all known land deposits combined.** ⚠️ **Also cobalt-rich
  crusts on seamounts and sulfides at hydrothermal vents.**
- **⚠️ THE ISA PROCESS HAS NOT DELIVERED.** ⚠️ **The Authority has been negotiating a Mining
  Code for over 12 years without success.** ⚠️ **As of January 2026 it had issued 31
  exploration contracts, and its March 2026 session ended with no mining approved and no
  code adopted — with unresolved disagreement across environmental safeguards, liability,
  inspection, compliance and benefit-sharing.** ⚠️ **The July 2026 session again delayed the
  rules.**
- **⚠️ NEARLY 40 GOVERNMENTS — including the UK, France and Germany — have called for a
  moratorium or precautionary pause** until there is sufficient evidence mining can proceed
  without serious harm.
- **⚠️ THE COLLISION.** ⚠️ **Rather than wait, The Metals Company applied for US permits
  after an April 2025 executive order directed federal agencies to license exploration and
  development both within the US EEZ and in areas BEYOND national jurisdiction, including
  the CCZ.** ⚠️ **In March 2026 NOAA determined a TMC USA application was in "substantial
  compliance" — covering roughly 65,000 km² with an estimated 619 million tonnes of wet
  nodules — and the areas OVERLAP with ISA contract areas held by TMC's own subsidiaries.**
- **⚠️ It is now litigation.** ⚠️ **The ISA opened a compliance inquiry in July 2025 into
  whether TMC remained in compliance with its ISA obligations; in June 2026 TMC's
  subsidiaries NORI and TOML took the ISA to ITLOS, arguing the inquiry was unfair.**
  ⚠️ **Conservation groups have urged the Authority to suspend or terminate contracts or
  impose a moratorium.**

> **⚠️ GOTCHA — the underlying legal problem is that the US is not a party to UNCLOS,** and
> ⚠️ **the seabed beyond national jurisdiction is designated the "common heritage of
> mankind" under a regime the US has not joined.** **⚠️ So one actor is issuing permits under
> domestic law for areas another regime claims exclusive authority over — and both can
> point to a legal basis.**
> ⚠️ **That is why this matters beyond mining: it is a test of whether a slow multilateral
> commons regime can hold when a fast unilateral alternative exists.**

**⚠️ The commercial reality is less impressive than the politics.** ⚠️ **TMC reported a
widened annual net loss of roughly US$320 million for 2025, up from about US$82 million,
driven by royalty liabilities and rising exploration and administrative costs — with the
stock falling on the announcement.** ⚠️ **No commercial deep-sea mining is occurring.**
**⚠️ The genuine scientific uncertainty** is the strongest argument for caution: ⚠️ **nodule
fields, seamounts and vents support ecosystems that are poorly characterized, recovery
timescales are extremely long, and sediment plume behaviour is contested.** ⚠️ **Note also
that several major downstream buyers — including automotive and technology companies — have
supported a moratorium, which undercuts the "essential for the energy transition" framing
from the demand side.**
**⚠️ Sourcing note: my sources here split between conservation organizations and law firms
advising the industry.** ⚠️ **I anchored the procedural facts on the Earth Negotiations
Bulletin and a Congressional Research Service report, which document mechanics rather than
advocating.**

---

## §28. Misconceptions

| Misconception | Correction |
|---|---|
| Ore is defined by what's in it | ⚠️ **It's an economic term. Price changes the deposit size** (§1 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`) |
| A big resource means a big mine | ⚠️ **Resource ≠ reserve. Modifying factors decide** (§4 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`) |
| Inferred resources can be mined | ⚠️ **They cannot be converted directly to reserves** (§4 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`) |
| National reserve figures are audited | ⚠️ **Some are politically determined** (§4 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`) |
| Mining's energy is in the trucks | ⚠️ **Comminution dominates — a few % of world electricity** (§8 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`) |
| Grinding is reasonably efficient | ⚠️ **Most input energy becomes heat and noise** (§8 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`) |
| Cyanide is the main gold risk | ⚠️ **It degrades. The catastrophic risk is a tailings release** (§11 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`, §12 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`) |
| Mercury in gold mining is historical | ⚠️ **ASM is a leading anthropogenic mercury source** (§11 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`) |
| Tailings dams are like water dams | ⚠️ **Upstream construction can liquefy with no trigger** (§12 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`) |
| Acid drainage stops when the mine closes | ⚠️ **It's self-sustaining for centuries** (§13 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`) |
| Porosity means a well will produce | ⚠️ **Permeability decides flow** (§14 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`) |
| Seismic finds oil | ⚠️ **It images structure. Fluids are inferred** (§15 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`) |
| Mud is just lubricant | ⚠️ **It's the primary well control barrier** (§16 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`, §17 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`) |
| Blowouts are one big failure | ⚠️ **Multiple barriers degrade together** (§17 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`) |
| Fracking causes the earthquakes | ⚠️ **Mostly wastewater disposal injection** (§18 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`) |
| Fracking contaminates aquifers through fractures | ⚠️ **Where it occurs, it's casing, cement or surface spills** (§18 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`) |
| Shale wells produce steadily | ⚠️ **Very steep first-year decline** (§19 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| Coal is one commodity | ⚠️ **Thermal is substitutable; coking coal isn't yet** (§22 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| High prices bring quick new supply | ⚠️ **10–20 year lead times. Hence the cycle** (§23 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| Silicosis is a solved problem | ⚠️ **Engineered stone fabrication caused a resurgence** (§24 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| Closure bonds cover closure | ⚠️ **Frequently set below true cost** (§25 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| Artisanal mining is simply illegal activity | ⚠️ **A livelihood for millions; formalization beats prohibition** (§26 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| Rare earths are rare | ⚠️ **The chokepoint is separation and magnets** (§27.1) |
| Opening a mine fixes rare earth dependency | ⚠️ **Refining and magnet capacity is the gap** (§27.1) |
| Deep-sea mining has started commercially | ⚠️ **No code, no approvals, and it's in litigation** (§27.2) |

---

## §29. Numbers

```
⚠️ Copper porphyry grade  ~0.3–1% Cu · ⚠️ 99%+ becomes tailings
⚠️ Comminution  ⚠️ a few % of GLOBAL electricity; most energy wasted
⚠️ Gold density  19.3 — why gravity separation works
⚠️ Mine lead time  ⚠️ 10–20 years discovery to production
⚠️ Rare earth refining  ⚠️ China ~90–91% (IEA) · tungsten ~80% ·
                        antimony ~60% (reported)
⚠️ REE controls  ⚠️ 7 elements Apr 2025 → +5 from 8 Nov 2025
⚠️ Extraterritorial threshold  ⚠️ reported 0.1% Chinese-origin content
⚠️ Diversified refining capacity by 2035  ⚠️ ~⅔ of mined supply
⚠️ Planned magnet capacity  ⚠️ only ~⅓ — the real gap (IEA 2026)
⚠️ Australia REE exploration  ⚠️ ~45% of global spend 2024; 89 projects
⚠️ ISA exploration contracts  ⚠️ 31, as of January 2026
⚠️ Mining Code negotiation  ⚠️ 12+ years, not adopted
⚠️ Moratorium supporters  ⚠️ nearly 40 governments
⚠️ TMC USA application  ⚠️ ~65,000 km², 619 Mt wet nodules (reported)
⚠️ TMC 2025 net loss  ⚠️ ~US$320m, up from ~US$82m (reported)
```

---

## §30. Sources

| Source | Why |
|---|---|
| **SME Mining Engineering Handbook** | ⚠️ **The industry reference** |
| **Wills' Mineral Processing Technology** | ⚠️ **§8–§9 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`, `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`, the standard** |
| **Hartman & Mutmansky, *Introductory Mining Engineering*** | Accessible entry point |
| **Robb, *Introduction to Ore-Forming Processes*** | §2 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves` |
| **JORC Code / NI 43-101 / CRIRSCO** | ⚠️ **§4 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`, and free to read** |
| **Selley & Sonnenberg, *Elements of Petroleum Geology*** | §14 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing` |
| **Bourgoyne et al., *Applied Drilling Engineering*** | §16–§17 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing` |
| **GISTM (Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management)** | ⚠️ **§12 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`, primary** |
| **IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook** | ⚠️ **§27.1 — the least interested source available** |
| **USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries** | ⚠️ **Free annual data on every commodity** |
| **CSB and equivalent investigation reports** | ⚠️ **§24 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`. Read the disaster reports** |
| **Earth Negotiations Bulletin (IISD)** | ⚠️ **§27.2 — reports mechanics, not advocacy** |

---

## §31. Quick Reference

### 31.1 Picker
| Question | Where |
|---|---|
| Is this deposit economic? | ⚠️ **Grade, tonnage, stripping ratio, cutoff** (§1 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`, §23 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| Resource or reserve? | ⚠️ **Ask which, and who signed it** (§4 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`) |
| Open pit or underground? | ⚠️ **Stripping ratio versus depth** (§5 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`, §6 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`) |
| Where does the energy go? | ⚠️ **Comminution** (§8 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`) |
| Why grind so fine? | ⚠️ **Liberation — and it costs energy super-linearly** (§8 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`, §9 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`) |
| How risky is this tailings facility? | ⚠️ **Ask the construction method first** (§12 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`) |
| Will this site drain acid? | ⚠️ **Acid-base accounting, before mining** (§13 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`) |
| Why did the well blow out? | ⚠️ **Multiple barriers, not one** (§17 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`) |
| Is fracking causing earthquakes? | ⚠️ **Usually disposal injection, not the frac** (§18 → `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`) |
| Why is supply so slow to respond? | ⚠️ **Decade-scale lead times** (§23 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| Who pays for closure? | ⚠️ **Check the bond against real cost** (§25 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`) |
| Why can't we just mine more rare earths? | ⚠️ **Separation and magnets are the gap** (§27.1) |
| Is deep-sea mining happening? | ⚠️ **No code, no approvals, active litigation** (§27.2) |

### 31.2 Evaluating an extractive project
- [ ] ⚠️ **Resource vs reserve, and under which code, signed by whom** (§4 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`)
- [ ] Grade, tonnage, stripping ratio and cutoff assumptions (§1 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`, §23 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`)
- [ ] ⚠️ **Metallurgical testwork — is the recovery actually demonstrated?** (§9 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`, §10 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`)
- [ ] ⚠️ **Tailings storage method and whether upstream construction is used** (§12 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`)
- [ ] ⚠️ **Acid generation potential assessed** (§13 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`)
- [ ] Water source, competing users, discharge plan (§13 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`)
- [ ] ⚠️ **Position on the cost curve, not just absolute cost** (§23 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`)
- [ ] Price assumptions and sensitivity (§23 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`)
- [ ] ⚠️ **Closure cost estimate and whether the bond covers it** (§25 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`)
- [ ] ⚠️ **Community consent, and FPIC where indigenous rights apply** (§26 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`)
- [ ] Jurisdiction and resource-nationalism exposure (§23 → `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety`)
- [ ] ⚠️ **For processing: is the refining and downstream route secured?** (§27.1)

---

## §32. Method

**§1–§26 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`, `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`, `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`, `mining-petroleum-geology-drilling-well-control-and-fracturing`, `mining-production-offshore-refining-coal-economics-and-safety` rests on mature engineering and long-established practice** — **ore genesis,
flotation, the reserve codes, well control, decline curves, and the failure mechanisms of
tailings dams and blowouts.** ⚠️ **None of it needed verification; froth flotation is over a
century old and liquefaction is well understood.**

**Two searches were run in August 2026**, on **critical mineral supply** and **deep-sea
mining** — ⚠️ **the first because it is the most consequential thing happening in resource
markets and is systematically misdescribed as a scarcity problem, the second because it is
where the legal framework is actively breaking.**

**Confidence.** **High** in §1 → `mining-grade-deposits-exploration-and-reserves`, §8 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution` and §12 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water`, which are the sections I'd most want read.
⚠️ **"Ore is an economic term" is the idea that makes the rest of the field intelligible —
the price literally changes how much deposit exists.** ⚠️ **§8 → `mining-surface-underground-drilling-blasting-and-comminution`'s comminution point is the
one that surprises people most: breaking rock consumes a few percent of global electricity
and wastes most of it, which is the strongest physical argument for recycling.**
⚠️ **§12 → `mining-processing-metallurgy-gold-tailings-and-water` is the one with lives attached — the distinction between upstream and downstream
tailings construction is the single most predictive fact about whether a facility is
dangerous, and the structural mismatch between a company's finite life and a dam's
permanent one is why failures recur.**

**High** on §27.1's structural claims, anchored on the IEA and CSIS: ⚠️ **China at roughly
90–91% of rare earth separation and refining, the November 2025 addition of five elements
including holmium, and the IEA's finding that diversified refining capacity reaches about
two-thirds of mined supply by 2035 while magnet capacity reaches only one-third.**
⚠️ **The magnet-gap finding is the most useful thing in the section, because it identifies
where the leverage actually persists after mining diversifies.** ⚠️ **Price-spike and
licensing-approval figures come from investment newsletters with positions and are marked
reported.**

**High** on §27.2's chronology, anchored on the Earth Negotiations Bulletin and a
Congressional Research Service report: ⚠️ **31 exploration contracts, the March and July
2026 sessions ending without a code, nearly 40 governments backing a pause, NOAA's March
2026 substantial-compliance determination on an application overlapping ISA areas, and the
ITLOS filing in June 2026.**
⚠️ **The framing I'd defend is that this is a jurisdictional collision rather than only an
environmental argument — the US is not an UNCLOS party, so two regimes each with a claimed
legal basis now overlap on the same seabed.** ⚠️ **Sources on both sides are interested
parties, and I've said so.**