Evaluates the robustness of classifiers against universal and individual adversarial perturbations under domain-specific linear constraints. Probes the trade-off between attack success rate and computational efficiency across finance, network security, medical IoT, and cyber-physical systems. Use when the user wants to benchmark on LCLD, IDS, IoMT, SWaT, WADI, or asks about evaluating this task. Reports ASR.
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---
name: capx-adversarial-eval
description: Evaluates the robustness of classifiers against universal and individual adversarial perturbations under domain-specific linear constraints. Probes the trade-off between attack success rate and computational efficiency across finance, network security, medical IoT, and cyber-physical systems. Use when the user wants to benchmark on LCLD, IDS, IoMT, SWaT, WADI, or asks about evaluating this task. Reports ASR.
metadata:
skill_kind: dataset_eval
source_arxiv: 2510.15699
bibtex_key: [REDACTED]
confidence: high
---
# capx-adversarial-eval
> Constrained Adversarial Perturbation — Nishad et al. (2025) (arXiv:2510.15699, 2025)
## What this evaluates
Evaluates the robustness of classifiers against universal and individual adversarial perturbations under domain-specific linear constraints. Probes the trade-off between attack success rate and computational efficiency across finance, network security, medical IoT, and cyber-physical systems.
## Datasets
- **LCLD** — total ?; splits: val (-1), test (-1)
- **IDS** — total ?; splits: val (-1), test (-1)
- **IoMT** — total ?; splits: val (-1), test (-1)
- **SWaT** — total ?; splits: val (-1), test (-1)
- **WADI** — total ?; splits: val (-1), test (-1)
## Metrics
- `ASR` **(primary)** — range: percent
- Adversarial Success Rate: the percentage of samples whose classification prediction changes from the original (correct) label to an incorrect label after applying the perturbation. Calculated separately on the training set X and the unseen test set.
## Input / output format
**Input**: Structured feature vectors representing normal samples from each dataset, fed into a trained classifier (1D-CNN for LCLD, FFNN for others).
**Output**: Perturbed samples (original input + perturbation vector δ) and the resulting classification prediction from the target model.
## Scoring recipe
```python
def compute_asr(original_preds, perturbed_preds, total_samples):
misclassified = sum(1 for p_orig, p_pert in zip(original_preds, perturbed_preds) if p_orig != p_pert)
return (misclassified / total_samples) * 100
```
## Common pitfalls
- Confusing the set X (used to learn the universal perturbation) with the evaluation test set; ASR is reported separately for both.
- Ignoring domain constraints: baselines like UAP generate unconstrained perturbations, while CAPX enforces linear invariants, making direct ASR comparisons without constraint context misleading.
- Assuming fixed perturbation radius: ASR is highly sensitive to the ℓ2-norm budget (ε), which is varied from 0.10 to 0.40 in experiments.
## Evidence (verbatim from paper)
> The set X, used to learn the universal perturbation for each method, consists of correctly classified normal samples randomly selected from the validation set. A separate set of 3,000 correctly classified normal samples is randomly selected from the test set and used as unseen data to test the generalization ability of perturbation. Table[2] summarizes the adversarial efficacy of CAPX and baselines, where CAPX consistently achieves higher ASR while requiring significantly lower computation time.
## Citation
```bibtex
@misc{nishad2025constrained,
title={Constrained Adversarial Perturbation},
author={Nishad et al. (2025)},
year={2025},
note={arXiv:2510.15699}
}
```
- arXiv: 2510.15699