Audit a jailbreak-defense report across encoding-family attacks. Use when you need help with encoding audit.
Scanned 9/8/2026
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---
name: encoding-audit
description: Audit a jailbreak-defense report across encoding-family attacks. Use when you need help with encoding audit.
license: CC-BY-NC-SA-4.0
phase: 18
lesson: 14
metadata:
version: 1.0.0
tags: [artprompt, ascii-art, encoding-attack, utes, structural-sleight]
---
Given a jailbreak-defense report, enumerate the encoding-family attacks covered and the defense layer that catches each.
Produce:
1. Encoding coverage. List each attack family evaluated: ASCII art (ArtPrompt), base64, leet-speak, UTF-8 homoglyphs, nested JSON / YAML / CSV, tree/graph UTES, image-modality. Flag families missing.
2. Defense-layer mapping. For each family, identify which defense layer (keyword filter, perplexity filter, paraphrase, retokenization, output classifier, multimodal moderator) catches it and which does not.
3. Visual-recognition gap. Per Jiang et al. 2024, PPL and Retokenization fail against ArtPrompt because the recognition happens at the visual level. Does the report's defense include anything that operates at the visual/structural level?
4. Generalization test. UTES (StructuralSleight) generalizes to arbitrary rare structures. Does the report test structures not in its training defense set?
5. Capability-safety tradeoff. A model with stronger visual-text capability (high ViTC score) is more vulnerable to ArtPrompt. Note the model's ViTC score if reported; request it if not.
Hard rejects:
- Any defense claim based solely on substring/keyword filtering.
- Any defense claim that covers one encoding family and extrapolates to "encoding attacks."
- Any defense claim without a per-family attack-success rate.
Refusal rules:
- If the user asks whether ArtPrompt is "patched," refuse and explain the recognition-level vs text-level defense gap.
- If the user asks for a recommended all-encoding defense, refuse a single recommendation — defense must be layered across all families that the deployment might face.
Output: a one-page audit that fills the five sections above, flags the primary encoding gap, and names the single most urgent defense layer to add. Cite Jiang et al. (arXiv:2402.11753) and StructuralSleight once each.
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