Cloud Iam Deep

---
name: cloud-iam-deep
description: Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP 
category: Document Processing
source: antigravity
tags: [node, api, claude, ai, workflow, document, security, hacking, kubernetes, aws]
url: https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/cloud-iam-deep
---

> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**
> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> **Mandatory confirmation gate**
> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
>
> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

## When to use

Trigger when:
- A cloud credential surfaces (key, secret, token, JSON file)
- SSRF chain reaches IMDS / metadata endpoint
- APK / git-leak reveals embedded cloud key
- Recon shows public S3/GCS/Azure-blob with permissions you can verify
- A Kubernetes API or service-account token is exposed
- Post-RCE on a cloud-hosted instance — pivot to cloud control plane

Do NOT use for:
- On-prem-only environments (use AD attack skills — but those are out of scope per external-only boundary)
- Web2 vulns that happen to be on AWS — use the relevant `hunt-*` skill

---

## Credential identification (first 60 seconds)

```bash
# AWS access key patterns
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # IAM user access key (long-term)
ASIA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # STS temporary credential
AGPA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # IAM group
AIDA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # IAM user (user-id)
AROA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # IAM role
ANPA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # Managed policy

# AWS secret pattern (40-char base64-ish — context required)
[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}              # AWS secret access key

# Azure
AccountKey=[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{86}   # Storage account key
client_secret pattern + UUID    # Azure AD app credential

# GCP service account JSON
{
  "type": "service_account",
  "project_id": "...",
  "private_key_id": "...",
  "private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----..."
}

# K8s SA token (JWT format — decode to confirm)
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1...     # decode kid claim to see issuer
```

---

## AWS — read-only validation (the safe first step)

```bash
# Set credential
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="AKIA..."
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."

# 1. WHO am I?
aws sts get-caller-identity
# Returns: UserId, Account, Arn
# Arn tells you: IAM user vs role, account ID, name

# 2. WHAT can I do? (the privesc question)
# Try common read-only first — failures still inform you
aws iam list-users 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-roles 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-policies 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-groups 2>&1 | head -5

# 3. WHAT policies are attached to me?
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <self>
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name <self>          # inline policies
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name <self>

# 4. Service-by-service surface
aws ec2 describe-instances --max-items 1 2>&1 | head
aws s3 ls 2>&1 | head -10
aws lambda list-functions --max-items 5 2>&1 | head
aws rds describe-db-instances --max-items 5 2>&1 | head
aws secretsmanager list-secrets --max-results 5 2>&1 | head
aws ssm describe-parameters --max-results 5 2>&1 | head

# 5. Audit any cross-account / external trust
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?contains(AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement[0].Principal.AWS, `arn:aws:iam::`)]' 2>&1 | head -20
```

---

## AWS privesc patterns (24+ documented — `iam_privesc` techniques)

Quick lookup — if you have any of these IAM actions, escalate via the listed technique:

| You have | Escalate via |
|---|---|
| `iam:CreateAccessKey` | Create access key on any user → impersonate |
| `iam:CreateLoginProfile` | Set a console password on a user → login |
| `iam:UpdateLoginProfile` | Reset console password on a user |
| `iam:AttachUserPolicy` | Attach AdministratorAccess to self |
| `iam:AttachGroupPolicy` | Attach AdministratorAccess to a group you're in |
| `iam:AttachRolePolicy` + sts:AssumeRole | Attach to a role you can assume |
| `iam:PutUserPolicy` | Inline AdministratorAccess to self |
| `iam:PutGroupPolicy` | Inline policy on a group |
| `iam:PutRolePolicy` | Inline on a role you can assume |
| `iam:AddUserToGroup` | Add self to admin group |
| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + sts:AssumeRole | Modify trust to allow self |
| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | Create v2 of an attached policy with admin |
| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | Switch attached policy to admin version |
| `iam:PassRole` + ec2:RunInstances | Launch EC2 as admin role → use instance creds |
| `iam:PassRole` + lambda:CreateFunction/InvokeFunction | Run code as admin role |
| `iam:PassRole` + cloudformation:CreateStack | CF stack creates resources as admin |
| `iam:PassRole` + glue:CreateDevEndpoint | Notebook runs as a