Run a team of postmortem agents that builds the timeline, analyzes causes, drafts corrective actions, and reviews for blamelessness and completeness. Use after an incident when you need a rigorous, blameless writeup and owned action list instead of a hasty narrative that pins it on a person.
Scanned 9/5/2026
Install to Claude Code
npx -y skills add Amey-Thakur/AI-SKILLS --skill agent-postmortem-council --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
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---
name: agent-postmortem-council
description: Run a team of postmortem agents that builds the timeline, analyzes causes, drafts corrective actions, and reviews for blamelessness and completeness. Use after an incident when you need a rigorous, blameless writeup and owned action list instead of a hasty narrative that pins it on a person.
---
# Agent postmortem council
A postmortem written in one pass under pressure blames whoever touched the
deploy and ships vague actions no one owns. A council splits the work: one
agent reconstructs what happened, one finds why, one writes what changes, and
one checks the result is blameless and complete. Holding cause analysis apart
from action drafting keeps the writeup from leaping to fixes before it
understands the failure.
## Method
1. **Timeline builder reconstructs the sequence.** Assemble events from alerts,
deploy logs, dashboards, and chat into `timeline.md`: UTC timestamps, event,
source, one line each. Mark the detection, escalation, and mitigation
moments. Facts only, no interpretation yet.
2. **Cause analyst separates trigger from root cause.** Load
`site-reliability-engineer`. Run contributing-factor analysis, five whys or a
causal tree, over the timeline. Output `causes.md`: the trigger, the
underlying cause, and the detection and mitigation gaps that let it grow.
Blame lands on systems and gaps, never a named person.
3. **Hold the blameless line.** Any sentence shaped like "X should have" gets
rewritten as "the system allowed" or "no guardrail caught". A postmortem that
names a culprit teaches people to hide the next incident.
4. **Action drafter turns causes into owned work.** Output `actions.md`, one row
per action with an owner, a due date, and a link to the specific cause it
removes. Prefer actions that make the failure impossible over actions that
ask people to be careful. An action with no cause link is scope creep.
5. **Reviewer checks completeness and tone.** Load `incident-commander-role`.
Confirm every cause has at least one action, every action has an owner and a
date, and no line assigns blame. Output a sign-off or a send-back naming the
defects. A missing owner is a send-back.
6. **One revision, then publish.** The drafters address the send-back once.
Publish to the `postmortem-review-board` record when the reviewer signs
off; a second failed review escalates to a human facilitator rather than
looping.
## Run it
In Claude Code, run the four roles as subagents in sequence, passing
`timeline.md`, `causes.md`, and `actions.md` as files on the incident's branch,
with the orchestrator gating on the reviewer's sign-off. Terminate when the
reviewer approves with every cause actioned and every action owned, or when a
second review fails and a human facilitator takes over. To port, use a CrewAI
sequential Crew with a final review task, an AutoGen GroupChat with a critic
enforcing blamelessness, or a LangGraph pipeline with a review node that routes
back to the drafter once.
## Signals it works
- Every action row links to a cause and names an owner with a date.
- No sentence in the writeup blames a person by name or role.
- Causes split the trigger from the underlying weakness, not just the last
click.
## Boundaries
This council produces the writeup and action list, not the fixes; the actions
hand off to the owning teams' backlogs. It follows the organization's blameless
convention and severity definitions rather than inventing them, and it leaves
the decision to close the incident to the incident commander.
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