Set up Claude Code hooks to block dangerous git commands (push, reset --hard, clean, branch -D, etc.) before they execute. Use when user wants to prevent destructive git operations, add git safety hooks, or block git push/reset in Claude Code.
Scanned 9/12/2026
Install to Claude Code
npx -y skills add stanfish06/skillquarium --skill git-guardrails-claude-code --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
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---
name: git-guardrails-claude-code
description: Set up Claude Code hooks to block dangerous git commands (push, reset --hard, clean, branch -D, etc.) before they execute. Use when user wants to prevent destructive git operations, add git safety hooks, or block git push/reset in Claude Code.
---
# Setup Git Guardrails
Sets up a PreToolUse hook that intercepts and blocks dangerous git commands before Claude executes them.
## What Gets Blocked
- `git push` (all variants including `--force`)
- `git reset --hard`
- `git clean -f` / `git clean -fd` / `git clean -xdf`
- `git branch -D` / `git branch --delete --force`
- `git checkout .` / `git checkout -- .` / `git restore .` / `git restore --staged .`
The script strips git's global options before matching, so `git -C <path> push`,
`git -c <key>=<val> push` and `git --git-dir=… --work-tree=… push` are blocked too.
When blocked, Claude sees a message telling it that it does not have authority to access these commands.
## Limits
Matching is substring-based on the command text, so it over-blocks (a command that
merely mentions `git push` is refused) and it cannot see through `eval`, a shell
variable, or a script the command invokes. Treat it as a seatbelt against accidents,
not as a security boundary.
## Requires
`jq`, on the `PATH` of every environment the hook runs in — Claude Code does not
bundle it, and the global install in step 1 puts the hook in devcontainers and CI
images too. If `jq` is missing or the payload does not parse, the script exits 2
(blocks) rather than silently permitting.
## Steps
### 1. Ask scope
Ask the user: install for **this project only** (`.claude/settings.json`) or **all projects** (`~/.claude/settings.json`)?
### 2. Copy the hook script
The bundled script is at: [scripts/block-dangerous-git.sh](scripts/block-dangerous-git.sh)
Copy it to the target location based on scope:
- **Project**: `.claude/hooks/block-dangerous-git.sh`
- **Global**: `~/.claude/hooks/block-dangerous-git.sh`
Make it executable with `chmod +x`.
### 3. Add hook to settings
Add to the appropriate settings file:
**Project** (`.claude/settings.json`):
```json
{
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "\"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR\"/.claude/hooks/block-dangerous-git.sh"
}
]
}
]
}
}
```
**Global** (`~/.claude/settings.json`):
```json
{
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "~/.claude/hooks/block-dangerous-git.sh"
}
]
}
]
}
}
```
If the settings file already exists, merge the hook into the existing `hooks.PreToolUse` array. Don't overwrite other settings.
### 4. Ask about customization
Ask if user wants to add or remove any patterns from the blocked list. Edit the copied script accordingly.
### 5. Verify
Run a quick test:
```bash
echo '{"tool_input":{"command":"git push origin main"}}' | <path-to-script>
echo '{"tool_input":{"command":"git -C /tmp push origin main"}}' | <path-to-script>
echo '{}' | <path-to-script>
```
All three should exit with code 2 and print a BLOCKED message to stderr — the last
one confirms the hook fails closed on a payload it cannot read.
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