Claude Skills by nuroctane

'Configures pfSense firewall rules, NAT policies, IPsec/OpenVPN tunnels,

'Installs, configures, and tunes Snort 3 to monitor network traffic

'Deploys and configures Suricata IDS/IPS with Emerging Threats rulesets,

Configures TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) on servers, covering cipher suite and

'Configures Zscaler Private Access (ZPA) to replace traditional VPN

Router into 817 Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF, ATLAS, D3FEND, AI RMF, F3). Use for security investigations, DFIR, red/blue team playbooks.

Deobfuscates malicious JavaScript found in phishing pages, web skimmers, and dropper scripts by reversing encoding layers, eval chains, string manipulation, and control-flow obfuscation to reveal the original malicious logic. Use when investigating a phishing page's obfuscated JavaScript, analyzing a Magecart-style web skimmer, or deobfuscating a JavaScript dropper that fetches second-stage malware.

Systematically deobfuscates multi-layer PowerShell malware using AST analysis, dynamic tracing, and tools like PSDecode and PowerDecode to reveal hidden payloads and C2 infrastructure. Use during incident response or malware analysis when a PowerShell script is obfuscated with encoding, string manipulation, or invocation tricks and you need to recover the underlying commands, dropped payloads, or C2 endpoints.

Deploy cloud-native deception across AWS, Azure, and GCP using decoy (honey) resources whose only purpose is to generate a high-fidelity alert the instant an attacker touches them: canary IAM access keys, permission-less decoy users/roles/service principals, honey object-storage buckets, and decoy secrets in Secrets Manager / Key Vault / Secret Manager. Wires detection through CloudTrail + EventBridge, Azure Sentinel honeytoken watchlists + Defender, and GCP Cloud Audit Logs, so any use of a ...

Deploys Cloudflare Access with Cloudflare Tunnel for zero trust access to self-hosted apps, configuring identity-aware policies, device posture checks, and WARP client enrollment as a VPN replacement. Use when replacing VPN with Cloudflare One, exposing internal apps without open inbound ports, or securing contractor/third-party access to specific applications.

'Deploys canary files (honeytokens) across file systems to detect ransomware

Plants Canarytokens-based decoy artifacts (honey credentials, DNS tokens, web-bug URLs, AWS keys, documents, kubeconfigs) using Thinkst's open-source Canarytokens project and alerts via email or webhook when a token is touched. Use for high-fidelity intrusion detection in low-telemetry areas like file shares or credential stores, or to catch credential dumping and data-theft staging.

Deploys Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access for SASE-based zero trust network access, configuring GlobalProtect agents, ZTNA Connectors, security policy enforcement, and Strata Cloud Manager integration for unified management. Use when implementing enterprise-grade SASE with integrated ZTNA/SWG/CASB/FWaaS, replacing both VPN and branch firewalls with cloud-delivered security, or integrating ZTNA with an existing Palo Alto NGFW estate.

Deploys and monitors ransomware canary files using Python's watchdog library, placing decoy files mimicking high-value targets (financial records, credentials, database exports) where ransomware enumerates first, and alerting via email, Slack, or syslog on any read/modify/rename/delete. Use for early-warning ransomware detection on file servers, NAS, or endpoints, or to supplement EDR where agents can't be deployed.

Deploys a Software-Defined Perimeter per the CSA v2.0 specification, configuring Single Packet Authorization, mutual TLS, and SDP controller/gateway components to enforce zero trust network access. Use when building or hardening zero trust network architecture, implementing SPA-based "invisible" infrastructure that cloaks services from unauthenticated scanning, or meeting compliance requirements for zero trust network access.

Deploys and configures Tailscale (or self-hosted Headscale) as a WireGuard-based zero trust mesh VPN, setting up identity-aware ACLs, exit nodes, subnet routers, and MagicDNS for encrypted peer-to-peer connectivity. Use when replacing traditional VPN servers with an identity-authenticated mesh network or enforcing granular per-device access control lists.

Plan, run, and measure an adversary engagement operation using the MITRE Engage framework so that deployed deception is driven by strategy instead of deployed ad hoc. Covers the Engage Matrix (Prepare, Expose, Affect, Elicit, Understand), the 10-Step Operational Process, mapping engagement Activities to the ATT&CK techniques they expose, and defining measurable Goals and Operational Objectives. Use when a team has honeypots, honeytokens, or canary tokens but no coordinating strategy, when lea...

Detects prompt injection using regex signature matching, heuristic scoring for structural anomalies, and DeBERTa-based transformer classification, flagging direct injections (system-prompt overrides, role-play escapes) and indirect injections (encoded payloads, obfuscation) per OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM01:2025). Use for input validation layers in chatbots/agents/RAG pipelines, or for retrospectively classifying injection attempts in logs or incident investigations.

Deploys anomaly detection for OT/ICS environments using machine learning on OT network baselines, physics-based process models, and Modbus/DNP3/OPC UA traffic analysis to flag deviations, rogue devices, and mismatches against historian data. Use for continuous OT monitoring, baselining deterministic SCADA polling, or investigating alerts from Nozomi Guardian/Dragos needing deeper protocol analysis.

'Detects anomalous authentication patterns using UEBA analytics, statistical

Detect API enumeration attacks (BOLA/IDOR, OWASP API1:2023) by writing SIEM

Detect Layer 2 ARP poisoning/spoofing by deploying ARPWatch, Dynamic ARP

'Detect cyber attacks on OT historian servers (OSIsoft PI, Ignition, GE

Detect unusual API call patterns in AWS CloudTrail logs using boto3,

'Scan source code repositories, CI/CD pipelines, and configuration files

Build automated AWS GuardDuty finding response pipelines using EventBridge

Detect Azure service principal abuse in Microsoft Entra ID using KQL detection

Audit Azure Blob and ADLS storage accounts for public access exposure, weak

Detect and test for OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization

Deploy AI and NLP-powered detection systems to identify business email

Detect Business Email Compromise (BEC) fraud, where attackers impersonate

'Deploy and operationalize Amazon GuardDuty, covering protection plans

'Detect command-and-control (C2) traffic tunneled over DNS from tools like

'Detect compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing

Detects unauthorized runtime drift in containers by monitoring binary execution, filesystem changes, and configuration deviation from the original immutable image, using Falco and Microsoft Defender for Containers. Use when validating immutable-infrastructure controls, hunting for unexpected package installs or binaries written inside a running container, or determining whether a container diverged from the image it was built from. Keywords: drift, immutable infrastructure, new binary execute...

Detects container escape at runtime across tooling - namespace manipulation, capability abuse, kernel exploits, sensitive host mounts, and anomalous syscalls - and explains which signals matter regardless of whether Falco, Sysdig, auditd, or an EDR is doing the collection. Use when deciding what breakout behaviour to monitor, investigating a suspected Docker or Kubernetes breakout, or comparing escape coverage across runtime sensors. Keywords: container escape, breakout, namespaces, CAP_SYS_A...

Writes and tunes Falco rule syntax for container escape detection - conditions, macros, lists, priorities, and output fields - covering host filesystem mounts, sensitive host path access, kernel module loading, and privileged capability abuse, including how to drive down false positives. Use when authoring or tuning a specific Falco rule for breakout behaviour, or triaging a noisy escape-related Falco alert. Keywords: Falco rule, macro, list, condition, priority, falco_rules.local.yaml, tunin...

Deploys and operates Falco with the modern eBPF driver in Kubernetes and Docker, covering driver selection, Helm installation, output channels, and the built-in ruleset that detects container escape, namespace abuse, privileged mounts, and anomalous syscalls. Use when standing Falco up on a cluster, choosing between the eBPF and kernel-module drivers, routing Falco alerts into a SIEM or Falcosidekick, or upgrading an existing deployment. Keywords: Falco, modern_ebpf, kernel module, Helm, Falc...

Detect LSASS credential dumping, SAM database extraction, and NTDS.dit theft (e.g. via Mimikatz) using Sysmon Event ID 10 process-access logging, Windows Security logs, and SIEM correlation rules. Use when hunting for credential-theft activity on Windows/Active Directory hosts or triaging EDR alerts on LSASS access.

'This skill teaches security teams how to detect and respond to unauthorized

Identify poisoned training data and backdoored ML models across the pipeline using IBM's Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (activation clustering, spectral signatures, trigger reconstruction), Cleanlab for label-quality issues, and supply-chain checks like weight-hash verification and safetensors enforcement. Use before training or deploying on third-party/user-contributed data or downloaded checkpoints, during ML supply-chain reviews, or when investigating model misbehavior tied to specific inp...

Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.

Detect AI-generated deepfake audio used in voice phishing (vishing) by extracting spectral features (MFCC, spectral centroid, spectral contrast, zero-crossing rate) and classifying samples with machine learning models, supporting batch audio analysis, confidence scoring, and forensic reporting. Use for deepfake voice detection, vishing investigations, AI-generated speech analysis, voice cloning detection, or audio authenticity verification.

Detect and prevent dependency confusion (public-over-private package name resolution) in npm, PyPI, and Maven by enumerating claimable internal package names with tools like `confused` and OWASP `dep-scan`, then enforcing source restrictions via `.npmrc`, `pip.conf`/`pyproject.toml`, and Maven `settings.xml`. Use when onboarding a repo to a supply-chain security program, auditing lockfiles/manifests for confusable dependencies, or after an incident that may have leaked internal package names.

Detect DLL side-loading and search-order hijacking (MITRE T1574) where adversaries plant malicious DLLs for legitimate signed applications to load, by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 7 DLL-load events, checking signatures/hashes against known-good versions, and flagging path anomalies with EDR tools like CrowdStrike, MDE, or SentinelOne. Use when investigating EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs, hunting for APT persistence via trojanized applications, or triaging incidents involving DLL hijacking.

Detect anomalies in DNP3 communications used in SCADA/ICS systems by monitoring unauthorized control commands, firmware update attempts, protocol violations, and deviations from baseline traffic using deep packet inspection and machine learning approaches. Use when securing energy-sector or other OT/ICS networks, investigating suspicious DNP3 master/outstation activity, or building an anomaly-based IDS for industrial control traffic.

Detect data exfiltration via DNS tunneling (tools like iodine, dnscat2, dns2tcp) by analyzing query entropy, subdomain length, query volume to single domains, TXT/CNAME/NULL record abuse, and oversized response payloads using passive DNS monitoring and statistical/ML methods. Use when hunting for covert DNS-based data exfiltration or building a passive DNS anomaly detection capability.

Detect compromised O365 and Google Workspace email accounts by analyzing Unified Audit Logs and Azure AD sign-in logs for impossible travel, inbox rule creation/deletion (Set-InboxRule, New-InboxRule), external mail forwarding rules, and unusual Microsoft Graph API access or OAuth token use. Use when investigating suspected business email compromise (BEC), account takeover, or mailbox persistence via malicious inbox rules.

Detect malicious inbox/mail-flow forwarding rules that adversaries create to maintain

Hunt AADGraphActivityLogs and MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs in Microsoft Sentinel/Log Analytics using KQL to fingerprint offensive Entra ID enumeration tools such as ROADtools, AADInternals, and AzureHound, including User-Agent signatures, roadrecon endpoint sweeps, and sign-in correlation. Use when investigating suspicious Microsoft Graph API activity, Entra ID reconnaissance, or building Sentinel analytics rules to detect these tools.