Deprecated: use block-destructive-commands, which shares this policy's destructive-command table. rtk#1007. Destructive verdicts come from the chock_destructive table shared with block- destructive-commands: the same blocks (root/home deletes, force/delete/mirror pushes, reset --hard, clean -f, IaC destroy, cloud deletes, DB drops, lockouts) and asks (rm -rf off rtk's safe list, bare lease, stash drop, prunes, -auto-approve). Own rows block credential-file reads (.env, keys, ~/.ssh) and echo ...
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npx -y skills add open-coder-ai/chock-catalog --skill rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
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---
name: rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker
description: "Deprecated: use block-destructive-commands, which shares this policy's destructive-command table. rtk#1007. Destructive verdicts come from the chock_destructive table shared with block- destructive-commands: the same blocks (root/home deletes, force/delete/mirror pushes, reset --hard, clean -f, IaC destroy, cloud deletes, DB drops, lockouts) and asks (rm -rf off rtk's safe list, bare lease, stash drop, prunes, -auto-approve). Own rows block credential-file reads (.env, keys, ~/.ssh) and echo or inline *_API_KEY/_SECRET/_TOKEN. Skips file rows in container exec."
metadata:
chock.artifact: rule
chock.enforcement: advise
chock.coverage_without_chock: advisory
---
# rtk Dangerous Actions Blocker
Deprecated: use block-destructive-commands, which shares this policy's destructive-command table. rtk#1007. Destructive verdicts come from the chock_destructive table shared with block- destructive-commands: the same blocks (root/home deletes, force/delete/mirror pushes, reset --hard, clean -f, IaC destroy, cloud deletes, DB drops, lockouts) and asks (rm -rf off rtk's safe list, bare lease, stash drop, prunes, -auto-approve). Own rows block credential-file reads (.env, keys, ~/.ssh) and echo or inline *_API_KEY/_SECRET/_TOKEN. Skips file rows in container exec.
```
block: chock_destructive table (= block-destructive-commands: rm_-rf(/|~|.|abs), push(-f|+ref|:ref|--mirror), reset_--hard|clean_-f|checkout_., destroy|cloud_delete, sql_drop|dropdb), read(.env|*.pem|*.key|id_rsa|~/.ssh|~/.aws), echo|inline($*_API_KEY|$*_SECRET|$*_TOKEN)
ask: rm_-rf(relative, off safe_list), lease_bare, stash_drop, branch_-D, docker_*_prune, -auto-approve, pkill_-f, systemctl_disable; skip_inside: docker|kubectl_exec(file rows); prefix: rtk
```
This skill is advisory: the client reading it has no mechanism to enforce it. The same policy compiled by `chock` can refuse an agent's shell command before it runs. See https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock
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