Use when auditing, pen-testing, hardening, and verifying code against red team tactics vulnerabilities, injection vectors, and auth flaws.
Scanned 9/29/2026
npx -y skills add Harmitx7/tribunal-kit --skill red-team-tactics --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
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---
name: red-team-tactics
description: "Use when auditing, pen-testing, hardening, and verifying code against red team tactics vulnerabilities, injection vectors, and auth flaws."
version: 6.0.0
last-updated: 2026-09-29
skills:
- vulnerability-scanner
- backend-security-expert
- api-security-auditor
tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Edit, Write
scripts-binding:
- .agent/scripts/lint_runner.js
- .agent/scripts/verify_all.js
---
# Red Team & Penetration Testing Principles
## Mandatory Pre-Flight Context Inspection
Before reading, generating, or refactoring code in the `red-team-tactics` domain, inspect these 5 critical parameters:
1. **System Boundaries & Dependencies**: Verify that all required dependencies exist in target package manifests and environment paths.
2. **Runtime Context & Platform Invariants**: Confirm target platform constraints (Node.js, Browser, Mobile OS, Edge runtime) before applying APIs.
3. **Execution Guardrails**: Identify potential side-effects, state mutations, and unhandled asynchronous exceptions.
4. **Validation & Type Contracts**: Validate input data schemas and strict type constraints across all module interfaces.
5. **Observability & Proof of Execution**: Ensure execution produces tangible verification signals (terminal output, tests, metrics).
## Activation Boundaries
- **Activate when:** Use when auditing, pen-testing, hardening, and verifying code against red team tactics vulnerabilities, injection vectors, and auth flaws.
- **DO NOT activate when:** The task falls outside the `red-team-tactics` domain or is managed by a different dedicated specialist agent.
## ๐ Multi-Pass Execution Protocol
| Pass | Phase | Core Action | Adaptive Depth |
|:---|:---|:---|:---|
| **Pass 1** | **Understand** | Deconstruct the user's explicit objective, implicit requirements, and platform constraints. | Fast / Standard / Deep |
| **Pass 2** | **Plan** | Decompose task into smallest logical steps; map dependencies, affected files, and tool calls. | Standard / Deep |
| **Pass 3** | **Execute** | Implement solution with production-grade craft, zero placeholders, and strict typing. | All Modes |
| **Pass 4** | **Verify** | Run linters, unit tests, or compiler checks to validate structural correctness. | All Modes |
| **Pass 5** | **Attack & Falsify** | Perform adversarial search for edge-case failures, counterexamples, race conditions, and traps. | Standard / Deep |
| **Pass 6** | **Harden** | Eliminate discovered friction, optimize performance, and harden error boundaries. | Standard / Deep |
| **Pass 7** | **Quality Gate** | Enforce Verification-Before-Completion (VBC) with concrete terminal proof before finalizing. | All Modes |
---
## ๐ ๏ธ Technical Architecture & Reference Recipes
## Hallucination Traps (Read First)
- โ Testing only happy-path authentication -> โ
Red teaming must test token reuse, expired tokens, forged tokens, and privilege escalation
- โ Reporting vulnerabilities without proof-of-concept -> โ
Every finding needs a reproducible PoC and severity rating (CVSS)
- โ Stopping after finding the first vulnerability -> โ
Real attackers chain multiple low-severity issues; test for escalation paths
---
A red team engagement is a controlled attack.
The goal is to find what a real attacker would find โ before they do.
โ ๏ธ **These techniques are for authorized security testing only. Unauthorized use is illegal.**
---
## Engagement Scope First
Before any testing activity:
1. **Written authorization** โ who authorized this engagement and in what scope?
2. **Scope definition** โ which systems, IPs, domains, time windows are in scope?
3. **Rules of engagement** โ what is prohibited? (production data access, social engineering of specific roles, DDoS)
4. **Emergency contact** โ who do you call if you discover a critical live breach mid-engagement?
5. **Deconfliction** โ does the blue team know an engagement is running, or is it blind?
No authorization = no testing.
---
## Attack Phases (Based on MITRE ATT&CK)
### 1. Reconnaissance
Passive and active information gathering before touching the target.
**Passive (no target contact):**
- DNS lookup: `nslookup`, `dig`, certificate transparency logs
- OSINT: LinkedIn for employee names/roles, GitHub for leaked configs, Shodan for exposed infrastructure
**Active (target is contacted):**
- Port scanning: `nmap -sV -sC <target>`
- Web tech detection: `whatweb`, `wappalyzer`
- Subdomain enumeration: `amass`, `subfinder`
### 2. Initial Access
How does an attacker get their first foothold?
Common vectors:
- Phishing (credential harvest or malicious attachment)
- Exposed admin interfaces with default or weak credentials
- Publicly exposed vulnerable services (`searchsploit`, `nuclei`)
- Supply chain compromise (malicious npm package, CI/CD injection)
### 3. Persistence
Maintaining access after initial compromise:
- Scheduled tasks / cron jobs
- Web shells on compromised web servers
- New user accounts with admin rights
- SSH authorized_keys injection
### 4. Lateral Movement
Moving from initial foothold to higher-value targets:
- Pass-the-hash / pass-the-ticket (Active Directory)
- SSH key reuse across hosts
- Credential reuse (if one service is compromised, others sharing the password are vulnerable)
- Internal network scanning to map new targets
### 5. Exfiltration
Getting data out without triggering alerts:
- Small, slow transfers to blend with normal traffic
- Staging data in cloud storage linked to attacker-controlled accounts
- DNS exfiltration (for heavily monitored networks)
---
## Common Vulnerability Targets
| Target | What to Test |
| ------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
| Web applications | OWASP Top 10, auth bypass, IDOR, SSRF |
| APIs | Object-level authorization, mass assignment, rate limiting |
| Authentication | Brute force protection, token entropy, password reset flow |
| Secrets | Exposed env files, git history, CI/CD environment variables |
| Third-party integrations | Webhook validation, OAuth redirect URI validation |
| Infrastructure | Open S3 buckets, exposed admin ports, default credentials |
---
## Detection Evasion (for Authorized Testing)
When testing detection capabilities:
- Slow scan rates to stay under IDS thresholds
- Use legitimate user agents and headers
- Blend with normal traffic patterns
- Test from IP ranges the organization wouldn't expect
---
## Reporting Format
```markdown
# Red Team Report: [Engagement Name]
## Executive Summary
[2โ3 sentences: what was tested, biggest risk found, business impact]
## Scope
[Systems tested, date range, authorization reference]
## Critical Findings
### CRIT-01: [Title]
**Risk:** Critical
**CVSS:** 9.8
**Description:** [What the vulnerability is]
**Evidence:** [Screenshot, payload, response]
**Impact:** [What an attacker could do]
**Remediation:** [Specific fix with code or config example]
## Attack Narrative
[Chronological story of the full attack path from initial access to objective]
## Remediation Priority
| Finding | Severity | Fix By |
| ------- | -------- | ------ |
```
---
## Ethical Boundaries
- Stop immediately if you discover evidence of an active breach by a real attacker โ report it, don't continue testing
- Don't access, copy, or delete real user data even if you can
- Document everything โ every command run, every finding noted
- Brief the client team before leaving โ no surprises in the report
---
## Output Format
When this skill produces a recommendation or design decision, structure your output as:
```
โโโ Red Team Tactics Recommendation โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
Decision: [what was chosen / proposed]
Rationale: [why โ one concise line]
Trade-offs: [what is consciously accepted]
Next action: [concrete next step for the user]
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
Pre-Flight: โ
All checks passed
or โ [blocking item that must be resolved first]
```
## ๐จ Edge-Case & Failure Mode Matrix
| Scenario | Risk | Production Mitigation |
|:---|:---|:---|
| **Empty or Null Inputs** | Unhandled exception or unexpected rendering collapse | Enforce fallback guards, optional chaining, and explicit empty state handlers |
| **Network Timeout / Latency** | Hanging operations or duplicate side-effects | Implement bounded abort controllers, exponential backoff, and idempotency keys |
| **Concurrency / Race Conditions** | Stale state overwrite or inconsistent data mutations | Use atomic transactions, mutex locking, or cancel-on-resubmit controls |
| **Invalid Schema / Malformed Payload** | Downstream runtime errors or security injection | Validate boundary payloads with Zod/Pydantic schemas prior to execution |
| **Resource / Memory Saturation** | OOM errors, frame drops, or memory leaks | Clean up listeners, cancel active timers, and enforce pagination/virtualization |
## ๐๏ธ Tribunal Verification & Guardrails
**Active Reviewers:** `security-auditor` ยท `penetration-tester` ยท `backend-security-expert`
**Slash Command:** `/review` or `/tribunal-full`
### ๐ฌ Evidence Standard (Tri-State Verification)
Every finding, audit statement, or completion claim must classify its factual certainty:
- **`[OBSERVED]`**: Directly confirmed in the codebase or verified via executed terminal command.
- **`[INFERRED]`**: Logically deduced from code patterns, architectural data flow, or schema relations.
- **`[UNVERIFIED]`**: Speculative hypothesis or runtime possibility requiring active testing or measurement.
### โ
Pre-Flight Self-Audit Checklist
```
โ
Are user inputs sanitized and treated as untrusted data at system boundaries?
โ
Are secrets loaded strictly via environment variables with zero hardcoding?
โ
Is least-privilege enforcement active on APIs, tokens, and storage buckets?
โ
Are prompt-injection delimiters and sanitizers wrapped around LLM inputs?
โ
Did I verify encryption in transit and at rest for sensitive data?
```
### ๐ Verification-Before-Completion (VBC) Protocol
**CRITICAL:** You must follow a strict "evidence-based closeout" state machine.
- โ **Forbidden:** Declaring a task complete because the output "looks correct."
- โ
**Required:** You are explicitly forbidden from finalizing any task without providing **concrete evidence** (terminal output, passing test suites, compiler success, or equivalent operational proof) that your output works as intended.
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