Claude Skills by costrict-plugins-repo

Baseline the EFI System Partition and hunt malicious EFI binaries such as ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, and Glupteba by mounting the ESP, hashing and verifying boot loaders, scanning with YARA, and flagging anomalous non-EFI files or out-of-band bootloader changes. Use during proactive threat hunts for firmware/bootkit persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1542.003) or when investigating suspected UEFI-level compromise that survives OS reinstall.

'Detects credential stuffing attacks by analyzing authentication logs

Run Chainsaw against collected Windows EVTX files to hunt with the SigmaHQ rule corpus, built-in detection rules, and high-speed keyword/regex search, plus analyze shimcache, SRUM, and event-log gaps, outputting colorized tables, CSV, or JSON. Use during first-response triage for offline, SIEM-free detection over Windows event logs, or to quickly confirm a hunt hypothesis and produce reporting output.

'Hunt for malicious PowerShell activity by analyzing Script Block Logging

Identify command-and-control beaconing patterns in network traffic by

Detect Cobalt Strike beacon command-and-control traffic using default TLS certificate signatures (serial 8BB00EE), JA3/JA3S/JARM fingerprints, HTTP malleable C2 profile pattern matching, and beacon jitter/interval analysis, built with Zeek network logs, Suricata IDS rules, and Python PCAP analysis. Use when hunting for Cobalt Strike beacon callbacks in network traffic or building detection rules for this C2 framework.

Detect C2 beaconing patterns in network traffic using frequency analysis,

Hunt for data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek and Suricata network telemetry for unusual data flows, DNS tunneling via large/frequent TXT queries, uploads to personal cloud storage, and encrypted-channel abuse, correlated against threat intel on destination domains. Use when hunting for data theft in a compromised environment, investigating unusual outbound data volumes, or determining what data was stolen during incident response.

Detect data-staging activity (MITRE ATT&CK T1074) by analyzing EDR/Sysmon process-creation and file-system telemetry (Event ID 4688, Sysmon 1/11) for 7-Zip/RAR/tar archive creation, unusual temp or hidden folder access, and anomalous consolidation of files from multiple directories. Use when hunting for pre-exfiltration staging behavior, building detection rules for archiver abuse, or validating monitoring coverage for T1074.

'Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting

Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 (AccessMask 0x100) for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All requests issued by non-domain-controller accounts. Use when hunting for DCSync credential theft, after detecting Mimikatz-class tooling, or during incident response and purple-team exercises involving Active Directory replication abuse.

'Detect NTFS timestamp manipulation (MITRE T1070.006) by comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION

Hunts for DNS-based persistence mechanisms such as DNS hijacking, dangling

Detects DNS tunneling and covert-channel data exfiltration by analyzing

Detects domain fronting C2 traffic by analyzing SNI-vs-HTTP-Host-header

Detects WMI-based lateral movement (e.g. wmic process call create,

Hunts for adversary abuse of legitimate cloud services (Azure, AWS, GCP,

Proactively hunts for adversary abuse of legitimate, signed system binaries

Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE

Detects NTLM relay attacks (MITRE T1557.001) by analyzing Windows Event

Systematically hunts for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows

Hunts for adversary persistence via WMI event subscriptions (MITRE T1546.003)

Detects process injection techniques (MITRE T1055) — including

Hunts for registry-based persistence mechanisms (MITRE T1547) in Windows

Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing

Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for Windows Scheduled Task persistence (T1053), guiding SIEM/EDR queries against task creation events (e.g. Event ID 4698), suspicious task actions, and unusual scheduling patterns. Use when hunting for scheduled-task persistence, after threat intel flags related campaigns, during incident response, or when alerts fire on schtasks/at.exe activity.

Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion (T1490) by querying SIEM/EDR telemetry for vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy, and PowerShell shadow-copy-deletion commands. Use when hunting for ransomware preparation or anti-forensics activity, after threat intel flags active campaigns, or when alerts trigger on shadow-copy deletion commands.

Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint

Detects T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, cross-referencing Autoruns entries, and running a Python watchdog script for real-time filesystem monitoring. Use when hunting for malware or implants that survive reboot via startup-folder placement, or when validating autoruns/EDR findings against known-good startup baselines.

Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for supply-chain compromise (T1195) by querying SIEM/EDR logs for trojanized software updates, compromised dependencies, unauthorized code modifications, and tampered build artifacts. Use when hunting after threat intel flags a compromised vendor/dependency, scoping a build-pipeline compromise, or reviewing update/build integrity.

Hunts for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks (T1053.005) by analyzing Security Event ID 4698 task-creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns from schtasks.exe/at.exe. Use after detecting schtasks or at.exe in process creation logs, during incident response to enumerate persistence on compromised hosts, or when Event ID 4698 fires for an unusual task.

Hunts for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation - shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications - by analyzing Windows Security Event Log IDs 4738, 4728, 4732, 4756, 4670, and 5136. Use when investigating suspected privilege persistence in Active Directory, after detecting anomalous group/credential changes, or during incident response to trace account tampering.

Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for command-and-control activity (T1071) by querying SIEM/EDR network telemetry for anomalous outbound traffic, rare destinations, non-standard ports, and unusual connection frequencies from endpoints. Use when hunting for beaconing/C2 traffic, after threat intel flags suspicious infrastructure, or when alerts fire on anomalous connections.

Detects suspicious Windows service installations (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003) by parsing System event log Event ID 7045, analyzing service binary paths, and flagging indicators of persistence mechanisms via Sysmon/EDR telemetry. Use when hunting for new-service persistence after a suspected compromise, when Event ID 7045 fires for an unfamiliar service, or during incident response to enumerate service-based persistence on Windows hosts.

Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for web shell deployment (T1505.003) on internet-facing servers by analyzing file creation in web directories, suspicious child-process spawning from web server processes, and anomalous HTTP request patterns. Use when hunting for web shells after a public-facing app compromise, when EDR/SIEM alerts fire on webserver process anomalies, or during incident response on internet-facing infrastructure.

Hunts for stolen-session and OAuth/PRT token replay (T1550.001) by correlating Microsoft Entra ID SigninLogs SessionId/UniqueTokenIdentifier fields and Okta System Log sso/session events to spot impossible travel, refresh-token reuse, and token use from anomalous ASNs. Use when hunting MFA-bypass via stolen cookies/tokens, investigating impossible-travel alerts, or scoping SaaS lateral movement after phishing.

Guides implementing AES-256 encryption in GCM mode (FIPS 197) for files and data stores at rest, covering key derivation, IV/nonce management, and authenticated encryption. Use when deploying or configuring encryption for data at rest, establishing controls to meet compliance requirements, or reviewing an implementation during a security assessment.

'Implements strategies to reduce SOC alert fatigue by tuning detection

Guides designing, deploying, and measuring an anti-phishing security awareness program - baseline phishing simulations, interactive training modules, just-in-time learning, and metric tracking - using platforms like KnowBe4, Proofpoint Security Awareness, or Cofense. Use when building or maturing a phishing awareness program, establishing training controls for compliance, or measuring phishing susceptibility and reporting rates over time.

'Configures Windows Group Policy Objects to block ransomware execution

Implements API abuse detection using token bucket, sliding window, and

'Configures API gateways such as Kong, AWS API Gateway, Azure APIM,

'Implements secure API key generation with sufficient entropy, server-side

'Implements API rate limiting and throttling with token bucket, sliding

Implements API schema validation using OpenAPI Specification and JSON

Implements API Security Posture Management (API-SPM) to continuously

Implements API security testing on the 42Crunch platform, combining

Implements API threat protection using Google Apigee reverse-proxy

'Implements application whitelisting using Windows AppLocker to restrict

Deploy Aqua Security's Trivy scanner to detect vulnerabilities, misconfigurations,