'Apply Flexport API security best practices including webhook signature
Scanned 9/2/2026
Install to Claude Code
npx -y skills add jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace --skill flexport-security-basics --agent claude-codeInstalls into .claude/skills of the current project.
Are you the author of Flexport Security Basics?
Add the live security badge to your README — it updates automatically with every re-scan.
[](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/jeremylongshore-flexport-security-basics-24064432)More formats (shields.io, HTML) on the badges page.
---
name: flexport-security-basics
description: 'Apply Flexport API security best practices including webhook signature
verification,
API key rotation, and least-privilege access patterns.
Trigger: "flexport security", "flexport webhook signature", "secure flexport API
key".
'
allowed-tools: Read, Write, Grep
version: 1.6.0
license: MIT
author: Jeremy Longshore <jeremy@intentsolutions.io>
tags:
- saas
- logistics
- flexport
compatibility: Designed for Claude Code
---
# Flexport Security Basics
## Overview
Flexport manages global freight logistics containing shipping manifests, customs declarations, commercial invoices, and supply chain partner data. A breach exposes trade routes, commodity values, importer/exporter identities, and customs brokerage details. Secure API credentials, webhook endpoints, and any pipeline that processes shipment tracking or purchase order data.
## Prerequisites
- A named security owner, scoped secret-manager integration, access-review cadence, and approved destinations for logistics data.
- Synthetic shipment fixtures and a defined incident/revocation path.
## Instructions
1. Issue least-privilege credentials per environment and integration; never put keys or secrets in source, tickets, shell history, or support bundles.
2. Verify webhook signatures using raw bodies, record opaque event identifiers only, and enforce idempotency before downstream processing.
3. Restrict access to shipping, customs, invoice, and partner data; review connected systems and remove access when the business need ends.
4. Redact diagnostics, encrypt approved exports, and rotate/revoke credentials immediately after suspected exposure.
## Output
Maintain a security receipt with access owner, secret reference, approved integration, review date, rotation/revocation outcome, and redacted incident status. Never include data, documents, or keys.
## Examples
Use a fictional booking event and scoped staging credential to verify that an invalid signature is rejected, a duplicate is suppressed, and revoking the credential blocks future requests. Keep only the opaque event ID and control outcome in the evidence.
## API Key Management
```typescript
function createFlexportClient(): { apiKey: string; baseUrl: string } {
const apiKey = process.env.FLEXPORT_API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) {
throw new Error("Missing FLEXPORT_API_KEY — store in secrets manager, never in .env in production");
}
// Never log the key; log only a hash suffix for debugging
console.log("Flexport client initialized (key suffix:", apiKey.slice(-4), ")");
return { apiKey, baseUrl: "https://api.flexport.com/v2" };
}
```
## Webhook Signature Verification
```typescript
import crypto from "crypto";
import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from "express";
function verifyFlexportWebhook(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void {
const signature = req.headers["x-hub-signature"] as string;
const secret = process.env.FLEXPORT_WEBHOOK_SECRET!;
const expected = "sha256=" + crypto.createHmac("sha256", secret).update(req.body).digest("hex");
if (!signature || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected))) {
res.status(401).send("Invalid signature");
return;
}
next();
}
```
## Input Validation
```typescript
import { z } from "zod";
const ShipmentQuerySchema = z.object({
shipment_id: z.string().regex(/^FLEX-\d+$/),
container_number: z.string().regex(/^[A-Z]{4}\d{7}$/).optional(),
origin_port: z.string().length(5).optional(),
destination_port: z.string().length(5).optional(),
hs_code: z.string().regex(/^\d{6,10}$/).optional(),
});
function validateShipmentQuery(data: unknown) {
return ShipmentQuerySchema.parse(data);
}
```
## Data Protection
```typescript
const FLEXPORT_SENSITIVE_FIELDS = ["customs_value", "commercial_invoice", "importer_tax_id", "broker_credentials", "hs_code"];
function redactFlexportLog(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
const redacted = { ...record };
for (const field of FLEXPORT_SENSITIVE_FIELDS) {
if (field in redacted) redacted[field] = "[REDACTED]";
}
return redacted;
}
```
## Security Checklist
- [ ] API keys stored in secrets manager, `.env` files in `.gitignore`
- [ ] Webhook signatures verified on every inbound request
- [ ] Different keys for dev/staging/prod environments
- [ ] Key rotation scheduled quarterly with dual-key transition
- [ ] Git history scanned for leaked keys
- [ ] HTTPS enforced for all API calls
- [ ] Request/response logging redacts auth headers and customs values
- [ ] Least-privilege access: read-only tokens for dashboards, run tokens for operations
## Error Handling
| Vulnerability | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Leaked API key | Full shipment and customs data exposure | Secrets manager + quarterly rotation |
| Unverified webhooks | Spoofed shipment status updates | HMAC-SHA256 signature verification |
| Customs data in logs | Trade compliance violation | Field-level redaction pipeline |
| Overly broad API scope | Access to unrelated shipment data | Role-scoped tokens per team |
| Unencrypted commercial invoices | Financial data breach | TLS 1.2+ in transit, AES at rest |
## Resources
- [Flexport Webhooks](https://apidocs.flexport.com/v2/tag/Webhook-Endpoints/)
- [OWASP API Security Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/)
## Next Steps
See `flexport-prod-checklist`.
Is this your skill, or is something wrong with this listing? Request removal or report an issue. Author removals are honored within 72 hours.
No comments yet. Be the first to comment!