Llmops Security Reviewer

---
name: "llmops-security-reviewer"
description: "Describe what this skill helps an agent do."
version: "0.1.0"
since: "2026-09-09"
last_modified: "2026-09-09"
authors:
  - "platform-engineering"
stability: "experimental"
min_platform_version:
  codex: "unknown"
  amazon-q: "unknown"
  antigravity: "unknown"
  auggie: "unknown"
  bob: "unknown"
  claude-code: "unknown"
  cline: "unknown"
  codebuddy: "unknown"
  continue: "unknown"
  costrict: "unknown"
  crush: "unknown"
  github-copilot: "unknown"
  gitlab-duo: "unknown"
  factory: "unknown"
  forgecode: "unknown"
  opencode: "unknown"
  openhands: "unknown"
  cursor: "unknown"
  roo-code: "unknown"
  kiro: "unknown"
  junie: "unknown"
  gemini-cli: "unknown"
  iflow: "unknown"
  kilocode: "unknown"
  kimi: "unknown"
  lingma: "unknown"
  pi: "unknown"
  qoder: "unknown"
  qwen: "unknown"
  windsurf: "unknown"
  ollama: "unknown"
deprecated_since:
replaces:
supersedes: []
changelog:
  - version: "0.1.0"
    date: "2026-09-09"
    change: "Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill"
---
# Llmops Security Reviewer

## Purpose

Review GenAI workloads for prompt injection, tool permissions, data exfiltration, RAG sources, sensitive prompt logging, eval sets, guardrails, and model access. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.

## Goal and behavioral contract

The authoritative Goal and artifact references are defined in `descriptor.yaml`. Capability boundaries, identity and delegation requirements, tool permissions, data boundaries, invariants, approval requirements, output contract, and operational limits are defined in `contract.yaml`. MCP/A2A trust boundaries and the reviewed execution closure live in `integrations/` and `dependencies.yaml`; ASPS and assurance requirements live in `assurance.yaml`.

Treat those declarations as mandatory execution constraints. `skcr` validates requirements but does not claim verification or enforce them at runtime.

## When to use

- LLMOps security decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
- A change affects LLMOps security artifacts such as prompt template, tool permission, RAG source, prompt log, eval set, guardrail policy.
- The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as prompt injection, tool abuse, data exfiltration, untrusted RAG content, sensitive prompt logging, uncontrolled model access.
- Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
- Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.

## Operating model

1. Identify the relevant LLMOps security artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
2. Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as red-team eval, retrieval allowlist, tool audit, DLP finding, guardrail result, access policy.
3. Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
4. Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
5. Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.

## Spec-Driven Change Context

- Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
- For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
- Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
- Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
- During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
- After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
- If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.

## Skill-Specific Review Scope

- Primary artifacts: prompt template, tool permission, RAG source, prompt log, eval set, guardrail policy.
- Risk themes: prompt injection, tool abuse, data exfiltration, untrusted RAG content, sensitive prompt logging, uncontrolled model access.
- Evidence signals: red-team eval, retrieval allowlist, tool audit, DLP finding, guardrail result, access policy.
- Ownership, approvals, review cadence, exception handling, and residual-risk decisions.
- Traceability from requirement or control intent to implementation, validation, and retained evidence.

## Skill-Specific Checklist

- [ ] Confirm the review boundary covers the right LLMOps security systems, teams, and environments.
- [ ] Inventory and inspect the current prompt template.
- [ ] Check whether tool permission is current, approved, versioned, and owned.
- [ ] Verify that RAG source has test, ticket, log, or approval support.
- [ ] Look for prompt injection and record concrete repository or process evidence.
- [ ] Look for tool abuse and identify affected assets, services, or stakeholders.
- [ ] Look for data exfiltration and classify the operational or audit impact.
- [ ] Use red-team eval to validate that the control or practice is operating.
- [ ] Use retrieval allowlist to confirm ownership, timing, and reproducibility.
- [ ] Check exception, risk-acceptance, and expiry handling for LLMOps security.
- [ ] Confirm remediation items have owners, due dates, validation steps, and evidence expectations.
- [ ] Identify missing artifacts separately from weak artifacts so the next action is unambiguous.
- [ ] Review whether logging, reporting, or retained evidence exposes sensitive data unnecessarily.

## Decision Rules

- If prompt template is missing for a critical service, raise at least a high-severity readiness gap.
- If retrieval allowlist cannot be tied to an owner and approval, treat the outcome as unauditable until corrected.
- If prompt log is present but expired or untested, require validation before accepting residual risk.
- If the only support is verbal or chat-only context, request durable ticket, document, log, or test evidence.
- If remediation would require a process or architecture decision, assign a decision owner instead of prescribing legal conclusions.
- If compensating measures reduce likelihood but not impact, keep the residual-risk statement explicit.

## Finding Categories

- Missing or stale LLMOps security artifact.
- Unclear ownership, approval, review cadence, or accountability.
- Insufficient validation, test proof, logs, ticket trail, or retained audit material.
- Unreviewed exception, residual risk, expiry, or compensating measure.
- Policy, architecture, operational, or platform implementation drift.
- Sensitive-data exposure in logs, reports, prompts, artifacts, or evidence packages.

## Severity Guidance

- Critical: a gap in LLMOps security creates immediate outage, data-loss, privilege, regulatory-reporting, or irreversible business risk.
- High: prompt template is missing, unowned, untested, or unauditable for a critical service or material change.
- Medium: tool permission exists but is stale, incomplete, inconsistently enforced, or weakly evidenced.
- Low: wording, metadata, formatting, link freshness, or minor traceability improvements are needed.

## DevSecOps Guardrails

- Do not read secrets, `.env` files, private keys, production credentials, masked CI/CD variables, database dumps, or sensitive logs unless explicitly required.
- Do not push, deploy, publish, merge, or create releases unless explicitly asked.
- Prefer merge requests, reviewable diffs, and auditable validation evidence.
- Prefer least privilege, minimal changes, and explicit rollback notes.
- Do not fabricate test results, repository state, commands, security findings, or validation outcomes.
- Report assumptions, uncertainty, residual risk, and validation gaps clearly.

## Output Requirements

- Findings ordered by severity with affected LLMOps security artifacts and evidence references.
- Coverage note for reviewed artifacts: prompt template, tool permission, RAG source, prompt log, eval set, guardrail policy.
- Risk note covering relevant themes: prompt injection, tool abuse, data exfiltration, untrusted RAG content, sensitive prompt logging, uncontrolled model access.
- Evidence request list using expected signals: red-team eval, retrieval allowlist, tool audit, DLP finding, guardrail result, access policy.
- Deliverables or updates needed: LLMOps security review, prompt-injection findings, tool-permission recommendations, RAG source risk notes, eval and guardrail gaps.
- Residual-risk, assumptions, missing-context, and validation-gap summary.

## Acceptance Criteria

- Relevant LLMOps security artifacts are identified, current, owned, and versioned where applicable.
- Each high-impact finding includes evidence, impact, likelihood, owner, and remediation guidance.
- Missing evidence is separated from failed controls or weak implementation.
- Exceptions and risk acceptances include owner, rationale, expiry, and compensating measures.
- Recommendations are review-oriented and avoid presenting regulatory interpretation as legal advice.
- Final output states pass, conditional pass, or blocked readiness with validation gaps.

## Anti-Patterns

- Treating a policy title or control name as proof that the practice operates effectively.
- Collapsing missing evidence and failed implementation into one vague finding.
- Accepting open-ended exceptions without owner, expiry, impact, likelihood, and compensating measures.
- Making legal, regulatory, or audit conclusions beyond the available evidence and review scope.
- Recommending broad process rewrites when a targeted owner, test, ticket, or evidence fix is enough.
- Copying sensitive production data into examples, evidence packages, prompts, or reports.

## Changelog

### 0.1.0 - 2026-09-09

- Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill.