Grad Social Capital

---
name: "grad-social-capital"
description: "Apply social capital theory (Putnam, Coleman, Bourdieu, Burt) to analyze how network structures and trust generate value or impose constraints. Use this skill when the user needs to evaluate bridging vs bonding capital, identify structural holes or network closure benefits, assess community or organizational trust dynamics, or when they ask 'how does our network create value', 'are we too insular', or 'where are the structural holes we can exploit'."
metadata:
  category: "WP-28 社會學理論"
  tags: ["social-capital", "Putnam", "Coleman", "Burt", "structural-holes", "bridging", "bonding", "trust"]
---

# Social Capital Theory

## Overview

Social capital theory explains how the structure and quality of social relationships generate resources, trust, and advantage for individuals, groups, and communities. Three major traditions — Coleman (rational closure), Putnam (civic engagement), and Burt (structural holes) — offer complementary lenses on how networks create and constrain value.

## When to Use

- Assessing whether a network provides access to diverse information or redundant support
- Evaluating trust, reciprocity, and cooperation within communities or organizations
- Identifying brokerage opportunities (structural holes) in inter-organizational networks
- Analyzing why some communities or teams outperform others despite similar resources

## When NOT to Use

- When network data is unavailable and analysis would be purely speculative
- When individual-level human capital (skills, knowledge) is the primary explanatory variable
- When the research question concerns macro-structural inequality (use Bourdieu's field theory instead)

## Assumptions

```
IRON LAW: Social capital can be both an asset AND a constraint — dense
networks enable trust but restrict access to novel information. Any
analysis that treats social capital as purely beneficial ignores the
well-documented dark side of strong ties and closure.
```

Key assumptions:
1. Relationships are resources — they provide information, influence, and solidarity
2. Network structure matters independent of individual attributes
3. Social capital is not equally accessible — it depends on position in the network
4. The value of social capital is context-dependent (closure helps in some settings, brokerage in others)

## Methodology

### Step 1: Define the Network and Level of Analysis

Specify the actors (individuals, teams, organizations, communities) and the relationships being analyzed (advice, trust, resource exchange).

### Step 2: Assess Network Structure

| Concept | Theorist | Description | Value Created |
|---------|----------|-------------|---------------|
| **Bonding capital** | Putnam | Dense ties within a group | Trust, solidarity, mutual aid |
| **Bridging capital** | Putnam | Ties across diverse groups | Access to novel information, broader identity |
| **Network closure** | Coleman | Dense, closed networks with shared norms | Norm enforcement, trust, sanctioning |
| **Structural holes** | Burt | Gaps between non-redundant contacts | Information arbitrage, brokerage, control |

### Step 3: Evaluate Trust and Norms

Assess the level of generalized trust, reciprocity norms, and sanctioning mechanisms present in the network.

### Step 4: Identify Benefits and Constraints

Map the advantages and dark-side effects of the current network configuration.

## Output Format

```markdown
## Social Capital Analysis: [Context]

### Network Definition
- Actors: [who is in the network]
- Relationship type: [what ties are being analyzed]
- Level: [individual / group / community]

### Structural Assessment
| Dimension | Current State | Implication |
|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| Bonding capital | [H/M/L] | [effect] |
| Bridging capital | [H/M/L] | [effect] |
| Network closure | [H/M/L] | [effect] |
| Structural holes | [many/few] | [brokerage opportunities] |

### Trust and Norms
- Generalized trust level: [H/M/L]
- Reciprocity norms: [strong/weak]
- Sanctioning mechanisms: [formal/informal/absent]

### Benefits and Dark Side
| Benefits | Constraints / Dark Side |
|----------|------------------------|
| [benefit from current structure] | [cost or limitation] |

### Recommendations
1. [How to optimize the bonding-bridging balance]
2. [Structural hole opportunities to pursue]
3. [Dark-side risks to mitigate]
```

## Gotchas

- Bonding and bridging are not opposites — effective networks need both in the right mix
- Burt's structural holes and Coleman's closure are complements at different levels, not competing theories
- The "dark side" of social capital includes groupthink, exclusion of outsiders, and excessive obligations
- Putnam's macro-level civic social capital does not map directly to Burt's individual-level brokerage
- Do not conflate social capital with social network analysis — SNA is a method, social capital is a theory
- Measurement is notoriously difficult; specify clearly whether you measure structure, trust, or both

## References

- Burt, R. S. (1992). *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*. Harvard University Press.
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, S95-S120.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Simon & Schuster.
- Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6), 1360-1380.