Resilience Reviewer

---
name: "resilience-reviewer"
description: "Describe what this skill helps an agent do."
version: "0.1.0"
since: "2026-09-09"
last_modified: "2026-09-09"
authors:
  - "platform-engineering"
stability: "experimental"
min_platform_version:
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  openhands: "unknown"
  cursor: "unknown"
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deprecated_since:
replaces:
supersedes: []
changelog:
  - version: "0.1.0"
    date: "2026-09-09"
    change: "Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill"
---
# Resilience Reviewer

## Purpose

Review timeouts, retries, circuit breakers, failover, backpressure, degraded modes, and resilience behavior. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.

## Goal and behavioral contract

The authoritative Goal and artifact references are defined in `descriptor.yaml`. Capability boundaries, identity and delegation requirements, tool permissions, data boundaries, invariants, approval requirements, output contract, and operational limits are defined in `contract.yaml`. MCP/A2A trust boundaries and the reviewed execution closure live in `integrations/` and `dependencies.yaml`; ASPS and assurance requirements live in `assurance.yaml`.

Treat those declarations as mandatory execution constraints. `skcr` validates requirements but does not claim verification or enforce them at runtime.

## When to use

- application resilience decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
- A change affects application resilience artifacts such as timeout setting, retry policy, circuit breaker, failover design, backpressure mechanism, degraded mode.
- The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as retry storm, missing timeout, failover surprise, unbounded queue, no degraded path, cascading failure.
- Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
- Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.

## Operating model

1. Identify the relevant application resilience artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
2. Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as chaos test, load-shed metric, dependency error rate, fallback log, SLO impact, incident history.
3. Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
4. Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
5. Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.

## Spec-Driven Change Context

- Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
- For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
- Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
- Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
- During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
- After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
- If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.

## Skill-Specific Review Scope

- Primary artifacts: timeout setting, retry policy, circuit breaker, failover design, backpressure mechanism, degraded mode.
- Risk themes: retry storm, missing timeout, failover surprise, unbounded queue, no degraded path, cascading failure.
- Evidence signals: chaos test, load-shed metric, dependency error rate, fallback log, SLO impact, incident history.
- Ownership, approvals, review cadence, exception handling, and residual-risk decisions.
- Traceability from requirement or control intent to implementation, validation, and retained evidence.

## Skill-Specific Checklist

- [ ] Confirm the review boundary covers the right application resilience systems, teams, and environments.
- [ ] Inventory and inspect the current timeout setting.
- [ ] Check whether retry policy is current, approved, versioned, and owned.
- [ ] Verify that circuit breaker has test, ticket, log, or approval support.
- [ ] Look for retry storm and record concrete repository or process evidence.
- [ ] Look for missing timeout and identify affected assets, services, or stakeholders.
- [ ] Look for failover surprise and classify the operational or audit impact.
- [ ] Use chaos test to validate that the control or practice is operating.
- [ ] Use load-shed metric to confirm ownership, timing, and reproducibility.
- [ ] Check exception, risk-acceptance, and expiry handling for application resilience.
- [ ] Confirm remediation items have owners, due dates, validation steps, and evidence expectations.
- [ ] Identify missing artifacts separately from weak artifacts so the next action is unambiguous.
- [ ] Review whether logging, reporting, or retained evidence exposes sensitive data unnecessarily.

## Decision Rules

- If timeout setting is missing for a critical service, raise at least a high-severity readiness gap.
- If load-shed metric cannot be tied to an owner and approval, treat the outcome as unauditable until corrected.
- If failover design is present but expired or untested, require validation before accepting residual risk.
- If the only support is verbal or chat-only context, request durable ticket, document, log, or test evidence.
- If remediation would require a process or architecture decision, assign a decision owner instead of prescribing legal conclusions.
- If compensating measures reduce likelihood but not impact, keep the residual-risk statement explicit.

## Finding Categories

- Missing or stale application resilience artifact.
- Unclear ownership, approval, review cadence, or accountability.
- Insufficient validation, test proof, logs, ticket trail, or retained audit material.
- Unreviewed exception, residual risk, expiry, or compensating measure.
- Policy, architecture, operational, or platform implementation drift.
- Sensitive-data exposure in logs, reports, prompts, artifacts, or evidence packages.

## Severity Guidance

- Critical: a gap in application resilience creates immediate outage, data-loss, privilege, regulatory-reporting, or irreversible business risk.
- High: timeout setting is missing, unowned, untested, or unauditable for a critical service or material change.
- Medium: retry policy exists but is stale, incomplete, inconsistently enforced, or weakly evidenced.
- Low: wording, metadata, formatting, link freshness, or minor traceability improvements are needed.

## DevSecOps Guardrails

- Do not read secrets, `.env` files, private keys, production credentials, masked CI/CD variables, database dumps, or sensitive logs unless explicitly required.
- Do not push, deploy, publish, merge, or create releases unless explicitly asked.
- Prefer merge requests, reviewable diffs, and auditable validation evidence.
- Prefer least privilege, minimal changes, and explicit rollback notes.
- Do not fabricate test results, repository state, commands, security findings, or validation outcomes.
- Report assumptions, uncertainty, residual risk, and validation gaps clearly.

## Output Requirements

- Findings ordered by severity with affected application resilience artifacts and evidence references.
- Coverage note for reviewed artifacts: timeout setting, retry policy, circuit breaker, failover design, backpressure mechanism, degraded mode.
- Risk note covering relevant themes: retry storm, missing timeout, failover surprise, unbounded queue, no degraded path, cascading failure.
- Evidence request list using expected signals: chaos test, load-shed metric, dependency error rate, fallback log, SLO impact, incident history.
- Deliverables or updates needed: resilience review, failure-mode findings, timeout and retry recommendations, degraded-mode gaps, resilience test plan.
- Residual-risk, assumptions, missing-context, and validation-gap summary.

## Acceptance Criteria

- Relevant application resilience artifacts are identified, current, owned, and versioned where applicable.
- Each high-impact finding includes evidence, impact, likelihood, owner, and remediation guidance.
- Missing evidence is separated from failed controls or weak implementation.
- Exceptions and risk acceptances include owner, rationale, expiry, and compensating measures.
- Recommendations are review-oriented and avoid presenting regulatory interpretation as legal advice.
- Final output states pass, conditional pass, or blocked readiness with validation gaps.

## Anti-Patterns

- Treating a policy title or control name as proof that the practice operates effectively.
- Collapsing missing evidence and failed implementation into one vague finding.
- Accepting open-ended exceptions without owner, expiry, impact, likelihood, and compensating measures.
- Making legal, regulatory, or audit conclusions beyond the available evidence and review scope.
- Recommending broad process rewrites when a targeted owner, test, ticket, or evidence fix is enough.
- Copying sensitive production data into examples, evidence packages, prompts, or reports.

## Changelog

### 0.1.0 - 2026-09-09

- Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill.