Implementing Aws Nitro Enclave Security

---
name: implementing-aws-nitro-enclave-security
description: 'Build AWS Nitro Enclave confidential computing environments using nitro-cli
  to create enclave images, configure attestation-aware KMS policies with PCR condition
  keys, validate attestation documents against the Nitro PKI root, and set up vsock/kmstool-enclave-cli
  pipelines for processing PII, keys, and health records. Use for Nitro Enclave setup,
  attestation validation, or scoping KMS to an enclave image hash.

  '
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: cloud-security
tags:
- AWS-Nitro-Enclaves
- confidential-computing
- attestation
- KMS
- enclave-isolation
- vsock
- PCR
version: 1.0.0
author: mukul975
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- PR.IR-01
- ID.AM-08
- GV.SC-06
- DE.CM-01
mitre_attack:
- T1078.004
- T1530
- T1537
- T1580
- T0816
---
# Implementing AWS Nitro Enclave Security

## When to Use

- Processing sensitive data (PII, PHI, financial records, cryptographic secrets) that must be isolated from EC2 instance operators and administrators
- Building confidential computing pipelines where even root-level access on the parent instance cannot read enclave memory or state
- Implementing cryptographic attestation workflows that tie KMS decryption rights to a specific, verified enclave image hash
- Deploying multi-party computation environments where two or more enclaves authenticate each other via attestation before exchanging data
- Hardening existing workloads that currently decrypt secrets on the parent instance by migrating decryption into an enclave boundary

**Do not use** when the workload does not handle sensitive data that requires hardware-level isolation, when the instance type does not support Nitro Enclaves (requires Nitro-based instances with at least 4 vCPUs), or when latency constraints make the vsock communication overhead unacceptable.

## Prerequisites

- An AWS account with permissions to launch Nitro-capable EC2 instances (m5.xlarge or larger, C5, R5, M6i families)
- AWS CLI v2 and the `nitro-cli` toolset installed on the parent EC2 instance (Amazon Linux 2 or AL2023)
- Docker installed on the parent instance for building enclave image files (EIF)
- An AWS KMS symmetric key with key policy permissions for the enclave's IAM role
- The `aws-nitro-enclaves-sdk-c` or Python `aws-encryption-sdk` for enclave-side KMS operations
- The Nitro Enclaves allocator service configured with sufficient memory and vCPU allocation in `/etc/nitro_enclaves/allocator.yaml`

## Workflow

### Step 1: Configure the Nitro Enclaves Environment

Set up the parent EC2 instance to support enclave launches:

- **Install the Nitro Enclaves CLI**: On Amazon Linux 2, install the tools and allocator:
  ```bash
  sudo amazon-linux-extras install aws-nitro-enclaves-cli
  sudo yum install aws-nitro-enclaves-cli-devel -y
  sudo systemctl enable --now nitro-enclaves-allocator.service
  sudo systemctl enable --now docker
  sudo usermod -aG ne ec2-user
  sudo usermod -aG docker ec2-user
  ```
- **Configure memory and CPU allocation**: Edit `/etc/nitro_enclaves/allocator.yaml` to reserve resources for the enclave. The enclave requires dedicated memory that is carved from the parent instance:
  ```yaml
  ---
  memory_mib: 4096
  cpu_count: 2
  ```
  Restart the allocator: `sudo systemctl restart nitro-enclaves-allocator.service`
- **Verify setup**: Run `nitro-cli describe-enclaves` to confirm the CLI can communicate with the Nitro hypervisor. An empty JSON array `[]` indicates no enclaves are running and the setup is correct.

### Step 2: Build the Enclave Image File (EIF)

Package the sensitive workload into a signed enclave image:

- **Create the application Dockerfile**: The enclave runs a minimal Linux environment. The application communicates exclusively through vsock:
  ```dockerfile
  FROM amazonlinux:2

  RUN yum install -y python3 python3-pip && \
      pip3 install boto3 cbor2 cryptography requests

  COPY enclave_app.py /app/enclave_app.py

  WORKDIR /app
  CMD ["python3", "enclave_app.py"]
  ```
- **Build the EIF with nitro-cli**: Convert the Docker image into an enclave image file, capturing the PCR measurements:
  ```bash
  docker build -t enclave-app:latest .
  nitro-cli build-enclave \
    --docker-uri enclave-app:latest \
    --output-file enclave-app.eif
  ```
  The output contains three critical PCR values:
  - **PCR0**: SHA-384 hash of the enclave image file (the full image digest)
  - **PCR1**: SHA-384 hash of the Linux kernel and bootstrap process
  - **PCR2**: SHA-384 hash of the application code
  Record these values; they are used in KMS key policies for attestation-based access control.

- **Build a signed EIF** (recommended for production): Generate a signing certificate and use it to produce PCR8:
  ```bash
  openssl ecparam -name secp384r1 -genkey -noout -out enclave_key.pem
  openssl req -new -key enclave_key.pem -sha384 \
    -nodes -subj "/CN=Enclave Signer" -out enclave_csr.pem
  openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in enclave_csr.pem \
    -signkey enclave_key.pem -sha384 -out enclave_cert.pem

  nitro-cli build-enclave \
    --docker-uri enclave-app:latest \
    --output-file enclave-app.eif \
    --private-key enclave_key.pem \
    --signing-certificate enclave_cert.pem
  ```
  PCR8 (the signing certificate hash) enables KMS policies that trust any image signed by a specific certificate, allowing image updates without changing the policy.

### Step 3: Configure KMS Attestation-Based Key Policies

Create a KMS key policy that restricts decryption to a verified enclave:

- **Policy using PCR0 (image hash)**: This locks the key to a specific enclave build. Any code change produces a new PCR0, requiring a policy update:
  ```json
  {
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
      {
        "Sid": "AllowEnclaveDecrypt",
        "Effect": "Allow",
        "Principal": {
          "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/EnclaveParentRole"
        },
        "Action": [
          "kms:Decrypt",
          "kms:GenerateDataKey"
        ],
        "Resource": "*",
        "Condition": {
          "StringEqualsIgnoreCase": {
            "kms:RecipientAttestation:ImageSha384": "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
          }
        }
      }
    ]
  }
  ```
- **Policy using PCR8 (signing certificate)**: Trusts any enclave signed with a specific certificate, enabling image rotation without policy changes:
  ```json
  {
    "Condition": {
      "StringEqualsIgnoreCase": {
        "kms:RecipientAttestation:PCR8": "ab3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890abcdef"
      }
    }
  }
  ```
- **Multi-PCR policy for defense in depth**: Combine PCR0 (image) and PCR1 (kernel) to ensure both the application and the boot environment match expected values:
  ```json
  {
    "Condition": {
      "StringEqualsIgnoreCase": {
        "kms:RecipientAttestation:PCR0": "<pcr0-hex>",
        "kms:RecipientAttestation:PCR1": "<pcr1-hex>"
      }
    }
  }
  ```
- **IAM role policy**: The parent instance's IAM role must have `kms:Decrypt` permission, but the KMS key policy condition ensures the actual decryption only succeeds when the request originates from a valid enclave with the correct attestation document attached.

### Step 4: Implement Secure Vsock Communication

Establish the parent-to-enclave communication channel:

- **Vsock architecture**: The only way an enclave communicates with the outside world is through a vsock (virtual socket). Vsock uses a CID (Context Identifier) and port number. The parent instance CID is always `3`, and the enclave CID is assigned at launch.
- **Parent-side proxy server**: The parent runs a proxy that forwards KMS API calls from the enclave through the vsock to the AWS KMS endpoint:
  ```python
  import socket
  import json
  import boto3

  VSOCK_CID = 3  # Parent CID
  VSOCK_PORT = 5000

  def start_proxy():
      sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_VSOCK, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
      sock.bind((VSOCK_CID, VSOCK_PORT))
      sock.listen(5)

      kms_client = boto3.client('kms', region_name='us-east-1')

      while True:
          conn, addr = sock.accept()
          data = conn.recv(65536)
          request = json.loads(data.decode())

          if request['action'] == 'decrypt':
              response = kms_client.decrypt(
                  CiphertextBlob=bytes.fromhex(request['ciphertext']),
                  Recipient={
                      'KeyEncryptionAlgorithm': 'RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256',
                      'AttestationDocument': bytes.fromhex(request['attestation_doc'])
                  }
              )
              conn.sendall(json.dumps({
                  'ciphertext_for_recipient': response['CiphertextForRecipient'].hex()
              }).encode())
          conn.close()
  ```
- **Enclave-side client**: The enclave application requests an attestation document from the Nitro Security Module (NSM) device at `/dev/nsm`, attaches it to KMS decrypt requests, and receives data encrypted to the enclave's ephemeral public key:
  ```python
  import socket
  import json
  from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, padding
  from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization

  PARENT_CID = 3
  VSOCK_PORT = 5000

  def get_attestation_document(public_key_der):
      """Request attestation document from NSM device."""
      # Uses the aws-nitro-enclaves-nsm-api
      # NSM provides: module_id, digest (SHA384), timestamp, PCRs,
      # certificate (from Nitro PKI), cabundle, public_key, user_data, nonce
      import nsm_util
      nsm_fd = nsm_util.nsm_lib_init()
      attestation_doc = nsm_util.nsm_get_attestation_doc(
          nsm_fd,
          public_key=public_key_der,
          user_data=None,
          nonce=None
      )
      return attestation_doc

  def decrypt_via_parent(ciphertext_hex):
      """Send decrypt request through vsock to parent proxy."""
      private_key = rsa.generate_private_key(
          public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048
      )
      public_key_der = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
          serialization.Encoding.DER,
          serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
      )

      attestation_doc = get_attestation_document(public_key_der)

      sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_VSOCK, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
      sock.connect((PARENT_CID, VSOCK_PORT))
      sock.sendall(json.dumps({
          'action': 'decrypt',
          'ciphertext': ciphertext_hex,
          'attestation_doc': attestation_doc.hex()
      }).encode())

      response = json.loads(sock.recv(65536).decode())
      sock.close()

      # KMS encrypted the plaintext to the enclave's public key
      # Only the enclave's private key can decrypt it
      ciphertext_for_recipient = bytes.fromhex(
          response['ciphertext_for_recipient']
      )
      plaintext = private_key.decrypt(
          ciphertext_for_recipient,
          padding.OAEP(
              mgf=padding.MGF1(algorithm=hashes.SHA256()),
              algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
              label=None
          )
      )
      return plaintext
  ```

### Step 5: Validate Attestation Documents

Verify attestation documents from enclaves to establish trust:

- **Attestation document structure**: The document is CBOR-encoded and COSE-signed (COSE_Sign1). It contains:
  - `module_id`: Identifier for the NSM module
  - `digest`: Hashing algorithm (SHA-384)
  - `timestamp`: Unix epoch milliseconds when the document was created
  - `pcrs`: Map of PCR index to measurement value (PCR0-PCR15)
  - `certificate`: The NSM's x509 certificate, signed by the Nitro PKI
  - `cabundle`: Certificate chain from the NSM certificate to the AWS Nitro root CA
  - `public_key`: The enclave's ephemeral public key (provided at attestation request time)
  - `user_data`: Optional application-defined data (up to 512 bytes)
  - `nonce`: Optional nonce for freshness verification

- **Validation steps**:
  1. Decode the COSE_Sign1 structure and extract the payload and certificate
  2. Verify the COSE signature using the public key from the embedded certificate
  3. Validate the certificate chain from the NSM certificate through the CA bundle to the AWS Nitro Attestation PKI root certificate (available at `https://aws-nitro-enclaves.amazonaws.com/AWS_NitroEnclaves_Root-G1.zip`)
  4. Check that the root CA certificate matches the expected AWS root: `aws.nitro-enclaves` CN
  5. Verify that no certificate in the chain is expired at the document's timestamp
  6. Compare PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 values against expected measurements from the enclave build output
  7. If a nonce was provided, verify it matches to prevent replay attacks

- **Attestation validation code**:
  ```python
  import cbor2
  from cose import CoseMessage
  from cryptography import x509
  from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID

  def validate_attestation(attestation_bytes, expected_pcrs, expected_nonce=None):
      cose_msg = CoseMessage.decode(attestation_bytes)
      payload = cbor2.loads(cose_msg.payload)

      # Verify certificate chain
      cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(payload['certificate'])
      cabundle = [x509.load_der_x509_certificate(c) for c in payload['cabundle']]

      # Check root CA is AWS Nitro
      root = cabundle[-1]
      cn = root.subject.get_attributes_for_oid(NameOID.COMMON_NAME)[0].value
      assert cn == 'aws.nitro-enclaves', f'Unexpected root CA: {cn}'

      # Verify PCR measurements
      pcrs = payload['pcrs']
      for idx, expected_value in expected_pcrs.items():
          actual = pcrs.get(idx, b'').hex()
          assert actual == expected_value, f'PCR{idx} mismatch: {actual}'

      # Verify nonce freshness
      if expected_nonce:
          assert payload.get('nonce') == expected_nonce, 'Nonce mismatch'

      return payload
  ```

### Step 6: Launch and Monitor the Enclave

Run the enclave and implement operational monitoring:

- **Launch the enclave**:
  ```bash
  nitro-cli run-enclave \
    --eif-path enclave-app.eif \
    --cpu-count 2 \
    --memory 4096 \
    --enclave-cid 16 \
    --debug-mode
  ```
  Note: `--debug-mode` enables the enclave console for development. Remove it in production as it allows reading enclave output, which breaks the isolation guarantee.

- **Verify enclave status**:
  ```bash
  nitro-cli describe-enclaves
  ```
  Expected output includes `"State": "RUNNING"`, the assigned `EnclaveCID`, memory, CPU count, and enclave flags.

- **Read enclave console** (debug mode only):
  ```bash
  nitro-cli console --enclave-id <enclave-id>
  ```

- **Terminate the enclave**:
  ```bash
  nitro-cli terminate-enclave --enclave-id <enclave-id>
  ```

- **CloudWatch monitoring**: Configure the parent instance to report enclave health metrics. Since the enclave has no network access, health checks must go through the vsock proxy:
  ```python
  # Parent-side health check over vsock
  def check_enclave_health(enclave_cid, port=5001):
      try:
          sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_VSOCK, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
          sock.settimeout(5)
          sock.connect((enclave_cid, port))
          sock.sendall(b'HEALTH_CHECK')
          response = sock.recv(1024)
          sock.close()
          return response == b'OK'
      except (socket.timeout, ConnectionRefusedError):
          return False
  ```

## Key Concepts

| Term | Definition |
|------|------------|
| **Nitro Enclave** | An isolated virtual machine created by the Nitro Hypervisor on a Nitro-based EC2 instance with no persistent storage, no network access, and no interactive access, even from the parent instance's root user |
| **Attestation Document** | A CBOR-encoded, COSE-signed document generated by the Nitro Security Module containing PCR measurements, a certificate chain to the AWS Nitro root CA, and optional user-provided data |
| **PCR (Platform Configuration Register)** | SHA-384 hash measurements that uniquely identify an enclave's image (PCR0), kernel/bootstrap (PCR1), application (PCR2), IAM role (PCR4), instance ID (PCR3), and signing certificate (PCR8) |
| **Vsock** | A virtual socket providing the sole communication channel between a parent EC2 instance and its enclave, using CID (Context Identifier) and port addressing |
| **EIF (Enclave Image File)** | The packaged enclave image built by nitro-cli from a Docker image, containing the kernel, ramdisk, and application, producing PCR measurements at build time |
| **Nitro Security Module (NSM)** | A custom Linux device (`/dev/nsm`) inside the enclave that provides attestation document generation and hardware random number generation |
| **COSE_Sign1** | CBOR Object Signing and Encryption single-signer structure used to sign the attestation document with the NSM's private key |
| **kms:RecipientAttestation** | AWS KMS condition key prefix that enables key policies to enforce that decrypt/generate operations only succeed when a valid attestation document with matching PCR values is presented |

## Tools & Systems

- **nitro-cli**: AWS CLI tool for building enclave image files, launching/terminating enclaves, and reading enclave console output
- **AWS KMS**: Key Management Service that natively supports attestation-based condition keys for Nitro Enclaves, encrypting responses to the enclave's ephemeral public key
- **aws-nitro-enclaves-sdk-c**: C SDK for enclave-side KMS operations that handles attestation document generation and vsock proxy communication
- **kmstool-enclave-cli**: Pre-built CLI tool (from the SDK) that runs inside the enclave to perform KMS Decrypt and GenerateRandom operations with attestation
- **Nitro Enclaves ACM**: AWS Certificate Manager integration that provisions TLS certificates inside enclaves for establishing HTTPS endpoints
- **CloudTrail**: Logs KMS API calls including `Decrypt` and `GenerateDataKey` operations that include `Recipient` parameters, enabling auditing of enclave-originated cryptographic operations

## Common Scenarios

### Scenario: Implementing a PII Tokenization Service in a Nitro Enclave

**Context**: A healthcare SaaS company processes patient records containing PHI. Regulations require that the decryption and tokenization of PHI never occurs on an instance accessible to operators. The company deploys a Nitro Enclave that receives encrypted patient records, decrypts them inside the enclave using KMS with attestation, tokenizes the PII fields, and returns only the tokenized records through the vsock.

**Approach**:
1. Build the tokenization application into a Docker image containing the tokenization logic, the `kmstool-enclave-cli` binary, and a vsock server that accepts encrypted records
2. Build the EIF with `nitro-cli build-enclave` and record PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 from the build output
3. Create a KMS key with a key policy that includes a `kms:RecipientAttestation:ImageSha384` condition matching PCR0, allowing only this specific enclave build to decrypt patient records
4. Deploy the parent instance with an IAM role that has `kms:Decrypt` on the key, but the KMS condition ensures decryption only succeeds inside the attested enclave
5. The parent application receives encrypted patient records over HTTPS, passes them to the enclave over vsock port 5000, and receives tokenized records back
6. The enclave requests an attestation document from the NSM, attaches it to the KMS Decrypt call, receives the plaintext encrypted to its ephemeral RSA key, decrypts locally, tokenizes PII (SSN, DOB, name), and returns `{ssn: "tok_a8f3...", dob: "tok_b2e1...", name: "tok_c9d4..."}`
7. CloudTrail logs show `Decrypt` calls with `RecipientAttestation` parameters, confirming all decryption occurs within the enclave boundary

**Pitfalls**:
- Running the enclave in debug mode in production, which allows console access and breaks the confidentiality guarantee that regulators require
- Setting the KMS key policy to use only the IAM role without attestation conditions, which allows the parent instance to decrypt directly without the enclave
- Failing to reserve sufficient memory in `allocator.yaml`, causing the enclave to fail at launch with an opaque "resource not available" error
- Not implementing vsock message framing, causing large records to be truncated at the 64KB socket buffer boundary
- Forgetting that PCR0 changes with every code rebuild, requiring a KMS policy update for each deployment; use PCR8 (signing certificate) for production to decouple builds from policy updates

## Output Format

```
## Nitro Enclave Security Assessment

**Enclave Image**: enclave-tokenizer.eif
**Build Date**: 2026-03-19T14:30:00Z
**Instance Type**: m5.2xlarge
**Allocated Resources**: 2 vCPUs, 4096 MiB memory

### PCR Measurements
| PCR | Value | Bound in KMS Policy |
|-----|-------|---------------------|
| PCR0 (Image) | a1b2c3d4e5f6... | Yes |
| PCR1 (Kernel) | f6e5d4c3b2a1... | Yes |
| PCR2 (Application) | 1a2b3c4d5e6f... | No |
| PCR8 (Signing Cert) | 9f8e7d6c5b4a... | Yes (production) |

### KMS Key Policy Verification
- Key ARN: arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:111122223333:key/mrk-abc123
- Attestation condition: kms:RecipientAttestation:ImageSha384 = PCR0
- Signing cert condition: kms:RecipientAttestation:PCR8 = <cert-hash>
- Parent role: arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/EnclaveParentRole
- Direct decrypt from parent: BLOCKED (attestation required)
- Decrypt from verified enclave: ALLOWED

### Security Posture
- [PASS] Debug mode disabled in production launch command
- [PASS] Vsock is the only communication channel (no network interface)
- [PASS] Attestation document nonce verification implemented
- [PASS] Certificate chain validates to AWS Nitro root CA
- [WARN] PCR0 used in policy; consider PCR8 for deployment flexibility
- [FAIL] Health check endpoint does not verify enclave attestation freshness
```