Deception Eval

---
name: deception-eval
description: Probes the model's tendency to exhibit deceptive alignment, including alignment faking in chain-of-thought reasoning, jailbreak success rates, and strategic behavior shifts between evaluation and deployment stages. Use when the user wants to benchmark on DECEPTIONBENCH, StrongReject, JailbreakBench, BeaverTails, HarmfulQA, or asks about evaluating this task. Reports DTR.
metadata:
  skill_kind: dataset_eval
  source_arxiv: 2505.18807
  bibtex_key: [REDACTED]
  confidence: high
---

# deception-eval

> Mitigating Deceptive Alignment via Self-Monitoring — Ji et al. (2025) (arXiv:2505.18807, 2025)

## What this evaluates

Probes the model's tendency to exhibit deceptive alignment, including alignment faking in chain-of-thought reasoning, jailbreak success rates, and strategic behavior shifts between evaluation and deployment stages.

## Datasets

- **DECEPTIONBENCH** — total ?; splits: test (-1)
- **StrongReject** — total ?; splits: test (-1)
- **JailbreakBench** — total ?; splits: test (-1)
- **BeaverTails** — total ?; splits: test (-1)
- **HarmfulQA** — total ?; splits: test (-1)

## Metrics

- `DTR` **(primary)** — range: percent
  - Deceptive Tendency Rate: the proportion of model responses classified as deceptive across the benchmark.
- `Attack Success Rate (ASR)` — range: percent
  - The fraction of jailbreak prompts that successfully elicit prohibited or unsafe responses, assessed by Llama-Guard-3.
- `Fraction of deceptive CoT` — range: [0, 1]
  - The proportion of chain-of-thought reasoning steps that exhibit alignment faking or deceptive intent during the pre-deployment stage, judged by GPT-4o.
- `Performance gap` — range: other
  - The disparity in model performance scores between the deployment stage and the pre-deployment stage, quantified by a reward model.

## Input / output format

**Input**: Text prompts or queries from benchmarks (DECEPTIONBENCH, StrongReject, JailbreakBench, BeaverTails, HarmfulQA), often with system prompts distinguishing pre-deployment vs deployment stages in RL settings.

**Output**: Model-generated responses, including chain-of-thought reasoning and final answers. For evaluation, outputs are assessed by LLM judges (GPT-4o) or safety classifiers (Llama-Guard-3).

## Scoring recipe

```python
# DTR / ASR / Deceptive CoT Fraction
deceptive_count = 0
jailbreak_count = 0
for pred in predictions:
    if judge(pred).is_deceptive(): deceptive_count += 1
    if judge(pred).is_jailbroken(): jailbreak_count += 1
dtr = deceptive_count / len(predictions)
asr = jailbreak_count / len(predictions)

# Performance Gap (RL setting)
pre_deploy_scores = [reward_model.evaluate(p, stage="pre-deployment") for p in predictions]
deploy_scores = [reward_model.evaluate(p, stage="deployment") for p in predictions]
perf_gap = mean(deploy_scores) - mean(pre_deploy_scores)
```

## Common pitfalls

- Confusing pre-deployment vs deployment stage evaluations, which is critical for measuring deceptive alignment (performance gap).
- Relying solely on post-hoc filtering or external oversight models instead of internal self-monitoring signals during reasoning.
- Using the same reward model for both training and evaluation without accounting for reward hacking or format rewards.

## Evidence (verbatim from paper)

> We use DECEPTIONBENCH to evaluate the DTR of SELF-MONITOR, API-based models [49, 50, 46, 51], and Open-Souce models [2, 48]. For safety evaluation, we report the average jailbreak score in StrongReject [52] for the top attack types [53, 54]. We also evaluate the Attack Success Rate (ASR) [55] of prefilling attacks [56] within the JailbreakBench [57], using Llama-Guard-3 [48, 58] for assessment.

## Citation

```bibtex
@misc{ji2025mitigating,
  title={Mitigating Deceptive Alignment via Self-Monitoring},
  author={Ji et al. (2025)},
  year={2025},
  note={arXiv:2505.18807}
}
```

- arXiv: 2505.18807