Phase 3 of security review prep. Orchestrates every scan family the review consumes — Code Analyzer (package SAST), the Partner Security Portal scanner check, authenticated DAST (+ Nuclei/Schemathesis) plan generation, TLS grading (SSL Labs or local testssl/sslyze), dependency audits, secret scan, and the external-endpoint OSS scanners (Semgrep SAST, OSV-Scanner SCA, Checkov IaC) — runs what an agent can run, hands the owner exactly what it cannot, and folds every finding into a dispositioned...
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---
name: run-scans
description: Phase 3 of security review prep. Orchestrates every scan family the review consumes — Code Analyzer (package SAST), the Partner Security Portal scanner check, authenticated DAST (+ Nuclei/Schemathesis) plan generation, TLS grading (SSL Labs or local testssl/sslyze), dependency audits, secret scan, and the external-endpoint OSS scanners (Semgrep SAST, OSV-Scanner SCA, Checkov IaC) — runs what an agent can run, hands the owner exactly what it cannot, and folds every finding into a dispositioned false-positive dossier. On a journey run it enters twice — the early host-independent static substrate (before the audit, needing only the scope manifest) and the late live/conditional tail (after artifacts exist); standalone it is the full sweep. The scan evidence is what the submission attaches.
allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob Write Edit Bash Bash(sf code-analyzer *) Bash(export SF_AUTOUPDATE_DISABLE=true SF_DISABLE_AUTOUPDATE=true) Bash(node *harness/ingest-scanner-findings.mjs *) Bash(node *harness/reconcile-provenance.mjs *) Bash(node *harness/seed-auto-dispositions.mjs *) Bash(node *harness/apply-dispositions.mjs *) Bash(node *harness/build-evidence-index.mjs *) Bash(node *harness/capture-openapi.mjs *) Bash(node *harness/render-scan-status.mjs *) Bash(node *harness/capture-org-mcp.mjs *) AskUserQuestion
---
# Run Scans
Produce the scan evidence the review requires, with the honesty line drawn
per family: what an agent ran (from what inputs, with the report file on
disk) versus what only the owner can run (and is therefore PENDING until the
owner's report file exists). Evidence lands in
`<target>/.security-review/evidence/`; dispositions land in the FP dossier
(`${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/templates/fp-dossier.md.tmpl` →
`<target>/docs/security-review/fp-dossier.md`). The failure class this phase
exists to kill: a submission whose scan reports are missing, stale,
unauthenticated, scoped narrower than the architecture doc, or carrying
undispositioned findings — each of those bounces at the materials check
(baseline: `process-prequeue-validation`, `scan-no-clean-scan-required`).
## When to use
- As the journey's **static-scan substrate** (early, BEFORE the audit): the
host-independent families need only the scope manifest — see "The
static/live partition" below
- As the journey's **live/conditional tail** (late): artifacts drafted and the
scope manifest's endpoint inventory exists — the DAST scope is generated
from it (this prerequisite belongs to the DAST/live tail, not the static
substrate)
- Re-scanning after fixes: the submitted report must be the post-fix run
- Refreshing evidence before submission (baseline: `scan-report-freshness`)
- NOT a replacement for the white-box audit
(`/sf-security-review-toolkit:audit-codebase` is static code review — a
different evidence class, never presentable as DAST)
- NOT for executing the DAST scan itself — that is owner-run by nature, and
this skill never claims otherwise (CONVENTIONS §2)
- NOT the reviewer's pen test — Salesforce's Product Security team tests the
surface regardless of anything submitted (baseline:
`dast-salesforce-runs-own-pentest`)
## Prerequisites
- `<target>/.security-review/scope-manifest.json` (from
`/sf-security-review-toolkit:scope-submission`). Missing? Offer to route
there first; degraded mode runs only the track the repo itself proves
(package tree → Code Analyzer; lockfiles → dependency audit) and records
that the endpoint families were skipped for lack of an inventory.
- `${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/baseline/requirements-baseline.yaml` readable.
- Per family: the Code Analyzer CLI + JDK 11+ (PMD engine) for the package
track — present `sf` used as-is, else consent-installable as the whole stack
to the tmp dir (0.8.41, the same gate as the OSS scanners); a ZAP install (or
the container) wherever the owner will run DAST;
network access for the TLS check; ecosystem package managers for the
dependency audit. For the external-endpoint families (7/8) and the DAST/TLS
extensions, the free/OSS tools — **Semgrep**, **OSV-Scanner**, **Checkov**,
and optionally **Trivy / Nuclei / Schemathesis / testssl.sh / sslyze**; each
is auto-**detected** (never auto-installed by THIS skill — see the hard
boundary below), found on the prepended PATH when the operator consented to a tmp
install at the journey gate (`<target>/.security-review/scanner-install.json`),
and, if still absent, handed to the owner as the exact install + run command
(`PENDING-OWNER-RUN`) rather than skipped silently.
- Credentials only ever via environment variables — this skill refuses to
write a secret into a plan, an evidence file, or the run log
(CONVENTIONS §6).
> **HARD BOUNDARY — THIS skill never mutates the host, never auto-fetches.** It
> **detects** scanners and **consumes** any the operator already consented to install;
> it **never installs them itself**. It MUST NOT run `pip install` / `pipx` /
> `npm i -g` / `brew` / a venv bootstrap / any package manager, and MUST NOT run a
> scan that **fetches third-party content over the network** (e.g. Semgrep pulling
> registry rule packs like `p/security-audit`). Installing software and fetching
> remote rule sets are **environment mutations / network egress** that
> `silence-is-yes` / full-auto never authorizes (it covers only inputs the preflight
> already DETECTED). A scanner that is absent — with no consented tmp install present
> (below) — is **`PENDING-OWNER-RUN`**: emit the exact install + run command for the
> owner, and move on. "Real evidence beats a PENDING stub" is **not** a license to
> self-install — a PENDING stub with the precise command IS the honest evidence here.
> The one always-allowed carve-out: a tool that is **already present** doing its
> **standard, bundled** read (`npm audit` hitting the registry it already targets;
> Code Analyzer's RetireJS using its shipped vuln DB).
>
> **The consent-gated install now EXISTS — and it is a SEPARATE, gated step, not
> something this skill does.** When the operator says yes at the journey's single
> preflight gate (the second of its two consents), `harness/install-scanners.mjs`
> installs the missing scanners to a tmp dir OUTSIDE the repo
> (`/tmp/sf-srt-scanners/<runid>/`, sha256-pinned binaries) and records them in
> `<target>/.security-review/scanner-install.json`. **As of 0.8.41 that consented set
> also includes the Code Analyzer stack** (`@salesforce/cli` + the `code-analyzer`
> plugin from npm + a JDK 11+ — a present `java`≥11 reused, else the pinned Temurin from
> Adoptium; ~1 GB, +~320 MB if Java must be provisioned), so on a cold box CRUD/FLS is
> deterministic-by-default rather than owner-gated. **This skill READS that pointer
> (when its `status` is not `cleaned`), prepends its `pathPrepend` to the PATH for the
> scan subprocesses, and uses those tools** — turning the absent families into real
> evidence (the Code Analyzer record's hermetic `env` + 2-dir `pathPrepend` is what
> Family 1's engine-explicit form exports). It still never runs the installer itself; absent the pointer (declined, or
> a standalone run with no journey gate), the answer stays `PENDING-OWNER-RUN`. The
> tmp tools are removed by `cleanup-scanners.mjs` at end-of-run (evidence kept).
> **When that consent was given, running the consented scanners with their STANDARD
> rule/template fetches (Semgrep registry rules, Nuclei templates, the OSV DB) is
> within scope** — the gate's install-yes covers installing AND running them for this
> run, since the fetch is inseparable from producing the evidence. Absent the consent,
> the no-remote-fetch rule above holds in full.
>
> **The tmp-scoped `install-scanners.mjs` path above is the PREFERRED install route** (it
> never touches the host's global state). A **global `npm install -g`** is only ever a
> gated fallback — and the shipped PreToolUse hook (`hooks/sf-ops-gate-hook.mjs`)
> **DENIES** `npm install -g` unless an affirmative `sf-cli-setup` consent is recorded
> (`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/record-consent.mjs --gate sf-cli-setup --answer "<operator's yes>" --target <repo>`,
> coupled to a mandatory `AskUserQuestion`). A skipped ask means the global install is
> denied, not silently run — so the tmp-scoped path stays the default.
## The eight families
Families 1–6 cover the Salesforce-package surface + secrets/deps/TLS. Families 7–8
(0.4.x, WI-17) close the **external-endpoint mechanical-scan gap**: the
partner-hosted server tree (Python/Node/Java/Go) + its IaC, which Code Analyzer
never sees and the LLM dimensions read but do not mechanically scan — yet
Salesforce explicitly pen-tests it ("Test Your Entire Solution… include all
external endpoints"). All Family 7/8 tools are free/OSS, no paid tier.
| Family | Applies when (manifest) | Scan runner | Evidence file(s) under `.security-review/evidence/` | Gate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Code Analyzer | managed-package element | agent | `code-analyzer-<date>.html` + `.json` | `scan-code-analyzer-v5-required` (blocker) |
| 2. Partner Security Portal scanner (Checkmarx) | managed-package element | owner (portal); agent parses the report | `portal-scan-<date>.*` | `scan-checkmarx-partner-portal` (blocker — required IN ADDITION to Code Analyzer) |
| 3. Authenticated DAST (+ Nuclei templates, Schemathesis OpenAPI fuzz) | external-endpoint / mcp-server | owner executes; agent generates the plan + runs what it can | `dast/dast-report.{html,json}`, `dast/dast-url-proof.png`, `dast/nuclei-<date>.json`, `dast/schemathesis-<date>.json`, `dast/run-notes.md` | `dast-self-run-required`, `dast-authenticated-scans` (blockers) |
| 4. TLS grade (SSL Labs **or** local testssl.sh/sslyze) | external-endpoint / mcp-server | agent | `ssllabs-<host>.json` **or** `tls-<host>-<date>.json` + capture | `endpoint-ssl-labs-a-grade` (qualitative bar; local TLS evidence satisfies it deterministically) |
| 5. Dependency audit | always | agent | `deps-<ecosystem>-<date>.json` + the register | `scan-dependency-vulnerabilities` (major) |
| 6. Secret scan (tree + full git history) | always | agent | `secret-scan-<date>.json` (redacted) (+ `detect-secrets-<date>.json` when the complementary pass ran) | `fail-hardcoded-secrets` (blocker) |
| 7. External SAST | external-endpoint with source (Python/Node/Java/Go) | agent | `semgrep-<date>.json`/`.sarif` + `opengrep-<date>.json`/`.sarif` (the reachability leg) (+ `bandit`/`njsscan`/`gosec`-<date>.json per language, + `redos-<date>.txt` — the regexploit ReDoS leg, verbatim text) | `scan-external-sast` (major; blocker on a confirmed critical in reviewer-reachable code); ReDoS leg → `resource-consumption-abuse` (major) |
| 8. External SCA + IaC | any lockfile / Dockerfile / IaC under a non-package source root | agent | `osv-<date>.json`, `iac-<date>.json` | `scan-external-sca` (major), `scan-iac-misconfig` (major) |
The *Applies when (manifest)* column — here and in every per-family *Applies
when:* line below — matches element types through their canonical form
(synonyms per `harness/render-detected-elements.mjs`'s
`ELEMENT_TYPE_SYNONYMS`, e.g. `external-web-app` ≡ `external-endpoint`): a
synonym-typed manifest selects exactly the families its canonical twin would.
## The static/live partition — two journey entry modes
The eight families split cleanly by what they need, and the journey drives the
two halves at different points:
- **Static substrate (host-independent — the journey runs these EARLY, before
the audit):** Family 1 (Code Analyzer — CRUD/FLS + sharing), Family 5
(dependency audit), Family 6 (secret scan), Family 7 (external SAST), and
Family 8 (SCA + IaC). These read the repo and consume only tools already
present or consent-installed at the journey gate; they need no reachable
host and no deployed org, only the scope manifest. Family 4's **local TLS**
form (testssl.sh/sslyze) MAY join the static pass, but ONLY when a manifest
endpoint host is reachable AND its read-only live-probe consent is already
recorded — a host-reaching probe stays behind the same gate at the same
ask-point regardless of when it runs; otherwise TLS stays in the tail or
`PENDING-OWNER-RUN`.
- **Live/conditional tail (the journey runs these LATE, after artifacts):**
Family 3 (the authenticated-DAST plan + the consented throwaway DAST — live
ops), Family 2 (the portal prediction — it maps the audit ledger's CONFIRMED
findings, which exist only after the audit), Family 4's host-grade TLS
(SSL Labs / host-reachable testssl where not already produced), anything the
static pass left `PENDING-OWNER-RUN`, and the Step 9b ingest + reconcile
tail.
**How the journey signals the mode:** it SAYS so in the invocation — "run the
static-scan substrate" vs "run the live/conditional tail" — and this skill runs
only that half's families (family selection from the manifest is unchanged;
the mode only partitions WHICH selected families run now). Each mode ends with
the Step 9b `--all` ingest + reconcile over whatever evidence now exists — both
harnesses are idempotent (stable ids dedup; reconcile only demotes), so running
them at the substrate tail AND again at the live tail is safe. **A standalone
invocation with no mode stated is the full sweep — all selected families, both
halves, exactly as before.** Consent posture is identical in every mode: this
skill installs nothing, and an absent tool is `PENDING-OWNER-RUN` (the hard
boundary above, verbatim). On a journey run, the static substrate is what makes
the audit's first pass ingest real scanner findings instead of leaving those
families PENDING until a re-audit.
## Steps
1. **Read the scope manifest and the baseline; establish the tool PATH; surface
the conflicts before running anything.** Select families from the manifest's
elements (table above). **Then read
`<target>/.security-review/scanner-install.json` (if present and `status` is not
`cleaned`) and prepend its `pathPrepend` entries to the PATH for every scan
subprocess** — those are the scanners the operator consented to install for this
run; with them on the PATH, the external-SAST/SCA/secret/TLS/DAST families that
would otherwise be `PENDING-OWNER-RUN` now resolve to real tools and real evidence.
**Verify each `pathPrepend` dir still EXISTS before trusting it** — the tmp dir
lives under `/tmp`, which a reboot wipes, so a stale pointer can outlive its tools;
a missing dir means treat that family as `PENDING-OWNER-RUN`, not present. Re-detect
availability with the (surviving) PATH in place (a tool both present-on-PATH and in
the pointer is just present). Warn when any `scan-*`/`dast-*`/`endpoint-*` entry
this run uses has `last_verified` older than 90 days (CONVENTIONS §4). Surface every
`conflicting` entry with its `conflicts` text — never silently pick a
side. As of the 2026-06 baseline sweep the scan-relevant remainder is
narrow: `endpoint-ssl-labs-a-grade` (only whether reviewers enforce the
letter grade in practice — the codified bar is qualitative) and
`process-review-fee` (the dollar amount). Formerly contested entries are
now verified — read them from the baseline, not from memory of old
prose: `scan-checkmarx-partner-portal` (the portal scanner is
operational and required for package-bearing submissions),
`dast-severity-bar` (the fix-vs-document bar is published),
`scan-code-analyzer-v5-required` (v5 tooling is prescribed verbatim,
though never assert a GA date), and `mcp-listing-managed-package` (an
AgentExchange MCP listing carries BOTH the package-scanning track and
the external-endpoint track).
*Deep-audit wiring note (no new gate):* when the deployed-package deep
audit has stood up an org, point the deep-audit tail at
`harness/capture-org-mcp.mjs` for the org-effective agent-mcp catalog read
(which registered MCP servers Agentforce ingested + their `active` /
`is-agent-action` state) — it rides the SAME recorded `sf-deep-audit-ops`
consent, no new gate, and feeds the third provenance lane
`generate-artifacts` folds into `artifact-exposed-tools-list`.
2. **Family 1 — Code Analyzer (package track).**
*Requires:* the current Code Analyzer's HTML report, submitted with the
review; the prior major version is retired (baseline:
`scan-code-analyzer-v5-required`).
*Install check:* verify the CLI is present and reports the currently
required major version — read that from the baseline entry at run time,
don't trust this prose. PMD needs JDK 11+; check `java -version` before
blaming the scanner.
*Cold-install path (0.8.41):* when `sf` / the plugin / a JDK are ABSENT and
the operator consented at the journey gate, `install-scanners.mjs`
provisions the whole Code Analyzer stack — the pinned `@salesforce/cli` +
the `code-analyzer` plugin + a JDK 11+ (a present `java`≥11 is reused, else
the pinned Temurin is fetched + sha256-verified) — into the tmp root, so
CRUD/FLS is deterministic-by-default instead of `PENDING-OWNER-RUN`. The
`code-analyzer` record inside the manifest that
`<target>/.security-review/scanner-install.json` points at carries a
hermetic `env` map and a 2-dir `pathPrepend` (the sf `.bin` AND
`JAVA_HOME/bin`). **Export that `env` and prepend both `pathPrepend` dirs**
for the scan subprocess, then run the workspace form below. Everything the
stack writes is contained under the tmp root, so `cleanup-scanners.mjs`
removes it structurally at end-of-run (evidence kept). When a present `sf`
is already on PATH, use it as-is — it is never re-installed.
**Report the Code Analyzer plugin version from the manifest record's
`code-analyzer` → `plugin.installed` field (read deterministically from the
installed plugin's `package.json`), NOT an ad-hoc `sf plugins` listing** — a
cold run misreported `5.13.0` while the pinned `5.14.0` was on disk because
it read the version from an LLM-parsed `sf plugins` instead of the manifest.
*Invocation — the deterministic-band form is PRIMARY.* Run the v5 workspace
form that selects the engines explicitly. This is the form that produces the
FLS band AND the `--all`-ingestable evidence JSON, and it is the primary
command for **BOTH** a present `sf` and the cold-installed stack — the only
difference between the two is how `sf` got onto PATH (a pre-existing install
vs. the 0.8.41 cold-install provision above), not which command you run. Every Bash
tool call runs in a **fresh shell**, so the CLI's update-availability banner-disable
flags must sit at the **top of every Bash block that runs `sf code-analyzer`** in
this skill, on their own line above the command — the banner otherwise prints ahead
of the `--json` / evidence payload and corrupts its parsing:
```bash
export SF_AUTOUPDATE_DISABLE=true SF_DISABLE_AUTOUPDATE=true
sf code-analyzer run --workspace <force-app-root> \
-r AppExchange -r sfge -r pmd \
--output-file .security-review/evidence/code-analyzer-<date>.json --view detail \
2> .security-review/evidence/ca-scan-log-<date>.txt
```
The `2>` capture is load-bearing: a per-file PMD `ParseException` goes ONLY
to stderr (the violations JSON has no error channel), and the ingest step
reads this scan-log to emit the scan-error coverage note deterministically.
The log is named `ca-scan-log-<date>.txt` on purpose — it must NOT start
with `code-analyzer-` (the scan-status renderer keys CA-report presence on
that prefix, and a `.txt` under it would be mis-counted as the report).
**`-r sfge` is mandatory for FLS:** `ApexFlsViolation` is DevPreview and NOT
in `Recommended`, so it only fires when sfge is selected explicitly;
`ApexCRUDViolation` comes in via `-r AppExchange` / `-r pmd`. All three
CRUD/FLS rules carry a Security/AppExchange tag, so they survive the ingest
adapter's security-tag filter. **A present `sf` does NOT exempt you from this
form:** the HTML-only submission form below, run on its own, yields NEITHER
the FLS band NOR the `--all`-ingestable JSON — so a box that already has `sf`
on PATH still MUST run this engine-explicit form (with `-r sfge` + the
evidence JSON) to get the deterministic CRUD/FLS band. SFGE has
per-entry-point timeouts and a JVM heap knob (`--sfge-jvm-args`); defaults
are fine at small sizes (the 0.8.41 spike ran 45 files in ~30 s) but budget
the timeout for large Apex trees. The 0.8.40 `--all` ingest then consumes the
resulting JSON into the deterministic band (already wired — don't re-wire).
Verify the flag syntax against YOUR installed CLI (`--help`) before
running — the last major-version transition changed the command shape
once already. The **AppExchange selector is load-bearing** (in BOTH forms):
it activates the review-specific PMD rule set (session-ID retrieval,
hardcoded credentials, install/uninstall-handler rules, the Critical
`FeatureManagement.changeProtection` license-gate-tampering rule
`AvoidFeatureManagementChangeProtection`, and the Moderate
`getInstance(userId/profileId)` taint rule `AvoidGetInstanceWithTaint` —
baseline: `scan-pmd-appexchange-rules`,
`violation-feature-management-change-protection`,
`violation-getinstance-with-taint`); a scan without it looks diligent and
misses the rules the reviewer cares about. The Graph Engine (`-r sfge`)
data-flow CRUD/FLS findings target the #1 review-failure cause, so triage
its output first (baseline: `scan-sfge-crud-fls-dataflow`, `fail-crud-fls`).
*Submission HTML artifact (an ADDITIONAL pass, NOT the primary/only
command).* The reviewer requires the HTML report, so ALSO emit it — the
byte-verified required invocation recorded in `scan-code-analyzer-invocation`:
```bash
export SF_AUTOUPDATE_DISABLE=true SF_DISABLE_AUTOUPDATE=true
sf code-analyzer run --rule-selector AppExchange \
--rule-selector Recommended:Security \
--output-file CodeAnalyzerReport.html
```
Run BOTH passes every time: the engine-explicit JSON above (the deterministic
band + machine triage — what feeds the ledger) AND this HTML (the submission
format — what gets uploaded). HTML alone is not enough; the engine-explicit
form is what makes CRUD/FLS deterministic.
**Scan-error coverage mandate — a failure is never a pass.** A file that hits
a PMD `ParseException` / per-file scan-error was NOT scanned, and its 0
violations are an artifact of the failure, not a clean result. This is now an
engine gate, not an eyeball step: the `2>` capture above records the run's
stderr to `evidence/ca-scan-log-<date>.txt`, and the ingest step
(`ingest-scanner-findings.mjs --all`) reads that log and emits a **COVERAGE
NOTE** naming each errored file DETERMINISTICALLY — the file surfaces as
un-scanned, never credited as clean. The driver's job is to verify the note
is present in the ingest output and record it (a missing scan-log degrades to
checking stderr by hand), then where feasible fix the parse blocker and
re-run so the file is actually covered.
*Agent runs:* install check, scan, JSON parsing, diffing findings against
the audit ledger, dossier-row drafting. *Owner runs:* the code fixes, and
confirmation of every FP justification.
*Evidence:* `evidence/code-analyzer-<date>.html` + `.json`. The captured
`ca-scan-log-<date>.txt` is an internal diagnostic, not submission evidence —
the completeness lint auto-excludes it (like the capture provenance sidecars),
and its signal surfaces as the deterministic scan-error coverage note.
*Disposition:* every violation becomes **fixed** (then re-scan — the
submitted report must come from the submitted code, not three fixes ago)
or a **dossier row**. Critical/High are must-fix; Code Analyzer has no
numeric pass threshold (the published bar is effort-based: fix what you
can, re-scan, document the rest) and CLI exit codes are not a readiness
signal (baseline: `scan-severity-threshold-unpublished`). The posture is
`scan-no-clean-scan-required`: **false positives are expected — justify
them.** Do not tune selectors down to manufacture a clean report; the
reviewer runs their own tooling, and a suspiciously empty report reads
worse than a documented one.
3. **Family 2 — Partner Security Portal scanner (Checkmarx): required IN
ADDITION to Code Analyzer for any submission that includes a package or
component.** The baseline entry (`scan-checkmarx-partner-portal`) is
verified current: the portal's Source Code Scanner scans Apex,
Visualforce, and Lightning code; it is not an alternative to Code
Analyzer, and it is not required for API-only or mobile-client
submissions. Two mechanics with budget teeth:
- **Three portal runs per solution version are included in the review
fee.** Develop against free PMD (unlimited runs — but PMD results are
NOT accepted with the submission) and spend the portal runs only on
submission-grade reports: an early sanity run, the post-fix run, one
spare. A paid Checkmarx license lifts the limit (and the linking
prerequisite below, and allows scanning unpackaged code).
- **The package version must be linked to an AppExchange listing before
the portal will scan it** — schedule the listing-link step ahead of
the scan, not the day of submission. Portal access needs a
Partner-Console-connected DevHub/packaging org plus the 'Author Apex'
permission.
*Owner runs:* the portal login, listing link, scan initiation, and
report download to `evidence/portal-scan-<date>.*`. *Agent runs:*
parsing the report and folding findings into the same dossier — one
disposition discipline across all scanners. The published Checkmarx
bar: every finding requires attention — fix or documented false
positive — EXCEPT those labeled "Code Quality" (baseline:
`scan-severity-threshold-unpublished`; the DAST companion bar lives in
`dast-severity-bar`).
*Prediction — pre-empt your 3 portal runs (WI-16).* The portal scan is
owner-gated, but the toolkit already ran Code Analyzer (Family 1) + the LLM
package dimensions (audit-codebase), which overlap heavily with Checkmarx's
Apex/VF/Lightning query families. Map every CONFIRMED package finding in the
ledger to its likely Checkmarx category and emit
`evidence/checkmarx-prediction-<date>.md`. Head that file with the
one-directional caveat verbatim so it reaches a partner who never opens this
skill: *"This predicts only the categories our local stack can see; Checkmarx
runs proprietary queries we don't have and WILL flag categories listed
nowhere below. Treat portal run #1 as DISCOVERY, not confirmation."* Then:
"your 3 portal runs will likely surface these; fix or pre-disposition first."
The mapping (finding class →
Checkmarx category): SOQL/SOSL injection → SQL/SOQL Injection · missing
CRUD/FLS → Missing Object/Field-Level Security · sharing bypass → Insecure
Sharing · XSS sinks → Stored/Reflected XSS · open redirect → Unvalidated
Redirect · hardcoded secret/ID → Hardcoded Credentials/Salesforce ID ·
JS-in-origin / Locker<40 → Lightning component hygiene · CSRF-on-instantiation
→ CSRF. **Honesty: this is a PREDICTION, not an equivalence** — Checkmarx's
proprietary queries find classes the local stack misses and vice versa; the
value is that your portal runs come back with *no surprises*, never "Checkmarx
will find nothing." **The prediction is one-directional: it covers only the
categories the local stack can see. Checkmarx runs proprietary queries we do
not have and WILL surface categories this prediction structurally cannot.
Treat portal run #1 as DISCOVERY of those blind-spot categories, not
confirmation of a clean bill — budget the three runs accordingly (run #1
finds, #2 confirms the fixes, #3 is the margin), and do not assume #1 is the
post-fix run.** Pre-fill the FP dossier with the dispositions you already
hold so a predicted finding the portal confirms is answered before you spend
run #2. *Optional, genuinely headless (paid CxOne licence):* if `CX_APIKEY` is
in the env, run the real Checkmarx One CLI (`cx scan create … --report-format
sarif`) as Family 2b over the package source and parse the SARIF — a licence
lifts the 3-run limit + the listing-link prerequisite; absent the key,
prediction-only.
4. **Family 3 — Authenticated DAST: the agent generates the plan; the owner
executes the scan against production — OR the toolkit runs it against a
throwaway.**
**THE FIRES-PATH LADDER — DAST must FIRE regardless of app size, and it is
MIRROR-ONLY.** The throwaway DAST is a flagship feature, not a nice-to-have: it must
land real evidence in the common case, degrading only when every rung genuinely fails.
A real cold run's throwaway DAST did NOT fire — the standup got a port and then the
api **image build** lost the last cores to the audit fan-out (resource contention,
NOT a broken build: the same Dockerfile builds fine standalone in ~240s, and the
sandbox is not network-blocked).
**MIRROR-ONLY, no exceptions.** DAST and the OpenAPI capture only ever hit a
DISPOSABLE THROWAWAY MIRROR the toolkit itself builds and destroys — `run-dast.mjs`
and `capture-openapi.mjs` take `--from-standup` (the stand-up pointer) and nothing
else; both engines REFUSE an explicit `--base-url` outright (exit 3), before any
consent is even looked up. The toolkit will NEVER scan or capture a pre-existing /
already-running instance: a listener that is already up could be a partner's REAL
product with REAL data behind it, and **loopback is NOT a sufficient safeguard — a
real instance is also on loopback**. There is no consent that unlocks a
running-instance scan; the ONLY DAST consent is `throwaway-dast`, whose affirmative
promises the scan touches only the disposable mirror the toolkit built. Do not offer,
suggest, or accept a running-instance scan under any framing — the engines refuse it
and so must the driver. Try the rungs IN ORDER; drop to the next only when the
current one is unavailable:
1. **Prebuilt-image compose — no source build.** `stack-detect` PREFERS a
`docker-compose.prod.yml` / `*.prod.yml` whose web/api tier ships an `image:` (not a
`build:`) over the build-from-source dev compose, recording
`recipe.buildsFromSource:false`. Standing that up pulls/uses the prebuilt image
instead of compiling from source — no heavy build competes with anything. This is
automatic in recipe selection; nothing to pass.
2. **Build from source — but SERIALIZED, never concurrent with the
audit fan-out.** When only a build-from-source recipe exists, the throwaway
stand-up/build MUST run **BEFORE or AFTER the audit fan-out, never DURING it** — the
cold-run failure was the heavy image build competing with the fan-out for the last
cores (the build succeeds fine standalone). `standupStack` is a single-shot executor
and cannot know about the fan-out, so this is a SEQUENCING RULE on the driver, not a
flag: do not kick off the throwaway build while an audit fan-out is saturating the
box. On a journey run, stand the throwaway up in the live/conditional tail (after the
audit), or explicitly ahead of it — just not overlapping.
3. **GET THE MIRROR WORKING AT ALL COSTS — fix the MIRROR's disposable copy, never
the partner's real files.** When the mirror build fails on a partner-repo defect
(the proven case: a compose `build.target` naming a stage its Dockerfile does not
declare — `docker compose build` dies "target stage not found"), the toolkit's
answer is to repair the THROWAWAY, not to give up and not to reach for something
already running. `stack-detect` diagnoses the defect and `standup-stack` applies
the fix inside the disposable mirror ONLY — a generated compose override (or a
copied-source patch) that lives OUTSIDE the repository and dies with the mirror —
and logs the partner-facing `.security-review/mirror-fixes.md`: (a) the DEFECT,
(b) what the MIRROR did, with proof the real code was untouched (the override
lives outside the repo; no compose file, Dockerfile, or source file in the
partner's repository was modified), and (c) the "fix this in your real repo"
guidance. The partner's real compose files, Dockerfiles, and source are NEVER
edited. A defect with no honest override is logged as a diagnosis and the
stand-up degrades with its real failure status — never a silent
build-into-failure, and never a fabricated fix.
**HARD RULE — "at all costs" NEVER means touching anything already RUNNING.**
The driver NEVER touches, stops, removes, or deletes ANYTHING already running
that the toolkit did not itself stand up — not files, not containers, not
volumes, not Salesforce orgs. "Get the mirror working at all costs" is
bounded to the DISPOSABLE COPY only (compose overrides on the mirror's own
throwaway); it is never a licence to clear whatever is in the mirror's way.
A container-name / port / resource collision with something already running
means the toolkit DEGRADES — DAST → PENDING-OWNER-RUN with the honest
diagnosis ("a container named X is already running — it may be your live
stack; I will NOT touch it") — it NEVER clears the collision by hand. NEVER
run `docker rm` / `docker stop` / `docker kill` / `docker compose down` (or
`sf org delete`) against a resource the toolkit did not create: diagnosing a
failed stand-up is exactly when the temptation to improvise a destructive op
strikes, and that improvisation is how a live production stack gets taken
down. ALL removal goes through the name-anchored teardown engines
(`teardown-stack.mjs`, `teardown-org.mjs`), which refuse non-toolkit names
structurally. The rule is general, not docker-specific: the same "improvise
a destructive op while diagnosing a failure" mode recurs as `sf org delete`
in the deep-audit lane — degrade honestly there too. (The engine enforces
the docker half: the loopback override pins every mirror service to a
run-unique `sf-srt-stack-<runId>-<svc>` container_name so the mirror can
never collide with — or be mistaken for — a live container, and the stand-up
executor never issues a destructive docker command on any failure.)
4. **Honest-degrade — the genuine LAST resort, not the expected outcome.** Only when
the mirror genuinely cannot be built (every rung above failed): write the
evidence-of-absence stub (`run-dast.mjs --absent --reason <why>`), tear the stack
down cleanly, and hand the owner the ZAP plan plus the honest diagnosis (the
`mirror-fixes.md` diagnosis names what blocked the build) — DAST and the OpenAPI
capture DEGRADE to **PENDING-OWNER-RUN**. NEVER a running-instance scan: a mirror
that will not build is a reason to hand the owner the plan, not permission to
point the scanner at something already listening. Keep this branch exactly as-is;
it is the floor, not the target. The tag gate is met by DAST **firing** in the
common case — fire first, degrade last.
**The `throwaway-dast` gate is the OPERATOR'S LIVE CALL — never auto-decline
it from a memory or a standing note** (the journey's SOURCE OF TRUTH &
MEMORY-INDEPENDENCE and NEVER AUTO-DECIDE A GATE rules). A stale host-session
memory about a past stand-up failure describes a toolkit that may since have
been fixed in code; it is context to RAISE inside the gate, never a decision.
Surface the gate; DAST degrades to PENDING-OWNER-RUN only on the operator's
own decline or a genuine engine refusal (e.g. `needs-secrets` left unfilled,
`no-docker`) — never on a pre-decided deny the operator never made.
*Autonomous option (0.7.0):* when the journey's throwaway-DAST consent
was given, the toolkit stands the backend up as a disposable mirror and runs a
digest-pinned ZAP against THAT
(`harness/{standup-stack,capture-openapi,run-dast,teardown-stack}.mjs`),
landing real evidence in `evidence/dast/zap-throwaway-local-*.json` — **labelled
local-throwaway**: it's corroborating DAST + a de-risking dry run, NOT the
production-equivalent submission scan (the active scan only ever hits a mirror the
toolkit built, never live prod / Salesforce infra / a third party). While the mirror
is up, `capture-openapi.mjs` also GETs the framework's own spec (read-only,
loopback-only, riding the same recorded consent) into `evidence/openapi-<date>.json` —
that is what upgrades the api-endpoints artifact `generate-artifacts` emits from
code-derived to mirror-captured, with prod-equivalence PENDING owner attestation. Then the
tag-gate DAST-fired check `node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/verify-dast-fired.mjs --target
<repo>` confirms a real fire actually LANDED — a `zap-throwaway-local-*.json` report AND an
honest `dast-provenance.json` (`scanKind ≠ not-run`, i.e. not the `--absent` degrade stub):
exit 0 = fired, exit 2 = degraded/absent (re-run run-dast against the toolkit-built mirror —
re-stand it up if it was torn down; the fire only ever comes from the mirror). The 0.9.0
cold-run tag gate requires that exit 0. *Requires (the
submission scan):* partner-run DAST of every external
endpoint with an industry tool — there is no hosted alternative (baseline:
`dast-self-run-required`); the scan must be **authenticated** (baseline:
`dast-authenticated-scans` — an anonymous scan covers only the public
shell and misses the authorization-flaw classes the review cares most
about); for MCP submissions the **identity/OAuth endpoints are in scope
as first-class targets** (baseline: `dast-scope-includes-identity-endpoints`
— driving the scanner *through* the login flow is not the same as
scanning the identity surface itself); the target must be
production-equivalent (baseline: `dast-endpoints-production-mode`); the
exported report must include the scan date, the targeted endpoints, and
all findings — that is what proves the stated endpoints were actually
scanned (baseline: `dast-screenshot-proof-of-scanned-url`).
*Agent runs:* generate the ZAP Automation Framework plan from
`${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/zap/zap-plan-template.yaml` per
`${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/zap/README.md` — the README carries the
binding rules. Fill the slots from the scope manifest's endpoint
inventory plus the same OpenAPI/endpoint spec submitted as the
api-endpoints artifact (one source of truth: the report scope provably
matches the docs, and the active scan reaches documented POST endpoints a
spider never finds). Seed the authorize/token/register/revoke paths and
`/.well-known/*` discovery docs explicitly. Pick the auth pattern (bearer
token via `${DAST_BEARER_TOKEN}`, or browser-login with poll
re-verification); secrets arrive via environment variables at run time,
never in the plan file. Validate the plan loads against the installed ZAP
— a half-loaded plan scans half the scope and tells you in a log line,
not an error. Confirm the environment label on every target URL from the
manifest; never point a scan at a URL whose staging-vs-production status
is unconfirmed.
*Owner runs:* authorization to scan, token minting (lifetime exceeding
the scan window — an expired token silently degrades the rest of the run
to an anonymous scan that still prints a green-looking report), CDN/WAF
edge handling per the README, the scan itself, and the post-fix re-scan.
This skill **never marks the scan executed** — it verifies the report
files exist in `evidence/dast/` and parses them when they do.
*Evidence:* `evidence/dast/dast-report.html` + `.json`,
`dast-url-proof.png` (must visibly show the target URL and scan date),
`run-notes.md` (ZAP version, plan file, token scope, edge allowlist
made/reverted).
*Disposition:* every finding **above informational** gets one — fixed
(the owner re-scans; the submission report is the post-fix run, and the
fixed finding leaves the dossier, replaced by the re-scan-clean evidence)
or a dossier row with code evidence. The README's FP-class catalog
pre-classifies the predictable noise from hardened endpoints
(anti-enumeration always-200s, 405-on-GET MCP paths, by-design 429s); a
class match is a hypothesis, not a disposition. The fix-vs-document
severity bar is published (baseline: `dast-severity-bar`): critical and
high findings require attention — fix or justified false-positive
documentation — while action on low/medium findings is not required,
only investigation encouraged. The toolkit's posture stays stricter
than that bar (a disposition for every finding, fix don't document
anything High/Critical) because undocumented low/medium noise still
invites reviewer questions.
*Extension — template DAST + spec-driven fuzzing (WI-17, agent-runnable where
a staging URL + probe consent exist):* beyond the authenticated ZAP crawl, run
**Nuclei** (`nuclei -u <url> -severity low,medium,high,critical -json-export
evidence/dast/nuclei-<date>.json`) for the community CVE / misconfig / exposure
template library, and **Schemathesis** (`schemathesis run <openapi-spec>
--base-url <url> --checks all`) driven from the OpenAPI artifact
`generate-artifacts` already emits — a genuinely different test class than the
crawl (it exercises the CONTRACT: 500s, auth-bypass on undocumented methods,
spec/implementation drift). Feed that same spec to ZAP's OpenAPI import so the
authenticated scan covers documented endpoints explicitly, not only what it
crawled. Same fix-vs-document bar; evidence under `evidence/dast/`.
5. **Family 4 — TLS grade, every external hostname.** *Requires:* the
codified transport bar per `endpoint-ssl-labs-a-grade` is qualitative —
HTTPS-only, secure TLS versions, weak ciphers disabled, HTTP-to-HTTPS
redirect, HSTS — with the SSL Labs A grade as official *recommended*
practice ("aim for an A"), not a codified pass/fail gate; the entry's
one remaining conflict is whether reviewers enforce the letter grade in
practice. Plus full trusted chain and expiry headroom (baseline:
`endpoint-trusted-ca-certificates`).
*Agent runs:* query SSL Labs for **every** external hostname in the
manifest's endpoint inventory — app, API, MCP host, identity host if
separate, webhook receivers. (For the MCP host specifically, when the
deployed-package deep audit stood up an org, `harness/capture-org-mcp.mjs`
records the org-effective MCP server `serverUrlHost` — the same registered
host the org catalog ingested — riding the recorded `sf-deep-audit-ops`
consent, no new gate.) Use the API (poll the analyze call until the
assessment is READY; request a **fresh** assessment, not a cached one —
a result from before your last config change is not evidence) or walk the
owner through the web UI. Save the JSON per host to
`evidence/ssllabs-<host>.json` plus a capture showing hostname, grade,
and date. Cheap header probes ride along into the same evidence: HSTS,
HTTPS-only/redirect behavior (baseline: `endpoint-hsts`,
`endpoint-https-only`).
*The gotcha that costs a cycle:* the grade measures **whatever terminates
TLS for the public hostname** — when a CDN/proxy edge fronts the origin,
the edge's configuration (minimum TLS version, cipher policy at the edge)
is what grades, not your origin. A field-tested pattern: an origin with a
flawless TLS config still grades down because the edge's minimum-TLS
setting admitted legacy protocols; the fix was one edge setting, no
origin change. Before raising the edge's floor beyond the bar, check what
your legitimate callers negotiate (Salesforce callouts included) so the
fix doesn't break the integration it protects.
*Disposition:* a hostname failing the qualitative bar (plain HTTP, weak
ciphers, no HSTS) is a **fix-now blocker, never a dossier entry**. A
hostname below A technically passes the codified gate but cedes
reviewer discretion — fix it anyway; exceeding the gate is cheap.
Record the failing protocol/cipher detail from the JSON as the
remediation pointer.
*Extension — local deterministic TLS evidence (WI-17):* the SSL Labs grade is
a contested external dependency (this entry's one open conflict — whether
reviewers enforce the letter grade). Produce **local, deterministic** TLS
evidence instead with **testssl.sh** (`testssl.sh --jsonfile
evidence/tls-<host>-<date>.json <host>:443`) or **sslyze** (`sslyze
--json_out=evidence/tls-<host>-<date>.json <host>:443`): protocol versions,
cipher list, cert chain + expiry, HSTS — the same qualitative bar, evidenced
offline with no third-party grade. This is the evidence file that **satisfies
`endpoint-ssl-labs-a-grade` deterministically** and clears its `conflicting`
status: you assert the qualitative properties directly (HTTPS-only, secure
versions, weak ciphers disabled, HSTS) rather than leaning on a letter grade.
6. **Family 5 — Dependency audit, every detected stack.** *Requires:*
bundled third-party components free of known CVEs (baseline:
`scan-dependency-vulnerabilities`) — outdated JS libraries with known
CVEs are a recurring failure cause, and **packaged static resources are
the classic miss** (an old framework copy vendored into the package's
static resources, invisible to the app repo's lockfile audit).
*Agent runs:* the ecosystem-native scanner per detected stack —
`npm audit` against the lockfile (record prod-vs-dev scope), `pip-audit`
for Python, RetireJS (bundled with Code Analyzer) over packaged JS and
static resources, the native equivalent for anything else the repo
contains. Evidence: `evidence/deps-<ecosystem>-<date>.json`.
*Disposition:* a known CVE **with a patched version available is
upgraded, not documented around** — flag breaking-change risk, but the
reviewer expects the upgrade. A finding with no fix available yet goes in
the **tracked-vulnerability register**
(`<target>/docs/security-review/vulnerability-register.md`): CVE,
component, exploitability-in-context, compensating control, remediation
path with a named owner and target date. The register backs the
readiness tracker's CI-evidence rows, and the dossier cross-references it
whenever another scanner flags the same library.
7. **Family 6 — Secret scan, working tree AND full git history.** *Requires:* a
no-hardcoded-secrets posture backed by a **mechanical** scan, not an assertion
(baseline: `fail-hardcoded-secrets` — an auto-fail class; managed-package code
obscurity is explicitly not a defense; `artifact-credential-storage-attestation`
(blocker) pairs the scan output with an owner signature, and the *absence* of
that scan output is itself the bounce). This family is the mechanical
complement to the `secrets-credentials` dimension's LLM finder, never its
replacement.
*Tool:* **gitleaks** (preferred — native full-history mode + deleted-blob
surfacing) **plus detect-secrets as the complementary second-opinion tree pass
when available** (`timeout 120 detect-secrets scan --all-files --exclude-files
'(^|/)(node_modules|\.git|dist|build|\.?venv|__pycache__|vendor|\.next|coverage)(/|$)'`
— a different ruleset catches what one engine's misses; its output ingests via the
`detect-secrets` adapter, engine-labelled honestly. The `--exclude-files` regex and the
hard `timeout` are MANDATORY, not optional: bare `--all-files` walks `node_modules` and
times out on every real repo — a complementary pass that never completes is dead weight.
If the `timeout` trips anyway, record the partial/absent output honestly and lean on
gitleaks, never a silent skip); trufflehog is a substitute when gitleaks
is unavailable. *Two passes, both
mandatory:* (1) **working-tree** over every resolved source root including IaC
paths (Dockerfile `ENV`/`ARG`, terraform `*.tf`/`*.tfvars`/`*.tfstate`,
CloudFormation/Ansible) — catches a secret in the submittable surface a
reviewer's bundled scanner reaches; (2) **full git history** (`gitleaks
detect` over all history) — surfaces deleted-but-recoverable blobs explicitly
(the mechanical form of the `secrets-credentials` `git log --diff-filter=D`
heuristic — a tool invocation, not an LLM spot-check). *Agent runs:* both
passes, parsing, dossier rows. *Owner runs:* the **rotation** of every
confirmed live secret — the agent cannot certify a credential dead.
*Evidence:* `evidence/secret-scan-<date>.json` (redacted), plus
`evidence/detect-secrets-<date>.json` when the complementary pass ran —
**record EVERY secret-scan output file this family produced in the
evidence-input** (tree, history, AND detect-secrets); an output that ingested
but never reached `evidence/index.json` is a scan the submission cannot cite,
and Step 11's completeness check fails loud on it. *Gate:*
`fail-hardcoded-secrets` (blocker); it also **backs**
`artifact-credential-storage-attestation`. *Disposition — keep the per-finding
distinction:* a secret in the partner's **private repo history** is rotate-now
breach debt the reviewer does not scan for; a secret in the **submitted
package/code** is a literal review gate — both NOT-CLEAN until dispositioned;
remediation is **rotation first, scrub second** (scrubbing without rotation is
theater); the dossier carries a **rotation-evidence** field (changed key-id /
revocation record / dated owner-signed note). *Honest ceiling — state it in the
evidence summary (CONVENTIONS §2):* mechanical scanners reliably catch
**provider-prefixed** (`AKIA…`/`sk-…`/`ghp_…`/`-----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY-----`)
and **high-entropy** secrets but **MISS custom-format / low-entropy** ones (a
bespoke token shaped like a UUID or a base64 config blob); the
`secrets-credentials` LLM finder is the standing complement. Full mechanics:
`${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/run-scans/SECRET-SCAN-FAMILY-6.md`.
8. **Family 7 — External SAST (the partner-hosted server tree).** *Applies when:*
the manifest shows an `external-endpoint` element with source — every detected
non-package language root (Code Analyzer scans only Apex/VF/Aura; it never sees
the Python/Node/Java/Go server Salesforce explicitly pen-tests). *Tool:*
**Semgrep** (OSS engine + free community rulesets) is the keystone — one tool
across languages, and custom-rule capable (a future pack can re-express the LLM
dimensions' heuristics as deterministic rules). Add a language gate where it
sharpens recall: **Bandit** (Python), **njsscan** (Node), **gosec** (Go).
Ingest note (0.8.83): bandit **test-path LOW** hygiene hits (B101 assert / B404
import under `tests/`, `test_*.py`, `*_test.py`, `conftest.py`) are filtered at
ingest as non-security noise with one aggregated note per evidence file — prod-path
LOW (e.g. a B105 hardcoded password) and every MEDIUM/HIGH hit ingest unchanged.
*Invocation (verify flags against your installed version):*
```bash
semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets \
--config p/<language> --config ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/rules/injection/ \
--json --dataflow-traces \
--output evidence/semgrep-<date>.json <server-root>
semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets \
--config p/<language> --config ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/rules/injection/ \
--sarif --dataflow-traces \
--output evidence/semgrep-<date>.sarif <server-root>
```
`--config ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/rules/injection/` is a toolkit-authored taint-rule
pack (additive with the registry packs above — a local directory, so no network or
login, free CE). It covers the XPath (CWE-643) + LDAP (CWE-90) injection classes the
OSS packs miss on Python/Go/JS (`p/security-audit` + `p/csharp` cover Java + C# only,
and njsscan's `node_xpath_injection` fires on `xpath.parse()` alone). Each rule is
`mode: taint` (it requires a real source→sink flow, never a bare sink) and
`semgrep --test`-validated; the CWE it tags routes the hit to `injection-xss` through
the same `metadata.cwe` path as the registry rules — no ingest change. *Honest scope:*
Semgrep CE taint is intra-file / intraprocedural, so the pack is low-FP but
moderate-FN — a tainted value that crosses a function or module boundary before the
sink falls to the LLM residual, not to a noisy bare-sink rule.
`--dataflow-traces` is load-bearing: it explicitly requests the source→sink
dataflow trace for taint-mode results — `extra.dataflow_trace` in the JSON is
what the ingest adapter captures as the finding's `reachabilityPath`
(+ `reachable: true`), so the live command must ask for the trace rather than
depend on any version's default. *Substrate ceiling:* whether `--json`
actually carries the trace is version-dependent (verified on a seeded
source→sink sample: 1.85.0 emits `extra.dataflow_trace`; 1.168.0 omits it
even with the flag — newer CLIs serialize the trace to text/SARIF output
only). The `--sarif` capture is the version-portable second surface: SARIF
`codeFlows` is the standardized taint-path serialization the ingest also
normalizes to `reachabilityPath` — but on current Semgrep CE the SARIF
codeFlows may be ABSENT too (verified 1.168.0: none emitted on a taint
finding that provably has a trace — Pro-gated), so **Opengrep below is the
OSS engine that actually produces the trace on current tooling**. The ingest
now says this deterministically (0.8.80): when a toolkit taint rule (the
`rules/injection/` pack — the one rule set whose taint mode is knowable from
the output, via its `rules.injection.` check_id prefix) fires with no
dataflow trace, the harness emits one aggregated "reachability substrate
unavailable on this engine version / output surface" note per evidence file
instead of leaving the report to this prose — relay that note in the
evidence summary. Honest scope: the marker covers the toolkit's own taint
pack only (registry/third-party rules carry no output-visible taint marker,
so their trace-lessness stays unmarked); the findings themselves still
ingest normally; only `reachabilityPath` is absent. The ingest also emits a
version-drift note when an opengrep evidence file records a version
different from the pinned install (opengrep only — the one ingest tool that
both records its producing version and is version-pinned).
**The Opengrep reachability leg (rides this family).** Opengrep (the
LGPL-2.1, consortium-governed Semgrep fork; installed as a pinned release
binary — it is not on PyPI) empirically emits the machine-readable trace
current Semgrep CE withholds, in BOTH output formats, and adds
cross-function (intra-file) taint via `--taint-intrafile`. Capture both
surfaces:
```bash
opengrep scan --config <rules> --taint-intrafile --dataflow-traces \
--json --output evidence/opengrep-<date>.json <server-root>
opengrep scan --config <rules> --taint-intrafile --dataflow-traces \
--sarif --output evidence/opengrep-<date>.sarif <server-root>
```
Flag note (verified on 1.25.0 over a seeded source→sink sample): Opengrep's
`--json` emits `extra.dataflow_trace` even WITHOUT `--dataflow-traces`, but
its `--sarif` emits `codeFlows` ONLY WITH the flag — keep it on both so the
two surfaces stay consistent. The `--all` ingest enumerates both
`evidence/*.json` and `evidence/*.sarif`; keep the `opengrep-<date>.*`
evidence names as written — Opengrep's JSON is content-identical to
Semgrep's format, and the documented name is what lets the ingest label the
findings' provenance `engine: 'opengrep'` honestly (SARIF self-identifies
via `tool.driver.name`; the JSON cannot).
The registry configs are fetched once; if the host is offline, vendor the rules
first (`semgrep --config <dir>`). The `--config p/security-audit --config
p/<language>` pair above is what routes findings to real methodology dimensions:
the ingest reads each scanner-emitted CWE and files injection-class hits under
`injection-xss` — including XPath (CWE-643) and LDAP (CWE-90), which route for
the languages an OSS rule already covers (Java + C# via `p/security-audit` +
`p/csharp`; Node XPath via njsscan's `node_xpath_injection`, `xpath.parse()`
only). No extra config is needed for those — njsscan already emits the routable
CWE. *Agent runs:* the scan, JSON parsing, diffing
against the audit ledger (the `injection-xss`/`oauth-identity` dimensions may
already have flagged the same sink — cross-reference, don't double-report),
dossier rows. *Owner runs:* the code fixes. *Evidence:*
`evidence/semgrep-<date>.json` (+ per-language files) — and when the Opengrep
leg ran, **record BOTH of its captured surfaces in the evidence-input**,
`opengrep-<date>.json` AND `opengrep-<date>.sarif` (the SARIF is the
version-portable codeFlows surface, not a disposable duplicate; an output
left out of `evidence/index.json` is a scan the submission cannot cite, and
Step 11's completeness check fails loud on it). *Gate:*
`scan-external-sast` (major; a confirmed critical in reviewer-reachable server
code — an injection, an auth bypass, an SSRF — is a blocker, because the
reviewer's pen test reaches it). *Honest ceiling:* SAST has a false-negative
floor; it complements the LLM dimensions + the reviewer's pen test, it replaces
neither.
**The ReDoS leg (rides this family).** When Family 7 runs, ALSO run the
**regexploit** ReDoS scan over every detected non-package language root — the
catastrophic-backtracking-regex *pattern* substrate of
`resource-consumption-abuse` is machine-checkable (regex-AST ambiguity
analysis), so it belongs to the deterministic band, not the LLM fan-out:
```bash
{ regexploit-py <server-root>; regexploit-js <server-root>; } > evidence/redos-<date>.txt
```
regexploit emits TEXT only (no JSON output exists in the tool), so the evidence
file is its VERBATIM stdout — and because the `--all` ingest enumerates only
`evidence/*.{json,sarif}`, the ReDoS TEXT evidence is NOT auto-recognized there.
**AUTO-run the explicit-scanner ingest form immediately after the redos scan** (do
NOT defer it to a manual re-run — a real cold run left the `.txt` un-ingested exactly
because it waited for step 9b's `--all` to notice a file `--all` structurally cannot
see):
```bash
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/ingest-scanner-findings.mjs \
--scanner regexploit --input evidence/redos-<date>.txt --target <target>
```
This is the same explicit form step 9b names — running it HERE, right after the scan,
is what makes the ReDoS finding land in the band without a second pass. The JS/TS
parser needs a one-time `npm install` inside the regexploit package —
the tool prints the exact command when the modules are missing; `regexploit-py`
needs nothing extra. Exit code is 0 whether or not vulnerable patterns are
found. *Gate:* `resource-consumption-abuse` (major). *Honest note:* the scanner
proves the PATTERN is catastrophic (exponential/polynomial backtracking);
whether attacker-controlled input reaches it is the audit's judgment — the
labelled `llm-inferred` residual — and the deterministic row sits beside, never
silences, the dimension's rate-limit / denial-of-wallet findings.
9. **Family 8 — External SCA + IaC.** *Applies when:* any lockfile, Dockerfile, or
IaC file exists under a non-package source root — the supply-chain + infra
surface the reviewer treats as in-scope when data flows through it. *Tools:*
**OSV-Scanner** (Google, OSS — multi-ecosystem, queries the OSV DB; leaner +
lower-noise than a per-ecosystem `npm/pip audit`) for SCA; **pip-audit** (PyPA,
OSS — the range-resolving Python SCA leg, see the lockfile-less rule below);
**Checkov** (OSS) for IaC misconfig (Terraform/CloudFormation/Kubernetes/
Dockerfile); **Trivy** (OSS) is an acceptable one-tool substitute covering
container image + deps + Dockerfile + secrets together. *Invocations:*
```bash
osv-scanner -r <server-root> --format json > evidence/osv-<date>.json
checkov -d <iac-dir> --framework terraform -o json > evidence/iac-terraform-<date>.json
checkov -f <Dockerfile> --framework dockerfile -o json > evidence/iac-dockerfile-<date>.json
trivy config -f json <compose-dir> > evidence/iac-compose-<date>.json # docker-compose / compose files
```
**docker-compose / compose IaC is scanned with `trivy config -f json <dir>`, NOT
checkov** — checkov has no `docker_compose` framework (a cold run improvised that
framework value and got an empty/errored scan; never pass it — route compose files
to Trivy as above). Both the checkov and trivy ingest adapters already file
`iac-misconfig` at class severity, so the ingest is unchanged either way.
**Lockfile-less Python SCA — `pyproject.toml`/`requirements.txt` with unpinned
RANGES and no lockfile (0.8.109; first-class installed since coldrun #4).**
OSV-Scanner **cannot resolve version ranges** —
it needs pinned versions (a lockfile or `==`-pinned requirements). A Python source
root that ships only a `pyproject.toml` (or a range-only `requirements.txt`) with no
`poetry.lock` / `pdm.lock` / pinned `requirements.txt` therefore goes **un-SCA'd by
OSV** — a real cold run left the entire FastAPI backend dep tree (including the
unmaintained `python-jose`) unscanned this exact way. When that shape is present, run
**`pip-audit`** (it RESOLVES the range set and audits the resolved tree in one step):
```bash
pip-audit -r <server-root>/requirements.txt -f json -o evidence/pip-audit-<date>.json # requirements
pip-audit <server-root> -f json -o evidence/pip-audit-<date>.json # pyproject (positional path; the installed pip-audit REJECTS a --project-path flag)
```
`pip-audit` is a **first-class INSTALLED scanner**: it rides the consented tmp
install set (`install-scanners.mjs` `PIP_TOOLS` — a pip venv, floating-latest like
semgrep/checkov, bin name == package name) and `tool-detect.mjs` lists it in the
Family-8 `external-sca-iac` family, so a consented run finds it on the prepended
PATH like any other scanner. Evidence is `evidence/pip-audit-<date>.json` (the
scan-status Family-8 row credits the `pip-audit-*` evidence prefix), and the output
ingests via the **`pip-audit` adapter** (`--scanner pip-audit`, or content-shape
recognition under `--all`) at gate **`scan-external-sca`**, dimension
`dependency-cve`. Two honesty rules carry over from the adapter: pip-audit output
has **no CVSS**, so every hit lands at the unscored-known-CVE band `medium` until
the audit (or the same advisory seen through OSV, which does carry the CVSS)
escalates it; and a `skip_reason` dependency surfaces as a coverage-gap NOTE —
un-audited is never clean. Absent the install consent, the hard boundary above
holds in full: resolving ranges and querying the vulnerability service is
**network I/O** — the same standard-fetch doctrine that covers Semgrep registry
rules and the OSV DB — so with no consented install present `pip-audit` stays
**`PENDING-OWNER-RUN`** (emit the exact install + run command and move on).
Alternatively, generate a lock first (`pip install --dry-run` resolution → a
pinned set) and feed OSV the pinned versions.
**Fail loud on any dependency manifest no scanner covered — never a silent pass.** A
dependency manifest (`pyproject.toml`, `requirements.txt`, `package-lock.json`,
`go.sum`, `Gemfile.lock`, …) that NO scanner in this run actually audited MUST surface
as a **coverage gap** in the scan-status render — an explicit `PENDING-OWNER-RUN` /
uncovered-manifest row, exactly like an absent tool — and MUST NOT read as a clean
`scan-external-sca` pass. A manifest OSV skipped for lack of pins, with no `pip-audit`
fallback run, is the silent-un-SCA'd class this rule kills: the un-audited manifest is
the bounce, not the finding. Cross-check the manifests you resolved against the ones on
disk before stating Family 8 DONE.
*Agent runs:* both passes, parsing, the SBOM / component-version table for the
security-program element-4 slot (reuse the OSV output), dossier rows. *Owner
runs:* dependency bumps + infra fixes. *Evidence:* `evidence/osv-<date>.json`,
`evidence/pip-audit-<date>.json`, `evidence/iac-*-<date>.json`. *Gate:* `scan-external-sca` (major — a known-CVE
dependency reachable in the deployed server), `scan-iac-misconfig` (major — an
open security group, a public bucket, a hardcoded image secret). A secret in a
Dockerfile `ENV`/`ARG` is ALSO a Family-6 `fail-hardcoded-secrets` hit —
cross-reference, don't double-disposition. *Honest ceiling:* SCA catches *known*
CVEs in *declared* deps; a vendored copy or a zero-day is invisible to it
(RetireJS over packaged static resources + the reviewer's pen test are the
complements).
9b. **Seed the deterministic band IN THIS PASS — `--all` ingest, then reconcile**
(Phase 1/2 of `docs/roadmap-deterministic-findings.md`). The families this pass ran
have now written their evidence JSONs under `.security-review/evidence/`. Fold every
recognized scanner output into the deterministic band right here — this closes EVERY
entry mode: on a journey run the static substrate does it EARLY (so the band is
seeded before the first audit pass), the live tail does it again over whatever the
tail added, and a standalone sweep does it so a single cold run is meaningful on
its own:
```bash
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/ingest-scanner-findings.mjs --all --target <target>
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/reconcile-provenance.mjs --target <target>
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/seed-auto-dispositions.mjs --target <target>
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/apply-dispositions.mjs --target <target>
```
`--all` ALWAYS runs the metadata source scan and recognizes every other scanner output
present by CONTENT SHAPE (never filename) — Code Analyzer + the OSS SAST / secret /
dependency-CVE / IaC-misconfig families this phase just produced — ingesting each as a
`provenance:'deterministic'` finding. `reconcile-provenance.mjs` then demotes any
co-located `llm-inferred` finding a scanner now OWNS (gitleaks / detect-secrets own
`hardcoded-secrets`; Code Analyzer / metadata own crud-fls / sharing / viewall; the
SAST + dependency-CVE adapters own no class, so they only ADD to the band). **When no
`code-analyzer-*.json` is present, `--all` reports CRUD/FLS + sharing as
PENDING-OWNER-RUN (never LLM-fill, never drop) — exactly the audit-codebase Step 4
contract.**
One format-C exception: the Family-7 ReDoS evidence (`redos-<date>.txt`) is the
tool's verbatim TEXT, so `--all` does not auto-recognize it — ingest it with the
explicit `--scanner regexploit --input evidence/redos-<date>.txt` form (shown in
Family 7) alongside the `--all` run; reconcile then covers it like every other
deterministic finding.
**Design note (in-pass ingest+reconcile, NOT a re-audit).** On a journey run the
EARLY static substrate is what flips the deterministic families from PENDING to
real findings BEFORE the first audit — the audit's own `--all` ingest then reads
that evidence on its FIRST pass, so nothing waits for a re-audit. The ingest at
the live tail (and on a standalone sweep) is the same machinery closing the same
loop for the families that legitimately run late — the deliberate choice over
re-running the whole `audit-codebase` pass after scans, which would double the
expensive LLM fan-out for no new signal. Both harnesses are pure + idempotent and
finding-neutral on re-run (stable ids dedup; reconcile only demotes, and a
deterministic finding never supersedes another deterministic one), so running
`--all` + reconcile at the substrate tail, again at the live tail, and again at
audit Step 4 / Step 6 is safe — the band is byte-stable run-to-run.
`seed-auto-dispositions.mjs` runs BETWEEN reconcile and apply: it pre-clears the
exact known-safe scanner-noise shapes as an OVERRIDABLE PRIOR, so the raw band —
dominated by mechanical false positives — is not wrong-by-default until a human
hand-clears it. It EMITS entries into the SAME
`<target>/.security-review/deterministic-dispositions.json` the audit uses, each
marked `disposition_source:'heuristic'` and carrying its `heuristic_id` + concrete
`evidence`, and lets `apply-dispositions.mjs` apply them — it invents no parallel
path and flips no status itself. Three CONSERVATIVE heuristics, precision over
coverage (when in doubt it leaves a finding OPEN): (1) MIGRATION-DDL — a semgrep
`avoid-sqlalchemy-text` / bandit `B608` hit under a migration directory (`alembic`,
`migrations`, `versions` segment) is server-authored schema SQL, not user input; a
text()/B608 OUTSIDE a migration dir is NOT cleared (a possible real injection). (2)
DEV-ONLY-DEP — an npm CVE for a package present ONLY in the adjacent package.json's
`devDependencies` is not in the deployed surface; a production or transitive dep is
NOT cleared. (3) HISTORY-ONLY SECRET — a gitleaks hit whose file is absent from the
current git HEAD is rotation debt, not a shipped artifact; a secret IN HEAD is NOT
cleared. The merge is ADDITIVE and NON-CLOBBERING: a hand-written adjudication for
the same engine+ruleId wins, and a re-run adds nothing (idempotent). Because these
are marked heuristic PRIORS the later audit reviews — and because
`apply-dispositions.mjs` structurally never touches an `llm-inferred` finding, so a
real issue the audit independently confirms at a cleared locus surfaces as the
audit's OWN untouchable finding — the seeder can never silently hide a blocker.
`apply-dispositions.mjs` then RE-APPLIES any structured deterministic-class
adjudications already recorded in
`<target>/.security-review/deterministic-dispositions.json` (the heuristic priors
just seeded, plus anything the audit wrote when it adjudicates a scanner class
false-positive/accepted-risk — see audit-codebase Step 6), so a standalone scan
pass's band is honest too — and the
re-apply is BOUNDED by each adjudication's mandatory scope: a re-ingested
finding at a KNOWN locus (named in the adjudication's `scope.files`, or with
`first_seen <= scope.as_of_pass` for a rule-wide adjudication) lands `confirmed`
and is flipped back to its dispositioned status; a finding of the same rule at
a NEW locus is NOT flipped — it stays `confirmed`, gains a
`pending_readjudication` note, and surfaces in the recap for re-adjudication
(a disposition may never suppress a finding nobody has looked at). Absent
file → clean no-op; pure + idempotent; it NEVER flips an `llm-inferred`
finding, never moves anything into the open band, never sets `fixed`.
**A non-zero exit from `apply-dispositions.mjs` is a HARD STOP.** The engine
is all-or-nothing at the file level: ANY invalid entry rejects the WHOLE
dispositions file — every offender is printed (`REJECTED entry #N: …`),
NOTHING is applied, and the ledger is left unchanged, so the band you are
about to report is NOT the adjudicated one. The remedy is to add the
mandatory `scope.files` or `scope.as_of_pass` to the NAMED entries and
re-run ONCE. NEVER hand-edit `audit-ledger.json`, NEVER proceed past the
failure, and NEVER loop re-running an unchanged file.
10. **Fold everything into one dossier.** Instantiate
`${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/templates/fp-dossier.md.tmpl` at
`<target>/docs/security-review/fp-dossier.md` (or update it
incrementally). The template's per-finding structure mirrors the official
False Positive Documentation template's field list (login-gated; baseline
`artifact-fp-documentation-format` — verified): official fields first
(Vulnerability Name, Detected By, Detailed explanation, Evidence,
References, the reviewer-reserved section), toolkit value-add fields in
the marked Supplementary section — so the filled dossier drops into the
wizard's FP slot without reformatting, and a wrong FP format never costs
the review cycle. One dossier across all eight families: register row plus a
per-finding block with all four required parts (flagged issue at
file:line, functional explanation, the concrete mitigation, technical
non-exploitability argument with evidence). Where the audit ledger
already refuted the same pattern, reuse its reasoning/evidence verbatim —
that is what the ledger is for. **Single source of truth for deterministic
findings:** a dossier FP row for a `provenance:'deterministic'` finding
MUST correspond to a disposition entry in
`<target>/.security-review/deterministic-dispositions.json` — the entry's
`reason` IS the dossier row's justification, and `apply-dispositions.mjs`
flips the ledger from the same entry, so a dossier FP and a ledger
refutation can never disagree. Author the dossier row FROM the disposition
entry (write the entry first if it does not exist), never as free-standing
prose. Never downgrade an exploitable finding to
"false positive" to dodge a fix; an Accepted-residual disposition always
carries an owner signature the agent cannot supply. **Exit bar: zero
undispositioned findings** — the undocumented finding is the bounce, not
the finding itself (baseline: `scan-false-positive-documentation`,
`scan-no-clean-scan-required`).
11. **Verify evidence on disk, then report status VERBATIM.** List
`.security-review/evidence/` and confirm each selected family's files
exist before stating any family's status; append a dated entry to
`.security-review/run-log.md` (what ran, tool versions, repo commit, what
is PENDING owner-run). **Then render the scan-status summary and print it
VERBATIM** — assemble this run's evidence mapping and build the index
(`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/build-evidence-index.mjs --repo <target>
--date <date> --input <evidence-input.json>`). **Then run the completeness
check:**
`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/build-evidence-index.mjs --repo <target> --check`
— it enumerates the top-level `evidence/*.{json,sarif,txt,html}` scan
artifacts (excluding `index.json` itself, `*.provenance.json` sidecars, and
subdirectories like `dast/`) and exits 2 naming every **orphan**: a file on
disk that the index never cites. An orphan means a scan ran but the
evidence-input omitted it (the exact bug class: a detect-secrets report and
an opengrep `.sarif` each ingested on a real run yet uncited) — add the
missing file to the evidence-input and REBUILD the index; never hand-edit
`index.json`, and never proceed to render on a failing check. Then render
`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/render-scan-status.mjs --target <target>
--commit <repo HEAD> --tools "<tool versions>"`. It emits the FIXED 8-row Family
table in canonical Family 1–8 order with locked columns `Family | Applies | Runner |
Status | Evidence file | Gate id | Next command if PENDING`, rendered from the
evidence `index.json` + the scope manifest (the manifest drives the Applies column).
Print its stdout verbatim — never hand-rebuild the table, reorder the families, or
drop a column. The readiness rule it enforces: a family reads **DONE only with the
report file on disk** — a generated plan with no
report is PARTIAL, full stop. `/sf-security-review-toolkit:compile-submission`
lints for HAVE-without-evidence and demotes it, but the lie should never
be written in the first place (CONVENTIONS §2).
## Failure modes that cost a review cycle
| Failure | Why it bites | Guard |
|---|---|---|
| Scanning a staging target that differs from production | The reviewer attacks production-equivalent infrastructure; evidence from a softer target (debug on, different auth, no edge) proves nothing and the delta surfaces as their finding, not yours | Same build, same hardening, debug off (baseline: `dast-endpoints-production-mode`); record which deployment was scanned in `run-notes.md` |
| DAST without authentication — or silently de-authenticated mid-scan | Covers only the public shell; an expired token mid-run degrades everything after it to anonymous while still printing a green report | Authenticated context is the requirement (baseline: `dast-authenticated-scans`); token lifetime > scan window; poll re-verification for session logins |
| Screenshot/report that doesn't show the URL | The reviewer cross-checks scan evidence against the architecture doc's endpoint list; proof that doesn't bind report-to-endpoint reads as no proof | Capture must visibly show target URL + scan date (baseline: `dast-screenshot-proof-of-scanned-url`) |
| Evidence older than the freshness expectation at submission | The validity window is not codified, which cuts both ways — stale-looking reports invite a bounce | Re-run the cheap scans (Code Analyzer, SSL Labs, dependency audit) at compile time; flag owner-run reports older than ~30 days for refresh (baseline: `scan-report-freshness`) |
| Report from three fixes ago | A report that predates the fixes it claims drove neither matches the submitted commit nor the dossier | Re-scan after fixes; record the repo commit alongside each report in the run log |
| Marking the scan row HAVE with a plan but no report | **Forbidden.** "Plan generated" is agent work; "scan executed" is owner work with a report file — conflating them is the exact dishonesty CONVENTIONS §2 exists to prevent | Step 11's on-disk check; the tracker's HAVE-requires-evidence contract |
| Blind scan through a CDN/WAF edge | Bot rules mangle probes, rate limits throttle the crawl, the report is noise — and the scan pages whoever watches the security alerts | Edge-handling decision per `${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/harness/zap/README.md`: scan an edge-free production-equivalent deployment, or temporarily allowlist the scanner and revert (documented in run notes) |
## Automated vs. manual recap
**Automated:** family selection from the manifest, baseline currency and
conflict surfacing, Code Analyzer install check + scan + parsing, dependency
scans + register drafting, SSL Labs API evidence, ZAP plan generation +
load validation, report parsing and FP-class matching, dossier drafting,
evidence-file verification, run-log entries.
**Owner-run:** the Partner Security Portal scan (login, listing link, the
three budgeted runs, report download), executing the DAST scan
(authorization, token minting, edge allowlist, the re-scan), every code
fix, dependency upgrades, and confirming each FP justification and signing
every accepted residual — an agent cannot certify non-exploitability.
Salesforce pen-tests the surface regardless of all of it.
## What feeds the next skill
The evidence files, the dossier, and the vulnerability register feed the
checklist rows and readiness verdict in
`/sf-security-review-toolkit:compile-submission` (which re-runs the cheap
scans when stale and demotes HAVE rows lacking evidence). The
production-mode verification carries into
`/sf-security-review-toolkit:prepare-test-environment` — the reviewer
attacks the same endpoints the DAST did, with the credentials that phase
stages. Findings fixed here belong in the audit ledger so the next
`/sf-security-review-toolkit:audit-codebase` pass doesn't re-report them.
Step 9b already seeded the deterministic band IN THIS PASS — `--all` ingested
every scanner output the pass produced and `reconcile-provenance.mjs` demoted the
co-located LLM duplicates. On a journey run the **static substrate** is the pass
that matters most here: it runs BEFORE the audit, so the audit's own deterministic
pass (`harness/ingest-scanner-findings.mjs --all`) reads the SAME evidence
(`evidence/code-analyzer-<date>.json` et al.) on its FIRST fan-out — stable ids
dedup, so re-ingest never duplicates and the band recurs identically run-to-run
(`docs/roadmap-deterministic-findings.md` Phase 1). The live tail and any
standalone sweep flip whatever remained. So running THIS phase is what flips the
CRUD/FLS + sharing classes from PENDING-OWNER-RUN to deterministic — the
replacement for the unstable LLM-only blocker sample.
Scanned 8/31/2026
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