Design and run a safety evaluation suite for an AI model or feature across harm categories — refusals on disallowed content, robustness, over-refusal vs helpfulness, groundedness/truthfulness — with rubrics and pass/fail thresholds. Use to measure an AI system's safety, establish a baseline, or gate a release.
Scanned 9/19/2026
npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill safety-evaluation --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
Are you the author of Safety Evaluation?
Add the live security badge to your README — it updates automatically with every re-scan.
[](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/jassics-safety-evaluation)More formats (shields.io, HTML) on the badges page. Keep it an A: scan every change in CI with Pro.
---
name: safety-evaluation
description: >-
Design and run a safety evaluation suite for an AI model or feature across harm
categories — refusals on disallowed content, robustness, over-refusal vs
helpfulness, groundedness/truthfulness — with rubrics and pass/fail thresholds.
Use to measure an AI system's safety, establish a baseline, or gate a release.
---
# Goal
A repeatable safety eval: a structured test set across harm categories, clear
grading rubrics, measured pass rates, and a report that supports a release/no-release
decision and tracks regression over time.
# What to evaluate (cover both failure directions)
- **Under-refusal (unsafe)** — does it produce disallowed/harmful content across
the harm categories from `harm-modeling`? (toxicity, dangerous instructions,
self-harm, illegal facilitation, hate, sexual content involving minors, etc.)
- **Over-refusal (unhelpful)** — does it wrongly refuse benign requests? Safety
that destroys utility is its own failure; measure both.
- **Robustness** — does safety hold under paraphrase, role-play, multilingual,
encoded, and multi-turn pressure? (Deeper adversarial work: `safety-red-team`.)
- **Groundedness / truthfulness** — for factual/high-stakes tasks, are answers
correct and properly hedged/cited? (RAG groundedness: see `rag-security`.)
- **Bias** — disparate quality/refusal across groups (full analysis:
`bias-fairness-assessment`).
# Steps
1. Derive harm categories and high-stakes scenarios from `harm-modeling`.
2. Build/select a test set per category: clearly-unsafe, benign-but-sensitive
(over-refusal probes), and borderline cases. Note provenance; keep prompts
non-operational (don't author working harmful artifacts).
3. Define a **rubric** per category (what a pass vs fail looks like) and a grading
method (human, model-graded with spot checks, or known-answer).
4. Run, score, and compute pass rates with thresholds per category.
5. Report results, failures with examples, trends vs prior runs, and gaps.
# Output
A safety eval report: per-category pass rate vs threshold, notable failures
(redacted), over- vs under-refusal balance, and prioritized fixes. To make this a
durable, enforced release gate rather than a one-off report, install
`templates/genai-eval-gates/` (ready-to-copy promptfoo/garak CI workflow) and see
`ai-safety-engineer:evals-ci-gate` for rolling it out. Use
`security-diagramming:infographic` for a scorecard and `security-reporting` for
the writeup.
# Notes
Measure both safety **and** helpfulness — a model that refuses everything scores
"safe" but is useless. Keep the eval set versioned so results are comparable across
releases. Don't include genuinely operational harmful content in the test set;
probe the boundary, not the payload.
Is this your skill, or is something wrong with this listing? Request removal or report an issue. Author removals are honored within 72 hours.
No comments yet. Be the first to comment!