Use when analyze the NTFS Master File Table ($MFT) to recover metadata
Scanned 9/8/2026
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---
name: analyzing-mft-for-deleted-file-recovery
description: Use when analyze the NTFS Master File Table ($MFT) to recover metadata
and content of deleted files by examining MFT record entries, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl,
and MFT slack space using MFTECmd, analyzeMFT, and X-Ways Forensics. Use when analyzeing
the ntfs master file table ($mft) to recover metadata.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: digital-forensics
tags:
- mft
- ntfs
- deleted-files
- file-recovery
- mftecmd
- usn-journal
- logfile
- mft-slack-space
- file-system-forensics
- dfir
version: '1.0'
author: oyi77
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- RS.AN-01
- RS.AN-03
- DE.AE-02
- RS.MA-01
category: cybersecurity
---
# Analyzing MFT for Deleted File Recovery
## Overview
The NTFS Master File Table ($MFT) is the central metadata repository for every file and directory on an NTFS volume. Each file is represented by at least one 1024-byte MFT record containing attributes such as $STANDARD_INFORMATION (timestamps, permissions), $FILE_NAME (name, parent directory, timestamps), and $DATA (file content or cluster run pointers). When a file is deleted, its MFT record is marked as inactive (InUse flag cleared) but the metadata remains until the entry is reallocated by a new file. This persistence makes MFT analysis a primary technique for recovering deleted file evidence, reconstructing file system timelines, and detecting anti-forensic activity such as timestomping.
## When to Use
**Trigger phrases:**
- "analyzing mft for deleted file recovery"
- "Analyze the NTFS Master File Table ($MFT) to recover metadata and content of del"
- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing mft for deleted file recovery
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
## Prerequisites
- Forensic disk image (E01, raw/dd, VMDK, or VHDX format)
- MFTECmd (Eric Zimmerman) or analyzeMFT (Python-based)
- FTK Imager, Arsenal Image Mounter, or similar for image mounting
- Timeline Explorer or Excel for CSV analysis
- Python 3.8+ for custom analysis scripts
- Understanding of NTFS file system internals
## MFT Structure and Record Layout
This section covers mft structure and record layout for analyzing mft for deleted file recovery.
- Ensure all prerequisites are met before proceeding
- Follow the documented workflow steps in sequence
- Record results and any anomalies encountered during this phase
### MFT Record Header
Each MFT record begins with the signature "FILE" (0x46494C45) and contains:
| Offset | Size | Field |
|--------|------|-------|
| 0x00 | 4 bytes | Signature ("FILE") |
| 0x04 | 2 bytes | Offset to update sequence |
| 0x06 | 2 bytes | Size of update sequence |
| 0x08 | 8 bytes | $LogFile sequence number |
| 0x10 | 2 bytes | Sequence number |
| 0x12 | 2 bytes | Hard link count |
| 0x14 | 2 bytes | Offset to first attribute |
| 0x16 | 2 bytes | Flags (0x01 = InUse, 0x02 = Directory) |
| 0x18 | 4 bytes | Used size of MFT record |
| 0x1C | 4 bytes | Allocated size of MFT record |
| 0x20 | 8 bytes | Base file record reference |
| 0x28 | 2 bytes | Next attribute ID |
### Key MFT Attributes
| Type ID | Name | Description |
|---------|------|-------------|
| 0x10 | $STANDARD_INFORMATION | Timestamps, flags, owner ID, security ID |
| 0x30 | $FILE_NAME | Filename, parent MFT reference, timestamps |
| 0x40 | $OBJECT_ID | Unique GUID for the file |
| 0x50 | $SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR | ACL permissions |
| 0x60 | $VOLUME_NAME | Volume label (volume metadata files only) |
| 0x80 | $DATA | File content (resident if <700 bytes) or cluster run list |
| 0x90 | $INDEX_ROOT | B-tree index root for directories |
| 0xA0 | $INDEX_ALLOCATION | B-tree index entries for large directories |
| 0xB0 | $BITMAP | Allocation bitmap for index or MFT |
## Deleted File Recovery Techniques
This section covers deleted file recovery techniques for analyzing mft for deleted file recovery.
- Ensure all prerequisites are met before proceeding
- Follow the documented workflow steps in sequence
- Record results and any anomalies encountered during this phase
### Technique 1: MFT Record Analysis with MFTECmd
```powershell
# Extract $MFT from forensic image using KAPE or FTK Imager
# Parse the $MFT with MFTECmd
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Evidence\$MFT" --csv C:\Output --csvf mft_full.csv
# Filter for deleted files (InUse = FALSE) in Timeline Explorer
# Look for entries where InUse column is False
```
**Identifying Deleted Files in CSV Output:**
- `InUse` = False indicates a deleted or reallocated record
- `ParentPath` shows original file location before deletion
- `FileSize` shows the original size (may still be recoverable)
- Timestamps in `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` and `$FILE_NAME` attributes persist
### Technique 2: USN Journal ($UsnJrnl:$J) Analysis
The USN Journal records all changes to files on an NTFS volume, including creation, deletion, rename, and data modification events.
```powershell
# Parse USN Journal with MFTECmd
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Evidence\$J" --csv C:\Output --csvf usn_journal.csv
# Key USN reason codes for deletion evidence:
# USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE = 0x00000200
# USN_REASON_CLOSE = 0x80000000
# USN_REASON_RENAME_OLD_NAME = 0x00001000
# USN_REASON_RENAME_NEW_NAME = 0x00002000
```
### Technique 3: $LogFile Transaction Analysis
The $LogFile stores NTFS transaction records that can reveal file operations even after the USN Journal has been cycled.
```powershell
# Parse $LogFile with LogFileParser
LogFileParser.exe -l "C:\Evidence\$LogFile" -o C:\Output
# Look for REDO and UNDO operations indicating file deletion:
# - DeallocateFileRecordSegment
# - DeleteAttribute
# - UpdateResidentValue (clearing InUse flag)
```
### Technique 4: MFT Slack Space Analysis
MFT slack space exists between the end of the used portion of an MFT record and the end of the allocated 1024 bytes. This area may contain remnants of previous file records.
```python
import struct
def parse_mft_slack(mft_path: str, output_path: str):
"""Extract and analyze MFT slack space for deleted file remnants."""
with open(mft_path, "rb") as f:
record_size = 1024
record_num = 0
slack_findings = []
while True:
record = f.read(record_size)
if len(record) < record_size:
break
# Verify FILE signature
if record[:4] != b"FILE":
record_num += 1
continue
# Get used size from offset 0x18
used_size = struct.unpack("<I", record[0x18:0x1C])[0]
if used_size < record_size:
slack = record[used_size:]
# Check if slack contains readable strings or attribute headers
if any(c > 0x20 and c < 0x7F for c in slack[:50]):
slack_findings.append({
"record": record_num,
"used_size": used_size,
"slack_size": record_size - used_size,
"slack_preview": slack[:100].hex()
})
record_num += 1
return slack_findings
```
## Correlation with Supporting Artifacts
This section covers correlation with supporting artifacts for analyzing mft for deleted file recovery.
- Ensure all prerequisites are met before proceeding
- Follow the documented workflow steps in sequence
- Record results and any anomalies encountered during this phase
### Cross-Reference MFT with $Recycle.Bin
```powershell
# Parse Recycle Bin with RBCmd
RBCmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\$Recycle.Bin" --csv C:\Output --csvf recycle_bin.csv
# Correlate: $I files contain original path and deletion timestamp
# Match MFT entry numbers from $R files back to original MFT records
```
### Cross-Reference MFT with Volume Shadow Copies
```powershell
# List volume shadow copies
vssadmin list shadows
# Mount shadow copies and extract $MFT from each
# Compare MFT records across shadow copies to track file changes over time
```
## Forensic Value
- **Deleted file metadata recovery**: Original filename, path, size, and timestamps
- **Timeline reconstruction**: File creation, modification, access, and deletion events
- **Timestomping detection**: Comparing $SI vs $FN timestamps
- **Data carving guidance**: MFT cluster runs point to file content on disk
- **Anti-forensic detection**: Identifying wiped or manipulated MFT records
## When NOT to Use
- You need to perform the attack, not analyze it (use performing-* skills)
- Task is about detection, not analysis (use detecting-* skills)
- You need to implement controls (use implementing-* skills)
- Task is about threat hunting, not post-incident analysis (use hunting-* skills)
- You don't have access to the artifacts/logs to analyze
- Task requires real-time monitoring (use SOC tools)
## Red Flags
- Performing actions without explicit written authorization from the asset owner
- Testing against production systems without a defined scope and rules of engagement
- Destroying potential evidence during the containment phase
- Failing to document the chain of custody for all collected artifacts
- Communicating incident details over unencrypted or monitored channels
## Verification
- All steps executed successfully against a test environment before production use
- Output documented with screenshots or logs demonstrating expected behavior
- Results validated against known-good baselines or reference implementations
- Documentation complete enough for another analyst to reproduce findings
## References
- NTFS MFT Advanced Forensic Analysis: https://www.deaddisk.com/posts/ntfs-mft-advanced-forensic-analysis-guide/
- MFT Slack Space Forensic Value: https://www.sygnia.co/blog/the-forensic-value-of-mft-slack-space/
- MFTECmd Documentation: https://ericzimmerman.github.io/
- SANS FOR500: Windows Forensic Analysis
## Example Output
```text
$ MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Evidence\$MFT" --csv /analysis/mft_output
MFTECmd v1.2.2 - MFT Parser
==============================
Input: C:\Evidence\$MFT (Size: 384 MB)
Total MFT Entries: 395,264
Parsing MFT entries... Done (12.4 seconds)
--- Deleted File Recovery Summary ---
Total Entries: 395,264
Active Files: 245,832
Deleted Files: 149,432
Recoverable: 87,234 (resident data or clusters not reallocated)
Partially Recoverable: 31,456 (some clusters overwritten)
Unrecoverable: 30,742 (all clusters reallocated)
--- Recently Deleted Files (Incident Window: 2024-01-15 to 2024-01-18) ---
MFT Entry | Filename | Path | Size | Deleted (UTC) | Recoverable
----------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|------------
148923 | exfil_tool.exe | C:\ProgramData\Updates\ | 1,258,496 | 2024-01-17 02:45:12 | YES
148924 | exfil_tool.log | C:\ProgramData\Updates\ | 45,312 | 2024-01-17 02:45:14 | YES
149001 | passwords.txt | C:\Users\jsmith\Desktop\ | 2,048 | 2024-01-17 02:50:33 | YES
149150 | scan_results.csv | C:\Users\jsmith\AppData\Local\Temp | 892,416 | 2024-01-17 03:00:01 | PARTIAL
149200 | mimikatz.exe | C:\Windows\Temp\ | 1,250,816 | 2024-01-18 01:15:22 | YES
149201 | sekurlsa.log | C:\Windows\Temp\ | 32,768 | 2024-01-18 01:15:25 | YES
149302 | .bash_history | C:\Users\jsmith\ | 4,096 | 2024-01-18 03:00:00 | NO
149400 | ClearEventLogs.ps1 | C:\Windows\Temp\ | 1,536 | 2024-01-18 03:01:12 | YES
--- $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME Timestamp Analysis (Timestomping Detection) ---
MFT Entry | Filename | $SI Created | $FN Created | Delta | Verdict
----------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------|----------
148923 | exfil_tool.exe | 2023-06-15 10:00:00 | 2024-01-15 14:34:02 | -214 days | TIMESTOMPED
149200 | mimikatz.exe | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 | 2024-01-16 02:30:15 | -745 days | TIMESTOMPED
Recovered files exported to: /analysis/mft_output/recovered/
Full CSV report: /analysis/mft_output/mft_analysis.csv (395,264 rows)
Timeline CSV: /analysis/mft_output/mft_timeline.csv
```
## Process
1. Analyze the task requirements
2. Apply domain expertise
3. Verify output quality
## Anti-Rationalization Table
| Rationalization | Reality |
|---|---|
| "We are too small to be targeted" | Automated attacks target everyone. Size does not matter. |
| "Security slows us down" | A breach slows you down 100x more. Build security in from the start. |
| "We will fix it after launch" | Vulnerabilities in production are exploited within hours. Fix before deploy. |Is this your skill, or is something wrong with this listing? Request removal or report an issue. Author removals are honored within 72 hours.
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