Conduct a blameless post-mortem analysis after an incident. Build timeline reconstruction, identify contributing factors, and generate actionable improvements. Focus on systemic issues rather than individual blame. Use after any production incident or service degradation, following a near-miss, when investigating recurring issues, or to share systemic learnings across teams.
Scanned 9/3/2026
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---
name: conduct-post-mortem
locale: caveman
source_locale: en
source_commit: 82c77053
fence_basis_commit: 82c77053
translator: "Julius Brussee homage — caveman"
translation_date: "2026-04-19"
description: >
Conduct a blameless post-mortem analysis after an incident. Build timeline
reconstruction, identify contributing factors, and generate actionable
improvements. Focus on systemic issues rather than individual blame. Use
after any production incident or service degradation, following a near-miss,
when investigating recurring issues, or to share systemic learnings across
teams.
license: MIT
allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash Grep Glob
metadata:
author: Philipp Thoss
version: "1.0"
domain: observability
complexity: basic
language: multi
tags: post-mortem, incident-review, blameless, timeline, action-items
---
# Conduct Post-Mortem
Lead blameless post-mortem to learn from incidents, improve system resilience.
## When Use
- After any production incident or service degradation
- Following near-miss or close call
- Investigating recurring issues
- Share learnings across teams
## Inputs
- **Required**: Incident details (start/end time, services affected, severity)
- **Required**: Access to logs, metrics, alerts during incident window
- **Optional**: Runbook used during incident response
- **Optional**: Communication logs (Slack, PagerDuty)
## Steps
### Step 1: Collect Raw Data
Gather all artifacts from incident:
```bash
# Export relevant logs (adjust timerange)
kubectl logs deployment/api-service \
--since-time="2025-02-09T10:00:00Z" \
--until-time="2025-02-09T11:30:00Z" > incident-logs.txt
# Export Prometheus metrics snapshot
curl -G 'http://prometheus:9090/api/v1/query_range' \
--data-urlencode 'query=rate(http_requests_total{job="api"}[5m])' \
--data-urlencode 'start=2025-02-09T10:00:00Z' \
--data-urlencode 'end=2025-02-09T11:30:00Z' \
--data-urlencode 'step=15s' > metrics.json
# Export alert history
amtool alert query --within=2h alertname="HighErrorRate" --output json > alerts.json
```
**Got:** Logs, metrics, alerts covering full incident timeline.
**If fail:** Data incomplete? Note gaps in report. Set up longer retention for next time.
### Step 2: Build Timeline
Create chronological reconstruction:
```markdown
## Timeline (all times UTC)
| Time | Event | Source | Actor |
|----------|-------|--------|-------|
| 10:05:23 | First 5xx errors appear | nginx access logs | - |
| 10:06:45 | High error rate alert fires | Prometheus | - |
| 10:08:12 | On-call engineer paged | PagerDuty | System |
| 10:12:00 | Engineer acknowledges alert | PagerDuty | @alice |
| 10:15:30 | Database connection pool exhausted | app logs | - |
| 10:18:45 | Database queries identified as slow | pganalyze | @alice |
| 10:22:10 | Cache layer deployed as mitigation | kubectl | @alice |
| 10:35:00 | Error rate returns to normal | Prometheus | - |
| 10:40:00 | Incident marked resolved | PagerDuty | @alice |
```
**Got:** Clear minute-by-minute sequence showing what happened and when.
**If fail:** Timestamp mismatches? Ensure all systems use NTP, log in UTC.
### Step 3: Identify Contributing Factors
Use Five Whys or fishbone analysis:
```markdown
## Contributing Factors
### Immediate Cause
- Database connection pool exhausted (max 20 connections)
- Query introduced in v2.3.0 deployment lacked index
### Contributing Factors
1. **Monitoring Gap**: Connection pool utilization not monitored
2. **Testing Gap**: Load testing didn't include new query pattern
3. **Runbook Gap**: No documented procedure for DB connection issues
4. **Capacity Planning**: Pool size unchanged despite 3x traffic growth
### Systemic Issues
- No pre-deployment query plan review
- Database alerts only fire on total failure, not degradation
```
**Got:** Multiple layers of causation identified, avoiding blame.
**If fail:** Analysis stops at "engineer made mistake"? Dig deeper. What allowed that mistake?
### Step 4: Generate Action Items
Create concrete, trackable improvements:
```markdown
## Action Items
| ID | Action | Owner | Deadline | Priority |
|----|--------|-------|----------|----------|
| AI-001 | Add connection pool metrics to Grafana | @bob | 2025-02-16 | High |
| AI-002 | Create runbook: DB connection saturation | @alice | 2025-02-20 | High |
| AI-003 | Add DB query plan check to CI/CD | @charlie | 2025-03-01 | Medium |
| AI-004 | Review and adjust connection pool size | @dan | 2025-02-14 | High |
| AI-005 | Implement DB slow query alerts (<100ms) | @bob | 2025-02-23 | Medium |
| AI-006 | Add load testing for new query patterns | @charlie | 2025-03-15 | Low |
```
**Got:** Each action has owner, deadline, clear deliverable.
**If fail:** Vague actions like "improve testing" won't get done. Make specific.
### Step 5: Write and Distribute Report
Use this template structure:
```markdown
# Post-Mortem: API Service Degradation (2025-02-09)
**Date**: 2025-02-09
**Duration**: 1h 35min (10:05 - 11:40 UTC)
**Severity**: P1 (Critical service degraded)
**Authors**: @alice, @bob
**Reviewed**: 2025-02-10
## Summary
The API service experienced elevated error rates (40% of requests) due to
database connection pool exhaustion. Service was restored by deploying a
cache layer. No data loss occurred.
## Impact
- 40,000 failed requests over 1.5 hours
- 2,000 customers affected
- Revenue impact: ~$5,000 (estimated)
## Root Cause
Query introduced in v2.3.0 deployment performed a full table scan due to
missing index. Under increased load, this saturated the connection pool.
[... timeline, contributing factors, action items as above ...]
## What Went Well
- Alert fired within 90 seconds of first errors
- Mitigation deployed quickly (10 minutes from page to fix)
- Communication to customers was clear and timely
## Lessons Learned
- Database monitoring is insufficient; need connection-level metrics
- Load testing must cover new query patterns, not just volume
- Connection pool sizing hasn't kept pace with traffic growth
## Prevention
See Action Items above.
```
**Got:** Report shared with team, stakeholders within 48 hours of incident.
**If fail:** Report delays exceed 1 week? Insights grow stale. Prioritize post-mortems.
### Step 6: Review Action Items in Standup/Retros
Track action item progress:
```bash
# Create GitHub issues from action items
gh issue create --title "AI-001: Add connection pool metrics" \
--body "From post-mortem PM-2025-02-09. Owner: @bob. Deadline: 2025-02-16" \
--label "post-mortem,observability" \
--assignee bob
# Set up recurring reminder
# Add to team calendar: Weekly review of open post-mortem items
```
**Got:** Action items tracked in project management tool, reviewed weekly.
**If fail:** Action items languish? Incidents will recur. Assign executive sponsor for high-priority items.
## Checks
- [ ] Timeline complete and chronologically accurate
- [ ] Multiple contributing factors identified (not just one)
- [ ] Action items have owners, deadlines, priorities
- [ ] Report uses blameless language (no "X caused the issue")
- [ ] Report distributed to all stakeholders within 48 hours
- [ ] Action items tracked in ticketing system
- [ ] Follow-up review scheduled for 4 weeks out
## Pitfalls
- **Blame culture**: Using "who" language instead of "what/why". Focus on systems, not people.
- **Shallow analysis**: Stopping at first cause. Always ask "why" at least 5 times.
- **Vague action items**: "Improve monitoring" not actionable. "Add metric X to dashboard Y by date Z" is.
- **No follow-through**: Action items created but never reviewed. Set calendar reminders.
- **Fear of transparency**: Hiding incidents reduces learning. Share widely (within appropriate security boundaries).
## See Also
- `write-incident-runbook` - create runbooks referenced during incidents
- `configure-alerting-rules` - improve alerts based on post-mortem findings
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