Claude Skills by MustafaKemal0146

tespit etme
data staging activity before exfiltration by monitoring for archive creation with 7-Zip/RAR, unusual temp folder access, large file consolidation, and staging directory patterns via

Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement by Tespit etme abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects through Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation) and Event ID 3 (network

tespit etme
DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.

tespit etme
NTFS timestamp manipulation (MITRE T1070.006) by comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME timestamps in the MFT. Uses analyzeMFT and Python to identify files with anomalous temporal

Hunt for DNS-based persistence mechanisms including DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone modifications using passive DNS databases, SecurityTrails

tespit etme
DNS tunneling and data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek dns.log for high-entropy subdomain queries, excessive query volume, long query lengths, and unusual DNS record types indicating

tespit etme
domain fronting C2 traffic by analyzing SNI vs HTTP Host header mismatches in proxy logs and TLS certificate discrepancies using pyOpenSSL for certificate Denetle:ion

tespit etme
WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event

Hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate cloud services for C2, data staging, and exfiltration including abuse of Azure, AWS, GCP services, and SaaS platforms.

Proactively hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate system binaries (LOLBins) to execute malicious payloads while evading Tespit.

Hunt for adversary abuse of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) by analyzing endpoint process creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for

tespit etme
NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status,

Systematically hunt for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints including registry, services, startup folders, and WMI subscriptions.

Hunt for adversary persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation event subscriptions by monitoring WMI consumer, filter, and binding creation events that execute malicious code triggered

tespit etme
process injection techniques (T1055) including CreateRemoteThread, process hollowing, and DLL injection via Sysmon Event IDs 8 and 10 and EDR process telemetry

Hunt for registry-based persistence mechanisms including Run keys, Winlogon modifications, IFEO injection, and COM hijacking in Windows environments.

tespit etme
MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries.

Hunt for adversary persistence via Windows Scheduled Tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task actions, and unusual scheduling patterns.

Hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion activity that indicates ransomware preparation or anti-forensics by monitoring vssadmin, wmic, and PowerShell shadow copy commands.

Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to tespit etme
targeted email attacks.

tespit etme
T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, analyzing autoruns entries, and using Python watchdog for real-time filesystem

Hunt for supply chain compromise indicators including trojanized software updates, compromised dependencies, unauthorized code modifications, and tampered build artifacts.

Hunt for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns that indicate T1053.005

Hunt for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation including shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications using Windows Security Event

Hunt for unusual network connections by analyzing outbound traffic patterns, rare destinations, non-standard ports, and anomalous connection frequencies from endpoints.

tespit etme
suspicious Windows service installations (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003) by parsing System event logs for Event ID 7045, analyzing service binary paths, and identifying indicators of persistence

Hunt for web shell Dağıt:ments on internet-facing servers by analyzing file creation in web directories, suspicious process spawning from web servers, and anomalous HTTP patterns.

Use YARA pattern-matching rules to hunt for malware, suspicious files, and indicators of compromise across filesystems and memory dumps. Covers rule authoring, yara-python scanning, and integration

Analyze advanced persistent threat (APT) group techniques using MITRE ATT&CK Navigator to create layered heatmaps of adversary TTPs for Tespit gap analysis and threat-informed defense.

Campaign attribution analysis involves systematically evaluating evidence to Belirle: which threat actor or group is responsible for a cyber operation. bu skill covers collecting and weighting

Monitor Certificate Transparency logs using crt.sh and Certstream to tespit etme
phishing domains, lookalike certificates, and unauthorized certificate issuance targeting your organization.

Analyzes intrusion activity against the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain framework to identify which phases an adversary has completed, where defenses succeeded or failed, and what controls

Analyzes indicators of compromise (IOCs) including IP addresses, domains, file hashes, URLs, and email artifacts to Belirle: maliciousness confidence, campaign attribution, and blocking priority.

Use the Malpedia platform and API to research malware family relationships, track variant evolution, link families to threat actors, and integrate YARA rules for Tespit across malware lineages.

Monitor and analyze ransomware group data leak sites (DLS) to track victim postings, extract threat intelligence on group tactics, and assess sector-specific ransomware risk for proactive defense.

MITRE ATT&CK is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) based on real-world observations. bu skill covers systematically mapping threat

Map advanced persistent threat (APT) group tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to the MITRE ATT&CK framework using the ATT&CK Navigator and attackcti Python library. The analyst queries

Analyzes structured and unstructured threat intelligence feeds to extract actionable indicators, adversary tactics, and campaign context. Use when ingesting commercial or open-source CTI feeds,

Şunu analiz et: threat landscape using MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) by querying event statistics, attribute distributions, threat actor galaxy clusters, and tag trends over time.

tespit etme
typosquatting, homograph phishing, and brand impersonation domains using dnstwist to generate domain permutations and identify registered lookalike domains targeting your organization.

Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to tespit etme
unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses

Automates the enrichment of raw indicators of compromise with multi-source threat intelligence context using SOAR platforms, Python pipelines, or TIP playbooks to reduce analyst triage time

Build an automated system to track adversary infrastructure using passive DNS, certificate transparency, WHOIS data, and IP enrichment to map and monitor threat actor command-and-control networks.

Extract and catalog attack patterns from cyber threat intelligence reports into a structured STIX-based library mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for Tespit engineering and threat-informed defense.

Build an automated pipeline to defang indicators of compromise (URLs, IPs, domains, emails) for safe sharing and distribute them in STIX format through TAXII feeds and threat intelligence platforms.

OpenCTI is an open-source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge, built on STIX 2.1 as its native data model. bu skill covers building an automated IOC enrichment pipeline

Build comprehensive threat actor profiles using open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques to document adversary motivations, capabilities, infrastructure, and TTPs for proactive defense.

Dağıt: MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) to aggregate, correlate, and distribute threat intelligence feeds from multiple sources for centralized IOC management and automated SIEM

Building a Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP) involves Dağıt:ing and integrating multiple CTI tools into a unified system for collecting, analyzing, enriching, and disseminating threat intelligence.

Collects and synthesizes open-source intelligence (OSINT) about threat actors, malicious infrastructure, and attack campaigns using publicly available data sources, passive reconnaissance tools,