Provision (or reprovision) a full environment — candidate-*, preview, or production — via the runner-owned `provision-env.yml` workflow. Covers the before (prereqs + minting secrets), the dispatch, the phase map, the hard-won gotchas that turn a "green" provision into a silent half-deploy, and the after (verify + decommission). Use when standing up a new env, reprovisioning a dead one, debugging a provision that "succeeded" but isn't serving, or when someone says "provision prod / candidate-b...
Installs into .claude/skills of the current project.
Are you the author of Provision Env?
Add the live security badge to your README. It updates with every re-scan.
[](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/cogni-dao-provision-env)
---
name: provision-env
description: >
Provision (or reprovision) a full environment — candidate-*, preview, or production — via the
runner-owned `provision-env.yml` workflow. Covers the before (prereqs + minting secrets), the
dispatch, the phase map, the hard-won gotchas that turn a "green" provision into a silent
half-deploy, and the after (verify + decommission). Use when standing up a new env, reprovisioning
a dead one, debugging a provision that "succeeded" but isn't serving, or when someone says
"provision prod / candidate-b", "the new VM isn't up", "ImagePullBackOff after provision",
"apex cut over to an empty VM", "525 after provision", "operator pod won't start".
Sibling to `docs/runbooks/fork-quickstart.md` (the forker's zero-to-green) — this is the
operator's reference for ANY env on the hub.
---
# provision-env — stand up an environment end-to-end
## The one mental model (read this first)
**Provision builds the house. Promote fills the furniture. They are different steps.**
- **Provision** (`provision-env.yml`) = substrate: Cherry VM → k3s → Compose infra (postgres, doltgres, temporal, litellm, redis, alloy) → OpenBao + ESO → Caddy edge → DNS → seeds the `deploy/<env>-<node>` branches → applies Argo ApplicationSets.
- **Promote** (`promote-and-deploy.yml`, the `/promote` skill) = fills the deploy branches with **real, proven per-node image digests** → Argo deploys the actual apps.
A provision is _supposed_ to leave you at running apps (it seeds digests for nodes its seed-source runs). But **it routinely leaves gaps that a green workflow hides** — placeholder digests, missing `local_certs`. Those are bugs/gaps, not "by design." This skill is the list of what to check and fix.
> `/version.buildSha` from **outside** the cluster is the only "is it really live" signal. The workflow conclusion lies (it can pass with dead pods, or fail while Argo heals the cluster behind it).
## BEFORE — prereqs (zero-spend, do all of them)
1. **Target GitHub environment exists** + carries the **minting secrets** (the run dies at "Write `.env.bootstrap`" if any are empty — this is the #1 first failure):
- Per-env: `CHERRY_PROJECT_ID`, `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN`, `CLOUDFLARE_ZONE_ID`, `GH_ADMIN_PAT`, `GH_ADMIN_USERNAME`
- Repo-level: `CHERRY_AUTH_TOKEN`
- Verify: `for k in CHERRY_PROJECT_ID CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN CLOUDFLARE_ZONE_ID GH_ADMIN_PAT GH_ADMIN_USERNAME; do gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/environments/<env>/secrets/$k >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "✅ $k" || echo "❌ $k MISSING"; done`
2. **`GH_ADMIN_PAT` = a dedicated BOT, never a human token.** Use the automation bot account (e.g. `Cogni-1729`), **classic** PAT with `repo, workflow, write:packages` (`admin:repo_hook` if webhooks). Fine-grained PATs **cannot reach org-owned repos from an outside collaborator** — classic follows the account's actual access. `GH_ADMIN_USERNAME` must equal `gh api user --jq .login` of that token.
3. **App + external secrets present on the env** (`OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, `EVM_RPC_URL`, `POSTHOG_*`, `POLYGON_RPC_URL`, plus DoltHub / OAuth / Tavily / Privy / Langfuse if the node uses them). They reach the pod only if they're also in the runner env-block of `provision-env.yml` + `NODE_BASELINE_KEYS` (`scripts/setup/lib/reconcile-secrets.sh`).
4. **Cloudflare token scope = DNS:Edit + Zone Settings:Edit** (the run hard-fails at zero spend if only DNS:Edit).
5. **Generate + SAVE an encryption passphrase** — you need it later to decrypt the init artifacts (kubeconfig, vm-key). `openssl rand -hex 24 > .local/<env>-init-passphrase.txt`.
6. **Production only:** know your **rollback anchor** (the current live VM IP) before dispatch — provisioning repoints the apex (see Gotcha 1).
## DISPATCH
```bash
gh workflow run provision-env.yml --repo <owner>/<repo> \
-f env=<candidate-a|candidate-b|preview|production> \
-f encryption_passphrase="$(cat .local/<env>-init-passphrase.txt)"
# run a branch's version with --ref <branch> (e.g. to test a renderer/secrets fix before main)
```
### Modes (`-f mode=`)
A full provision is the default. The narrow, idempotent **day-2 heal** mode reconciles the OpenBao SA/role substrate on an existing VM without a full re-provision (verify-and-heal; a re-run is a no-op):
- **`substrate-only`** — reconcile the env's OpenBao auth/role/SA layer on the existing VM (no tofu/VM/DNS). See `scripts/setup/reconcile-env-substrate.sh`.
> **Born-observable is NOT a provision mode** (it was `mode=observability` until the substrate fold; superseded). The node-log proxy (`GET /api/v1/nodes/{id}/observability/logs`) depends on two per-env pieces, and **both now come up on the normal flow — no bespoke lane, no "never hand-write" prohibition:**
>
> 1. **Alloy `nodeId`→`node` Loki-label config.** Re-pushed + checksum-restarted by the substrate-readiness lane (`scripts/ci/reconcile-node-substrate.sh` → `reconcile-alloy-config.remote.sh`), which runs on **every** candidate-flight + promote — so even an app-only promote (`skip_infra: true`) lands it current. Idempotent; an unchanged config is a no-op.
> 2. **Operator Grafana read creds** at `cogni/<env>/operator/{GRAFANA_URL,GRAFANA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN}`. The catalog row (`infra/secrets-catalog.yaml`, `service: operator`) + the operator ExternalSecret + provision **Phase 5e** (mints the `glsa_` read token from the one-time `GH_GRAFANA_CLOUD_ADMIN_TOKEN` and seeds **both** `_shared` AND `operator`) own this. A fresh provision wires it at birth.
>
> **If an OLD env (provisioned before Phase 5e seeded the operator path) lacks the creds:** re-run the standard provision, or seed `cogni/<env>/operator/GRAFANA_*` through the normal secret path (`secret-materialize.sh` / the substrate lane) — one Grafana stack serves every env (env is just a Loki label), so the same `glsa_` read token + URL is correct everywhere. Spec: `docs/spec/grafana-observability-access.md` §"Born observable".
## Phase map (where things die)
| Phase | Does | Common failure |
| ---------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Write `.env.bootstrap` | maps GH secrets → runner | **missing minting secret** (empty `GH_ADMIN_PAT`) |
| Restore prior init-artifact | re-run idempotency | prior artifacts encrypted with a _different_ passphrase → abort (delete prior VM+SSH key, or reuse passphrase) |
| 3 · Provision VM (tofu) | Cherry VM + DNS | adopt-vs-create; ephemeral tofu state on runner |
| **4b · DNS** | **cuts over apex + node subdomains to the new VM** | **production = LIVE cutover before apps exist (Gotcha 1)** |
| 4b.5 · Seed deploy branches | seeds digests | **placeholder digests (Gotcha 2)**; **H7 divergence (Gotcha 4)** |
| 5 · Compose | infra + Caddy | db-backup exit-137 — **can be FATAL: aborts the whole deploy → no app layer (Gotcha 13)** |
| 5b/5c · OpenBao + ESO + seed | secrets substrate | quoted secret values (Gotcha 6) |
| 5f · deploy-infra | Compose runtime | required-secret gaps (e.g. `POSTHOG_*`/`POLYGON_RPC_URL` if unset) |
| 7 · ApplicationSets | Argo deploys apps | placeholder digest → ImagePullBackOff |
| 9 · `/readyz` verify | 5-min/node | cascades red if scheduler-worker is down (Gotcha 11) |
## GOTCHAS — every one of these cost hours
1. **Apex cutover is in Phase 4b, BEFORE apps deploy (Phase 7).** For `production`, `cogni_operator_domain_for_env(production) = cognidao.org` (apex) — provisioning **repoints the live apex to the new, app-less VM for 10–20 min.** A failed run leaves the apex on a dead VM (a DNS time-bomb under resolver cache). **Always** have the old VM IP and roll the apex back if it goes sideways. Cleaner: **blue-green** — provision with `DOMAIN=<env>-next.<root>` override, validate the operator fully, then flip the apex by hand.
2. **Placeholder image digests = ImagePullBackOff that NEVER self-heals.** Nodes the seed-source doesn't run get `ghcr.io/.../cogni-template:<env>-placeholder-<node>` (a fake tag). **Each node has its OWN image** (same repo name, different digest) — do NOT reuse one node's digest for another (node-template's lacks `nodes/operator/app/migrate.mjs` → `MODULE_NOT_FOUND` in the migrate init container). **Fix:** get the correct per-node digest from a healthy env (`KUBECONFIG=.local/candidate-a-kubeconfig.yaml kubectl get deploy -n cogni-candidate-a -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,IMG:.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image`), patch each `deploy/<env>-<node>` overlay (`infra/k8s/overlays/<env>/<node>/kustomization.yaml`: replace `newTag: "*placeholder*"` with `newName + digest`), push, `kubectl -n argocd annotate app <env>-<node> argocd.argoproj.io/refresh=hard --overwrite`. The real fix = provision seeds real per-node digests (or run `/promote`).
3. **`local_certs` missing → Caddy 525 on every public host.** The rendered Caddyfile has bare site blocks (no TLS directive) → Caddy attempts Let's Encrypt **behind the Cloudflare proxy** → challenge can't reach origin → no cert → `tlsv1 internal error` → CF returns 525. The zone SSL mode is `full`, so the fix is **`local_certs`** (self-signed, CF Full accepts it). Manual: add `local_certs` inside the global `{ }` block of `/opt/cogni-template-edge/configs/Caddyfile.tmpl` on the VM (before the `log {` line), `docker restart cogni-edge-caddy-1`. Durable fix = `scripts/ci/render-caddyfile.sh` emits `local_certs` in its global block. (A pre-existing env may "work" only because it got an LE cert during an old grey-cloud window.)
4. **H7 — preview/prod deploy-branch divergence.** preview/production refuse force-update; Phase 4c commits `env-state.yaml` on top of the seed, so the tip is always ahead → re-runs abort at Phase 4b.5. **Clear `deploy/<env>*` branches before re-dispatch** (candidate-\* auto-force, so this only bites preview/prod). They re-seed clean.
5. **Re-run trap.** "Restore prior init-artifact keys" aborts if a previous run uploaded artifacts under a _different_ passphrase. **Deleting the Cherry VM + SSH key is NOT sufficient** — the restore step keys off the **prior run's GH `<env>-init-artifacts`** (1-day retention), not the VM. So a fresh-passphrase re-dispatch still finds the old artifact and dies `decrypt failed for <env>-vm-key`. Fixes: (a) **keep the SAME passphrase across retries of one env** (simplest — never regenerate mid-cycle), or (b) delete the prior artifact: `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/actions/artifacts --jq '.artifacts[]|select(.name|test("<env>-init-artifacts"))|.id'` → `gh api -X DELETE …/artifacts/<id>` → re-dispatch (fresh-key path). Seen 2026-06-04: regenerating the passphrase between candidate-b retries wasted a dispatch.
6. **Quoted secret values brick init.** `gh secret set` of a value that includes literal quotes (`'https://...'`) stores the quotes → URL-validated fields (`EVM_RPC_URL`, `POSTHOG_HOST`) fail the Zod schema → `/readyz` 503 init-loop. `.env.*` files are quoted (fine for `source`, **not** for verbatim `gh secret set`). Strip quotes before setting; operator-200 on the _old_ prod proves nothing about the _new_ secrets path.
7. **`.env.bootstrap` extraction traps.** Lines carry inline comments and a commented stale value, and `GITHUB_ADMIN_*` (file) vs `GH_ADMIN_*` (GH secret) differ. Extract with `grep -m1 "^KEY=" f | cut -d= -f2- | awk '{print $1}' | sed "s/['\"]//g"` (first field, quote-stripped) — naive `cut -d= -f2-` grabs the trailing comment.
8. **You CANNOT debug app failures from `gh run`.** The run shows phase text only; the real failure (ImagePullBackOff, init `MODULE_NOT_FOUND`, 525) lives in the cluster and Loki. Two access paths:
- **kubeconfig** from the init artifacts (after the run ends): `gh run download <id> --name <env>-init-artifacts`, decrypt each `*.enc` with `openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -pbkdf2 -iter 200000 -pass pass:<PP>`, then `KUBECONFIG=.../<env>-kubeconfig.yaml kubectl ...`.
- **Loki (no cluster access needed, works mid-run):** prod ships k8s-events to Grafana Loki — `{env="<env>"} |~ "(?i)imagepull|backoff|oom|evicted|context deadline"`. This is how you read the real pull error while Phase 9 is still grinding.
9. **Argo `selfHeal=true` reverts kubectl hacks.** `kubectl set image` / `edit` gets reverted to the deploy-branch state within ~3 min. **Fix the deploy branch** (push) — that's the source of truth.
10. **GHCR throttle ≠ placeholder.** A fresh 6gb-shared VM pulling 5 images at once can transiently `BackOff` (recovers). A placeholder tag `BackOff`s forever. Distinguish via Loki: a `:<env>-placeholder-<node>` tag is the never-heals case; a real `@sha256:...` that's slow is transient.
11. **`/readyz` cascade.** Every node's `/readyz` asserts scheduler-worker connectivity. If scheduler-worker is down (placeholder/ImagePull), **all** nodes report 0/1 + Phase 9 fails everything — looks like 5 failures, is 1 root cause. Fix scheduler-worker → the rest go Ready.
12. **Postgres root-password drift wedges the WHOLE infra deploy (and looks like an alloy/observability failure — it isn't).** `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` is honored only at **first-init of an empty volume**. After a re-provision or a `POSTGRES_ROOT_PASSWORD` rotation, the persisted `postgres_data` volume keeps the **old** password while `deploy-infra` renders `.env` from the **GH-secret SSOT** → `db-provision`'s TCP+scram auth fails, spins its full 120s, and `deploy-infra.sh` aborts at the `db-provision` step. The ERR-trap diagnostic then dumps `alloy "unsupported protocol scheme"` + "unhealthy containers" — **red herrings**: alloy/s-ui/git-sync/repo-init/alloy-k8s-events have **no healthcheck** (Docker reports `null`, not unhealthy), and the empty-Loki-URL line is a transient of that one re-render. The real line is `❌ Timed out waiting for Postgres` + `FATAL: password authentication failed for user "postgres"`. **Downstream blast radius:** the abort happens _before_ deploy-infra's Step-7 k8s-Secret write, so the `<node>-node-app-secrets` Secret is never refreshed → every catalogued **external** key (`GH_REVIEW_APP_*`, `DOLTHUB_*`, `PRIVY_*`, `LANGFUSE_*`, OAuth) stays **empty** in the pod even though it's present in the GH env + carried in the promote-and-deploy env block. Fix is in git (idempotent, self-healing): `deploy-infra.sh` reconciles the superuser password via the postgres image's `local … trust` unix socket (`compose exec … ALTER USER`) before `db-provision`, and `postgres-init/provision.sh` re-asserts the app/service role passwords on the "already exists" branch. Manual unwedge if you hit an unpatched env: `docker exec cogni-runtime-postgres-1 psql -U postgres -c "ALTER USER postgres PASSWORD '<.env value>'"` (and app_user / service user), then re-run the deploy.
13. **Phase 5f `db-backup` (exit 137) aborts the ENTIRE deploy-infra → zero app layer.** `deploy-infra.sh:643` runs `$RUNTIME_COMPOSE --profile backup up --force-recreate --no-deps --abort-on-container-exit --exit-code-from db-backup db-backup`. On a fresh/loaded VM the `db-backup` container is SIGKILLed (137) and `--abort-on-container-exit` kills deploy-infra **before Step-7** → the `cogni-<env>` namespace, the `<node>-node-app-secrets`, and the per-node Argo Applications are **never created**. Symptom: argocd/openbao/external-secrets/reloader all `Synced`+`Healthy`, **zero app pods**, no `cogni-<env>` ns, URLs 502/000. Looks like total node failure; is one backup container. (Distinct from Gotcha 12, which aborts at `db-provision`.) Seen 2026-06-04 — db-backup needs a `timeout`/retry or a skip-on-empty-DB guard so a flaky backup can't gate the whole app layer.
14. **A provision that dies late can upload an init-artifact INCONSISTENT with the live cluster — root + SSH lost despite a "good" artifact.** Seen 2026-06-04: `<env>-init-artifacts` decrypted cleanly and its `kubeconfig` authenticated to the live k3s, **but** the same artifact's `openbao-init.json` `root_token` did **not** authenticate (`bao token lookup -self` fails on an _unsealed_ OpenBao), its `vm-key` did **not** SSH (`publickey` denied), AND `generate-root` with its `unseal_keys_b64` failed. **A clean decrypt is NOT proof of valid custody.** Validate immediately: `kubectl -n openbao exec openbao-0 -- env BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200 BAO_TOKEN=$RT bao token lookup -self`. If it mismatches, the env has **no recoverable root or SSH** — surgical recovery is impossible; destroy + reprovision is the only path. (Likely cause: auto-init/auto-unseal racing the script's `bao operator init`, or a VM/key regen between phases — capture happens at a different moment than the live state.)
15. **Reprovision reuses the Cherry IP but rotates BOTH the host key and the deploy key.** Fresh VM at the same IP → (a) local `known_hosts` MITM warning, clear with `ssh-keygen -R <ip>`; (b) the **GH-secret VM deploy key goes stale** → `candidate-flight-infra` (every infra-lever workflow) fails at **"Setup SSH"** (`publickey`) until that secret is refreshed with the new `<env>-vm-key`. So you can't re-run deploy-infra via the workflow against a freshly-reprovisioned VM until you update the deploy-key secret — and if Gotcha 14 hit, you have no working key to update it with.
16. **Phase 1 of the DB-cred OpenBao port (`<env>-db-reader`) validates via k8s-auth — NO root token needed.** Even on a provision that died at 5f, if Phase 5b completed, the `<env>-db-reader` policy/role + `db-provisioner` SA are live. Prove the OpenBao read path with the kubeconfig alone: `JWT=$(kubectl create token db-provisioner -n default); TOK=$(kubectl -n openbao exec openbao-0 -- env BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200 bao write -field=token auth/kubernetes/login role=<env>-db-reader jwt=$JWT)` → `bao kv list cogni/<env>` succeeds (least-priv read). This is how Invariant-15 Phase 1 was deploy-verified on candidate-a despite the dead app layer.
17. **`$REPO_ROOT` (or any runner-only var) referenced INSIDE the remote heredoc is unbound on the VM → `set -u` aborts the whole deploy before Phase 7 → zero app layer.** `deploy-infra.sh` ships a quoted-heredoc remote script (`cat > … << 'EOF'`, runs on the VM via SSH); `REPO_ROOT` is assigned on the **runner** and never crosses. A bare `bash "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/…"` in that block dies `REPO_ROOT: unbound variable` AFTER Step-7 secrets but BEFORE the ApplicationSets apply — looks identical to Gotchas 12/13 (substrate green, no app pods) but the tell is `deploy-infra-remote.sh: line NNN: <VAR>: unbound variable` in the run log. **Rule: any helper a remote-block needs must be `scp`'d to `/tmp/` (alongside `ensure-temporal-namespace.sh`) and invoked as `/tmp/<name>.sh`, never via a runner path.** Seen 2026-06-04: `sync-app-webhook-secret.sh` added in #1482 with `$REPO_ROOT` silently broke EVERY clean provision for a day (fixed: upload to `/tmp` + call `/tmp/sync-app-webhook-secret.sh`).
18. **Phase 6 only applies the ExternalSecret leaves that EXIST on disk for that env — a missing per-(svc,env) leaf = that node never gets `<node>-env-secrets` → pod never Ready → Phase 9 `/readyz` reds the provision.** Phase 6 globs the single SSOT tree `nodes/<node>/k8s/external-secrets/<env>/` (every node carries its own leaf — operator, resy, scheduler-worker, canary, node-template; the pre-wizard operator-domain tree was purged). For an **ESO-migrated** node (consumes `envFrom: <node>-env-secrets`, not the deploy-infra bridge secret), if its leaf is absent for the target env, Phase 6 silently skips it (`Applied N` where N < node-count) and that pod boots without config. **The trap: this only bites the env that's missing the leaf** — candidate-a had all 5 leaves so it looked done; candidate-b shipped only 3 (scheduler-worker/canary/node-template), missing `external-secrets/candidate-b/{operator,resy}/`, so a clean provision reached Phase 6/7 fine but red'd at Phase 9 on operator+resy `/readyz`. Diagnose via the run's `Applied N ExternalSecret manifest(s)` count + the `=== ExternalSecrets sync state ===` dump (the missing nodes simply aren't listed). **Fix = add the per-(svc,env) leaf** (mirror an existing env, sed `namespace:` + `dataFrom.extract.key:`); it's committed → reproducible. Leaves are hand-authored per env today — a new env or node silently inherits this gap; the durable fix is to **codegen the leaves from the catalog** (same renderer class as `render-node-overlays.sh`). Seen 2026-06-04 (candidate-b clean-room).
19. **Per-env node membership ≠ the global catalog — Phase 9 must verify only the nodes the env DEPLOYS, or a correctly-provisioned subset-env reds.** `NODE_TARGETS` (from `scripts/ci/lib/image-tags.sh`) = every `type:node` in `infra/catalog/*` (operator, resy, canary, node-template). But an env deploys only what its **ApplicationSet** declares — equivalently, the nodes with an overlay under `infra/k8s/overlays/<env>/` (the env-scoped set Phase 4b.5 already uses). A subset env (candidate-b = 3-node `task.5094` OpenBao proof: canary/node-template/scheduler-worker, NO operator/resy) provisions DBs + secrets + ExternalSecret leaves for ALL catalog nodes (harmless over-provision), but its AppSet creates no operator/resy Argo app → no pod → Phase 9 (looping the global `NODE_TARGETS`) verifies operator/resy `/readyz`, fails after 5 min, and reds a provision whose declared nodes are all 1/1 + 200. The tell: `Applied 5 ExternalSecret manifest(s)` + ESO `SecretSynced True` for operator/resy, yet **no operator/resy pod** in `kubectl get pods` and **no `candidate-b-operator` Argo app**. Fix = scope Phase 9's loop to `[[ -d infra/k8s/overlays/<env>/<node> ]]` (skip undeclared). The deeper durable fix = make the per-env node set a single SSOT (the AppSet list) and derive NODE_TARGETS/DB/secret/verify scope from it, so a subset env doesn't over-provision. Seen 2026-06-04 (candidate-b); the old `CANARY IS RED` banner mislabels this (it fires for ANY node, not canary).
20. **A provision run is 30–60 min — re-engaging on completion without going silent is its OWN failure mode, and every passive monitor tried here MISSED. Exact ledger + the rule.** Mechanisms tried on the 2026-06-10 preview rebuild and why each went silent:
- **`gh run watch <id> --exit-status` via `Bash run_in_background: true`** (the obvious "ping me when it finishes"). **Fails: the background task is KILLED on every session resume / context-compaction boundary** (the `SessionStart` hook fires repeatedly across a long wait). A killed task emits `<task-notification status=killed>` — **NOT** a completion — so the agent gets a "killed / Continue from where you left off" prompt, not the run result. Treated as terminal ⇒ silence.
- **Replying "No response requested" / any stand-down to that `status=killed` notification.** This _was_ the silence. The killed-watcher notification is a **RE-ARM trigger**, never a terminal event, while the run is still pending.
- **`ScheduleWakeup` as a far-future BACKSTOP (1200s) behind the watcher.** Roles inverted — the _unreliable_ background watcher was treated as primary, the _durable_ wakeup as a 20-min backstop. When the run went green early and the watcher had already been killed, nothing re-invoked the agent for up to 20 min ⇒ effective silence (the human poked first).
- **`ScheduleWakeup(270s)` self-paced 5-min polls** (early runs). These _worked_ — durably re-invoked — but burn a turn every ~5 min for an hour.
**RULE: `ScheduleWakeup` is the ONLY durable re-invoke for a provision/flight/promote wait — make it PRIMARY, never a backstop.** (a) Match the delay to the phase you're gating on (a ~35-min provision → ~600–900s checks, not one 1200s shot). (b) A `gh run watch` background task is a _nice-to-have fast path_, never the sole signal — it WILL be killed across a resume. (c) **Never end a turn while a run is pending without a `ScheduleWakeup` armed.** (d) **A `status=killed`/`stopped` task-notification means RE-ARM, not stand down.** (e) Each wakeup's own prompt must say "re-arm before ending until `<terminal condition>`." Seen 2026-06-10: two silences on one preview rebuild — once from standing down on a killed watcher with no wakeup, once from a 20-min backstop that hadn't fired when the run went green.
21. **A migration only runs on the DEPLOYED operator image's commit — a stale-digest reprovision, OR healing by flighting a non-operator commit, leaves new migrations UNRUN despite a green run (silent success).** The operator `migrate` initContainer applies only the migrations baked into whatever operator image the `deploy/<env>-operator` branch pins (`nodes/operator/app/src/adapters/server/db/migrations/`). Two ways new DB state silently doesn't land: **(a)** a reprovision pins a digest that predates the migration (e.g. registry seed `0040`); **(b)** you heal by flighting **main head**, but main head is a non-operator change — flight/promote are **affected-only** (task.0376), so a commit touching **0** `nodes/operator/app` files (a provision-scripts / docs PR) does NOT redeploy operator. Either way operator's `/version.buildSha` stays stale and BOTH `flight-preview` + `promote-and-deploy` report `completed/success` (they verify whatever WAS deployed, not that your requested sha is serving). **Diagnose in the VM Postgres, never by workflow conclusion:** `docker exec cogni-runtime-postgres-1 psql -U postgres -d cogni_operator -Atc 'SELECT max(id) FROM drizzle."__drizzle_migrations"'` — behind main's migration count ⇒ the app-layer state that migration writes (registry rows, RLS, backfill) is missing. **Fix: flight/promote the specific operator-AFFECTING commit that carries the migration** (`git log --oneline <sha> -- nodes/operator/app` to find it), not main head; then verify in-DB. Seen 2026-08-07: registry seed `0040` (#1978 / `3c4f256`) reached preview+prod only after flighting `3c4f256`; flighting main head `a5f63fb` (#1980, provision-scripts-only) silently skipped operator (buildSha never moved, both workflows green). Cross-ref: [`/promote`](../promote/SKILL.md) § "Affected-only gotcha".
## AFTER — verify + custody
```bash
KUBECONFIG=.local/prod-art/<env>-kubeconfig.yaml kubectl get pods -n cogni-<env> # all 1/1
curl -s https://<public-host>/readyz # 200 — and curl /version, confirm buildSha
```
- **All pods 1/1**, not just a green run.
- **Custody (Gotcha 14 — this is what loses tokens):** decrypt `<env>-openbao-init.json` + `<env>-vm-key` + `<env>-kubeconfig.yaml` and land them in the **ONE canonical custody dir** `~/dev/cogni-template/.local/provision-creds/<env>/` (gitignored, `chmod 600`) — keep that dir's `README.md` status table current (per-env: the live VM IP, a validated-✅ line, and the file list — root token / kubeconfig / SSH key). **Validate the root token against the live cluster** (`bao token lookup -self`) before trusting it. Do NOT delete the GH artifact until the token is validated — its 1-day retention is the only backup. (If you have no password-manager CLI, this durable dir + validation IS the custody bar; the artifact expiring + no local copy = unrecoverable env.)
- ⚠️ **Scatter trap.** The provision workflow writes decrypted artifacts into **whatever workspace's `.local/` it ran from** (`.local/prod-art/…`, a Conductor workspace `.local/`, etc.). Those are throwaway working copies that go **stale the next reprovision** — do NOT let them become a second source of truth. Immediately promote the validated set into `~/dev/cogni-template/.local/provision-creds/<env>/` (the non-workspace clone) and treat every other `.local/` copy as disposable. An agent that greps a random workspace `.local/` will find a stale VM IP / dead kubeconfig; the canonical dir is the only address to publish.
- **Production:** keep the old VM as the rollback anchor until the new apex is proven, then decommission (delete the old Cherry VM, prune stale DNS).
## Linked guides
- [`docs/runbooks/fork-quickstart.md`](../../../docs/runbooks/fork-quickstart.md) — forker's zero-to-green (the human seam: bot PAT + minting secrets)
- [`docs/guides/create-env.md`](../../../docs/guides/create-env.md) — env stand-up + the known e2e gaps
- [`/promote`](../promote/SKILL.md) — fill real per-node digests (the app layer; production is human-gated)
- [`/cicd-secrets-expert`](../cicd-secrets-expert/SKILL.md) — minting vs runtime secrets, OpenBao/ESO, the quote/extraction traps
- [`/devops-expert`](../devops-expert/SKILL.md) — pipeline + VM SSH policy (candidate-a write-OK, never prod)
- `.github/workflows/provision-env.yml` · `scripts/setup/provision-env-vm.sh` · `scripts/ci/render-caddyfile.sh` · `scripts/setup/lib/reconcile-secrets.sh` — verify claims against code
