Use when security, auth, billing, concurrency, data integrity, or another high-stakes artifact needs adversarial review by a provider other than its author.
Scanned 8/31/2026
Install to Claude Code
npx -y skills add lawzava/megapowers --skill independent-review --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
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---
name: independent-review
description: Use when security, auth, billing, concurrency, data integrity, or another high-stakes artifact needs adversarial review by a provider other than its author.
---
# Independent Review
Use model review for residual uncertainty after tests, types, reproductions,
and measurements. State the artifact intent and acceptance boundary first. A
same-provider second look is context separation, not independence. The lead
owns remediation and reruns the real oracle.
## Trusted review path
Review a file or immutable commit range. Inspect the disclosure
before an external call. Set `review_tool` to the absolute installed
`scripts/megapowers-review.go` beside this `SKILL.md`, not a project copy.
```bash
go run "$review_tool" inspect --file path/to/file --provider claude
go run "$review_tool" inspect --base <base-revision> --head <head-revision> --provider codex
```
The inspection prints the provider path, binary hash, package hash, and an
`approval_token`. Check them, copy that token, declare the
different artifact author, and approve only that exact package and binary:
```bash
go run "$review_tool" review --file path/to/file \
--provider claude --author codex --approve-external "$approval_token"
go run "$review_tool" review --base <base-revision> --head <head-revision> \
--provider codex --author claude --approve-external "$approval_token"
```
The tool refuses an author and provider that do not differ. Other
rejections are deterministic: dirty worktrees, untracked files, routing
overrides, project-selected binaries, symlinks, submodules, binary data,
oversized packages, and secret-like paths or patterns.
External dispatch sends artifact bytes to another vendor. Confirm the user
authorized that egress for this artifact; a review mandate alone does not
authorize disclosure. A dispatch waiting on a permission prompt or provider
stall is blocked: surface it and ask; do not wait silently.
Any file or provider-binary change requires a new inspection. The pre-dispatch
disclosure lists paths, byte count, source identity, and hashes. Pass
`--approve-external` only after checking those fields.
Receipts are private and advisory, not an approval gate or tamper-proof
attestation. The transcript is not retained by default. Use
`--retain-transcript` only after a sensitive-data decision. Treat the
review verdict as a claim. Record credible findings, and explain dismissed
findings against the artifact intent. Fix as the single writer, then rerun the
artifact's acceptance tests after every material change.
The default receipt stays under private Git metadata. An explicit `--out` must
already exist as an absolute canonical directory outside the repository and may
not contain it. Receipt writes stay anchored to an opened directory handle.

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