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Buzz Signed Workspace Evidence

ASecurity

Convert exported Block Buzz / Nostr workspace events into bounded Agoragentic evidence. Use for signed release history, incident memory, workflow evidence, or Transaction Assurance preparation without treating channel membership as financial authority.

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  • Added August 31, 2026
ai-agentsrustgobashnodesecurity

Works with

  • cli

Security analysis

A100/100

Pro scans all 11 files and shows the line behind each finding

Scanned August 31, 2026

npx -y skills add rhein1/agoragentic-integrations --skill buzz-signed-workspace-evidence --agent claude-code

Installs into .claude/skills of the current project.

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SKILL.md
---
name: agoragentic-buzz-signed-workspace-evidence
description: Convert exported Block Buzz / Nostr workspace events into bounded Agoragentic evidence. Use for signed release history, incident memory, workflow evidence, or Transaction Assurance preparation without treating channel membership as financial authority.
license: Apache-2.0
metadata:
  upstream: block/buzz@f029deafae6ad3b63e13c29104f3be76122cb1df
  upstream_provenance: upstream-provenance.json
  nip01: nostr-protocol/nips@c53877571f96eb423661fc23c620d629d37b8f19
  status: experimental
---

# Buzz Signed Workspace Evidence

Run locally:

```bash
cd examples/buzz-signed-workspace-evidence
node cli.mjs <events.json> --out buzz-evidence.json
```

Rules:

1. Verify each canonical NIP-01 event ID with strict lower-case wire fields; reject coercion, an ID/content mismatch, or an out-of-range kind.
2. Accept signature, principal, and persistence claims only as typed external attestation references bound to the exact event ID, pubkey, and signature hash; persistence claims must also bind the exact source relay hash.
3. Treat every caller-supplied attestation reference as unverified until a separate trusted resolver authenticates the artifact and verifier identity; never accept a naked verification, persistence, or principal boolean.
4. Do not infer a principal or owner from a pubkey alone.
5. Buzz channel membership and workspace scopes are not economic mandates.
6. A relay-accepted event is not payment, delivery, outcome, or reconciliation proof. Require separate relay-audit persistence evidence when persistence matters.
7. Keep event content and source metadata hash-only by default. Hashes can remain correlatable for low-entropy values, so use bounded content only when the principal permits it and protect private exports separately.
8. Treat bounded mode as raw workspace content with best-effort known-pattern redaction, never as complete secret scanning or a public-safe export. Require explicit content authority, private handling, and publication review even when no redaction fires.
9. Do not post a receipt reference to Buzz without explicit principal publication authority and a signing key outside this adapter.
10. This source pin is review provenance only; it is not live relay, CLI, ACP, signature-verifier, private-channel, or audit-export compatibility evidence.
11. This skill grants no spend, wallet, deployment, publication, memory-write, or trust authority.

Report:

```text
event count and types
exact upstream and NIP-01 source pin
canonical ID integrity
event-bound but unverified signature-attestation-reference state
event-bound but unverified principal-attestation-reference state
event-bound but unverified relay-audit-reference state
content policy and redactions
hash-only source references
event root and full security-envelope bundle root
bundle verification result and externally trusted expected root, when available
raw-content, redaction-assurance, and publication-review state
Transaction Assurance blockers
caller-claimed Transaction Assurance states and state_claims_verified: false
next safe action
authority granted: false
```

Files in this skill

  • LICENSE11.1 KB
  • README.md13.9 KB
  • SKILL.md3.1 KB
  • buzz-event-evidence.mjs50.7 KB
  • cli.mjs3.8 KB
  • listing-candidates.json4.9 KB
  • package.json1.2 KB
  • receipt-reference.example.json1.6 KB
  • receipt-reference.schema.json3.2 KB
  • test.mjs28.5 KB
  • upstream-provenance.json2.3 KB

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