Determine mean time to failure (MTTF) for the following system components in specific environments of operation: [organization-defined] ;
Scanned 9/3/2026
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---
name: "SI-13_predictable-failure-prevention"
description: "Determine mean time to failure (MTTF) for the following system components in specific environments of operation: [organization-defined] ;"
category: "input-validation"
version: "5.2.0"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
- nist
- sp800-53
- rev5
- si-13
- si
tech_stack:
- aws
- azure
- gcp
- linux
- windows
cwe_ids:
- CWE-20
chains_with:
- CP-2
- CP-10
- CP-13
- MA-2
- MA-6
- SA-8
- SC-6
prerequisites: []
severity_boost:
CP-2: "Chain with CP-2 for comprehensive security coverage"
CP-10: "Chain with CP-10 for comprehensive security coverage"
CP-13: "Chain with CP-13 for comprehensive security coverage"
---
# SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention
## High-Level Description
**Family:** System and Information Integrity (SI)
**Framework:** NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, predictable failure prevention is intended to address potential failures of system components that provide security capabilities. Failure rates reflect installation-specific consideration rather than the industry-average. Organizations define the criteria for the substitution of system components based on the MTTF value with consideration for the potential harm from component failures. The transfer of responsibilities between active and standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capabilities. The preservation of system state variables is also critical to help ensure a successful transfer process. Standby components remain available at all times except for maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress.
## What to Check
- [ ] Verify SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention is documented in SSP
- [ ] Validate all 2 control requirements are implemented
- [ ] Confirm control is operating effectively
- [ ] Review evidence of continuous monitoring for SI-13
## How to Test
### Step 1: Review Documentation
Examine the System Security Plan (SSP) and related artifacts for SI-13 implementation details. Verify the organization has documented how this control is satisfied.
### Step 2: Validate Implementation
```
# For cloud environments, use cloud-audit-mcp tools
# For on-premises, review system configurations directly
# Example: Check if account management policies exist
grep -r "account.management\|access.control" /etc/security/ 2>/dev/null
```
### Step 3: Test Operating Effectiveness
Verify the control is actively functioning, not just documented. Check logs, configurations, and operational evidence.
## Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Usage |
| --------------- | -------------------------- | ------------------------------ |
| cloud-audit-mcp | Check integrity monitoring | `cloud_audit_monitoring` |
| AWS CLI | Review GuardDuty/Inspector | `aws guardduty list-detectors` |
## Remediation Guide
### Control Statement
Determine mean time to failure (MTTF) for the following system components in specific environments of operation: [organization-defined] ; and
Provide substitute system components and a means to exchange active and standby components in accordance with the following criteria: [organization-defined].
### Implementation Guidance
While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, predictable failure prevention is intended to address potential failures of system components that provide security capabilities. Failure rates reflect installation-specific consideration rather than the industry-average. Organizations define the criteria for the substitution of system components based on the MTTF value with consideration for the potential harm from component failures. The transfer of responsibilities between active and standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capabilities. The preservation of system state variables is also critical to help ensure a successful transfer process. Standby components remain available at all times except for maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress.
## Risk Assessment
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
| ---------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------- |
| SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention not implemented | High | System and Information Integrity |
| SI-13 partially implemented | Medium | Incomplete System and Information Integrity |
## CWE Categories
| CWE ID | Title |
| ------ | ------------------------- |
| CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation |
## References
- [NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 - SI-13](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=si-13)
- [NIST SP 800-53A Rev 5 (Assessment Procedures)](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/a/r5/final)
- [NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Full Catalog](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final)
## Checklist
- [ ] Control documented in SSP
- [ ] Implementation evidence collected
- [ ] Operating effectiveness validated
- [ ] Continuous monitoring in place
- [ ] Related controls (CP-2, CP-10, CP-13, MA-2, MA-6) reviewed
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