Protect a project and its users from compromised dependencies, publishing credentials, and build pipelines. Use when publishing packages or auditing what your build actually trusts.
Scanned 9/5/2026
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---
name: supply-chain-security
description: Protect a project and its users from compromised dependencies, publishing credentials, and build pipelines. Use when publishing packages or auditing what your build actually trusts.
---
# Supply chain security
Users of your package trust everything it depends on and everything your
build touches. The attack that matters is rarely against your code; it
is against a dependency, a maintainer account, or the pipeline that
produces the artifact.
## Method
1. **Lock dependencies and review what changes.** A lockfile committed
and its diff read at upgrade time is the cheapest control available
(see dependency-management).
2. **Protect publishing credentials above all.** Publishing tokens are
the keys to every user's machine: scoped narrowly, stored in a
secret manager, rotated, and never on a laptop (see
secrets-management).
3. **Require multi-factor authentication for anyone who can publish.**
Account takeover is the most common real-world compromise of a
package.
4. **Build from a clean, pinned environment.** Pin the toolchain and
base images so the artifact depends on inputs you can name, and
prefer builds that can be reproduced and checked.
5. **Sign artifacts and publish provenance.** A signature plus a record
of which source and pipeline produced the artifact lets consumers
verify they got what you built.
6. **Watch for typosquats and sudden maintainer changes.** New
dependencies with similar names, or a transfer of an existing one,
are the patterns worth alerting on.
7. **Keep an inventory of what you ship.** A bill of materials makes the
next ecosystem-wide vulnerability a query rather than an
investigation.
## Boundaries
- These controls raise the cost of compromise; none of them prevent a
determined attacker with maintainer access.
- Scanning finds known vulnerabilities and cannot detect a deliberate
backdoor in a dependency.
- Reproducible builds are hard in some ecosystems, and partial progress
still has value.
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