Skip to content
Back to skills

Agent Governance Lord

ASecurity

Lord skill for governing AI coding agents at runtime — gateway interception, agent/flow/model allowlisting, and MCP-server-as-securable. The control layer between an agent's decision and its real-world action.

  • 6 stars
  • 0 votes
  • 0 copies
  • 1 view
  • Added November 13, 2026
ai-agentsrustgorailsgitapidevops

Works with

  • api
  • mcp

Security analysis

A100/100

Scanned November 13, 2026

npx -y skills add m3taz-ahmed/aizee --skill agent-governance-lord --agent claude-code

Installs into .claude/skills of the current project.

Are you the author of Agent Governance Lord?

Add the live security badge to your README. It updates with every re-scan.

Security grade badge for Agent Governance Lord
[![Security: A — Skills Directory](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/api/skills/m3taz-ahmed-agent-governance-lord/badge)](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/m3taz-ahmed-agent-governance-lord)

More formats (shields.io, HTML) on the badges page. Keep it an A: scan every change in CI with Pro.

Download with Pro
SKILL.md
---
name: agent-governance-lord
description: Lord skill for governing AI coding agents at runtime — gateway interception, agent/flow/model allowlisting, and MCP-server-as-securable. The control layer between an agent's decision and its real-world action.
triggers:
  - agent governance lord
  - agent governance
  - agent gateway
  - runtime interception
  - agent allowlist
  - mcp securable
  - حوكمة الوكلاء
  - بوابة الوكلاء
personas:
  - ARCH
  - SEC
  - SRE
  - API
  - DEVOPS
tech_stack: []
lord: true

---

# Agent Governance Lord

[OBJ] Runtime governance for AI coding agents: intercept, allowlist, and audit every agent action.

## Problem

AI agents can write, push, and deploy without human review at each step. Access control answers "can the agent do this?" — governance answers "should the agent do this?" Permission is necessary; it is not sufficient. An agent can be fully permitted and still wrong.

## Rules

1. [REQ] **Gateway on the path.** Every LLM request and MCP tool call MUST pass through `runtime/agent_gateway.py` (pre-LLM + post-execution guardrails). No bypass.
2. [REQ] **Three verdicts.** Guardrails emit ALLOW / REDACT / BLOCK. Most severe wins (BLOCK > REDACT > ALLOW). Never silently drop a BLOCK.
3. [REQ] **Pre-LLM guardrails.** Inspect outbound prompt + tool payloads BEFORE the model sees them. Catch: secret leakage, prompt injection in tool responses fed back, forbidden tool calls.
4. [REQ] **Post-execution guardrails.** Inspect inbound response + generated code BEFORE the developer sees it. Catch: destructive commands, insecure patterns, hallucinated APIs.
5. [REQ] **Agent allowlist.** Only agents registered in `runtime/agent_catalog.py` with `status == ALLOWED` may run. Unknown agent = BLOCK + alert.
6. [REQ] **Flow allowlist.** Each agent has an `allowed_flows` list. A flow not in the list = BLOCK. No blanket flow access.
7. [REQ] **Model allowlist.** Each agent has an `allowed_models` list. A model not in the list = BLOCK. Prevents unauthorized model escalation.
8. [REQ] **MCP-as-securable.** MCP servers registered in `runtime/mcp_securable.py` as governed assets. Access via GRANT policies (USE/ADMIN/REGISTER). No ungoverned MCP server.
9. [REQ] **Composite identity.** Every agent action attributed to BOTH agent + human principal (`runtime/composite_identity.py`). No anonymous agent actions.
10. [REQ] **Audit every verdict.** Every ALLOW/REDACT/BLOCK logged with agent_id, user_id, tool, reason. Tamper-evident via existing audit chain.
11. [REQ] **Rate limiting.** Per-agent rate limits enforced at the gateway. Burst > threshold = BLOCK + cooldown.
12. [REQ] **Cost attribution.** Per-agent cost tracked via `runtime/cost_attribution.py`. Anomaly (spike/budget breach) = alert + optional throttle.
13. [REQ] **Plan validation.** Before edits, validate the agent's plan via `runtime/plan_diff_validator.py`. Forbidden paths = BLOCK. File count > max = WARN.
14. [REQ] **Diff validation.** After edits, validate the git diff. Undeclared imports = WARN. Test gap = WARN. Unrelated refactor = WARN.
15. [REQ] **Supply-chain guard.** New imports not in lockfile = WARN. External package not declared = BLOCK in strict mode.
16. [REQ] **Human-in-the-loop.** Irreversible/destructive actions (rm, drop, force-push, deploy to prod) require explicit human approval. Gateway holds the action pending approval.
17. [REQ] **Rollback path.** Every agent action that modifies state must have a documented rollback. No rollback = BLOCK.
18. [PROHIBIT] Bypassing the gateway for "trusted" agents. All agents pass through.
19. [PROHIBIT] Allowing an agent to call an ungoverned MCP server.
20. [PROHIBIT] Executing a destructive action without composite identity attribution + human approval.
21. [REQ] **SARC enforcement sites.** Implement 4 enforcement sites: Pre-Action Gate (block injection/PII/policy violations before LLM call), Action-Time Monitor (rate/cost/budget enforcement, circuit breakers), Post-Action Auditor (log, evaluate, score for reliability@k), Escalation Router (human approval, kill-switch, incident creation).
22. [REQ] **Agent SRE Governance v1.0.** Implement SLOs, error budgets, circuit breakers, chaos engineering, trace replay, Ed25519 artifact signing, SBOMs, and OpenTelemetry for all agent deployments. Reference: Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit.
23. [REQ] **Microsoft Agent Hooks.** Support framework-neutral governance contracts — "deny means deny" enforceable across LangChain, CrewAI, OpenAI Agents SDK, etc.
24. [REQ] **MCP 2026-07-28 stateless governance.** Update gateway for stateless MCP protocol. No session state assumptions. Per-request protocolVersion validation. Header-based routing (Mcp-Method, Mcp-Name).
25. [REQ] **Per-PR spend limits.** Implement per-PR spend caps (soft block) and org-level ACU visibility. Devin enterprise pattern.
26. [REQ] **Enterprise MCP server allowlist.** Maintain allowlist of approved MCP servers. Block ungoverned servers. Enterprise plugin governance (required/optional/forbidden plugins).
27. [REQ] **5-layer control plane.** Gateway Layer (auth, rate limiting, cost tracking) → Policy Layer (4-level hierarchy, fail-closed) → Observability Layer (tamper-evident audit) → Governance Layer (approvals, kill-switch, RBAC) → Integration Layer (A2A, MCP, REST, webhooks).
28. [PROHIBIT] Deploying agents without SARC 4-site enforcement and Agent SRE Governance compliance.

## Enforcement Stack

```
Agent request → AgentGateway.check_request (pre-LLM)
             → AgentCatalog.is_agent_allowed
             → AgentCatalog.is_flow_allowed_for_agent
             → AgentCatalog.is_model_allowed_for_agent
             → McpSecurableRegistry.check_permission (if MCP)
             → LLM call
             → AgentGateway.check_response (post-execution)
             → PlanDiffValidator.validate_diff (if code generated)
             → SupplyChainGuard.check_diff (if imports added)
             → CostAttribution.record
             → AuditLogger.log (composite identity)
```

## References

- Fiddler AI: "controls only hold where they sit on the agent's request and response path."
- GitLab Duo: composite identity, agent/flow catalog, tool approval guardrails.
- Databricks Unity Catalog: MCP servers as securables with GRANT policies.
- repo-contract: negative-constraint enforcement (most effective for safe agent workflows).

Attribution

Is this your skill, or is something wrong with this listing? Request removal or report an issue. Author removals are honored within 72 hours.

View all in ai-agents →

Comments

Loading comments…

Newsletter

Get the weekly list of safe new skills, and the ones we pulled.