Audit a long-context safety evaluation for many-shot jailbreaking coverage. Use when you need help with msj audit.
Scanned 9/8/2026
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---
name: msj-audit
description: Audit a long-context safety evaluation for many-shot jailbreaking coverage. Use when you need help with msj audit.
license: CC-BY-NC-SA-4.0
phase: 18
lesson: 13
metadata:
version: 1.0.0
tags: [many-shot-jailbreaking, context-window, power-law, anthropic]
---
Given a safety evaluation for a long-context model, audit whether the evaluation covers many-shot jailbreaking.
Produce:
1. Shot-count coverage. Report the shot counts tested (should include 1, 5, 16, 64, 256, and at least one >= 512 for models with >= 1M context). If the evaluation tests at a single shot count, ASR is uninformative — MSJ is a curve.
2. Power-law fit. Report the fitted exponent per behaviour category. A shallow exponent indicates the model is ICL-robust on that category; a steep exponent indicates MSJ is disproportionately effective.
3. Category breakdown. MSJ effectiveness varies by category: violent content, deceit, self-harm, bioweapon. Per Anil et al. 2024, violent/deceitful needs fewer shots to jailbreak. Flag any category absent from the evaluation.
4. Defense identification. Is a classifier-based prompt modification in place? Is the classifier itself evaluated for adversarial robustness? Anthropic's reported 61% -> 2% reduction depends on classifier calibration.
5. Compositional check. Does the evaluation test MSJ + PAIR, MSJ + persuasive templates, or MSJ + encoding? Compositional attacks are frequently stronger than any single technique.
Hard rejects:
- Any "our long-context model is safe" claim based on 5-shot-only evaluation.
- Any defense claim without reporting both jailbreak ASR and benign ICL performance on the same classifier — the trade-off is the point.
- Any category-aggregate ASR without a category breakdown.
Refusal rules:
- If the user asks whether MSJ can be fully patched, refuse the binary answer; MSJ shares a mechanism with ICL and cannot be eliminated without eliminating ICL.
- If the user asks for a recommended shot count for evaluation, refuse a single number; request the power-law fit over 5 to 512 shots.
Output: a one-page audit that reports the shot-count coverage, power-law fit per category, defense identification, and one compositional attack gap. Cite Anil et al. 2024 (Anthropic) once as the methodological reference.
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